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Ann Ferguson

This dissertation draws on the Aristotelian and contemporary communitarian belief
that

humans

are socially constituted, and analyzes the manifestations of this belief in

contemporary identity
politics.

self, I

While

I

politics

argue that

and

it is

in the

concept of ‘culture’ that often underlies identity

important to maintain a communitarian conception of the

depart from Aristotle and the communitarian tradition by rejecting the assumption

that a constitutive

community

is

characterized by unity and homogeneity.

identity politics has inherited both the virtues

Just as

communitarians claim

politics

have taken the self s

that the self is

identity to

I

then claim that

and the problems of communitarian theory.

never free from social constitution, so identity

be formed along lines of socially defined group

differences, and like communitarianism,

some

identity politics has entailed a call for unity.

In the case of identity politics, the requirement for

membership

in the

community may be

sharing certain essential characteristics of identity; difference can result in marginalization,

forced assimilation to the group norm, or expulsion. Because identity politics often relies

upon the concept of

‘culture’ to

When a community’s
culture, the

unity derives from

maintenance of the culture

closed off from changes as

come

to

ground group

it

its

itself

identities,

I

also

examine

this concept.

members understanding themselves

to share a

can be conservatizing; the culture can remain

preserves the “traditional” or “authentic”; furthermore,

be treated as an object outside of the people
vi

who

live

it

it

can

and as such the changing

lived realities of these people-particularly
changes that cross lines of identity-do not serve
to continually offer

new, changing, and ambiguous ways of conceiving
of what

between members of the community.

I

is

shared

argue for the development of group identity that

recognizes intersecting group differences, and can
permit hybridity or mixed identities.

end by suggesting

harming

its

that for a constitutive

members through

essence, or stagnation,

community

community

to

remain

truly constitutive without

marginalization, forced assimilation to a

members must

norm

or a shared

give up the sort of control that maintains the

as a unity.

vii
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INTRODUCTION

If not

with others,

how?

—Adrienne Rich

Who

are

my

people?”

is

a question which has surfaced frequently within the

discourse about strategies for resistance to oppression.
Asking the question, as well as
giving any answer to

it,

always a

is

conscious political choice about

upon

political matter.

how

politically relevant ideological

to

in itself

an understanding of what

it

is

to

way

have “a people”

is

my people?”

it

in the

one’s

own

act.

who

my people?”

sense about one’s political

life)

am

this

understanding will

is,

having a sense of collectivity

who

one’s “people”
is

to sort out

may

how

intersecting,

best to act in

indeed desirable. But

question (and thus trying to maintain a communitarian

categories, ethnic categories, or so on.

who

to one’s self.

be and to affirm them as

when one

refuses to answer by

endorsing distinct categories of identity, whether they be gender categories,

communities, people

oppressions can

question as one that makes sense implies that

proves problematic

as a problematic question by people

community

interested in reaching

resist interlocked

implies that to have such a communitarian sense

answering the “who are

I

hopes that

behooves one, as one struggles

the social and political world, to consider

consequences;

identities.

such a thing as having a people, that

Furthermore, asserting that

political

or another— and structuring one’s

be a purposeful political

both have “a people” and maintain complex

there

whether or not one makes a

assumptions and always has

provide a conceptual framework within which those

Posing the “who are

is,

answer the question, one’s answer always depends

furthermore, answering the question one

of sense accordingly— can

That

The “who

who

are

my

are marginals,

racial

people” question has been raised

on the edges or the outside of

recognize their community identifications as multiple,

and conflicting;

it

has been raised, for instance, by

1

women

of color and

Jewish
cultural

women

writing within the discourse of feminist
theory or the discourses of racial or

movements, when such theory assumes a simple
“we”: “we” who

“we” who

are

women

or

are Black, and so on. Listen, for instance,
to the following varied musings on

the complications of having “a people”:

Once when

my

I

walked

into a

room

eyes would seek out the one or two black faces

for contact or reassurance or a sign
I

was not alone

now walking
that

into

rooms

would destroy me

where

Once

shall
it

my eyes

was easy

to

of black faces

full

any difference

for

look?

know who were my

people.

--Audre Lorde (“Between”

In a troubled voice,

she died,

“my

“How

my

grandmother asked

can you

live so far

me

1

the last time

12)

I

saw her before

away from your people?”

In her mind,

people” were not synonymous with a mass of black people, but with

particular black folks that

fellowship, the folks with

one

is

connected to by

whom we

ties

of blood and

share a history, the folks

who

our

talk

talk (the patois of our region),

who know

Her comment silenced me.

My silent response was tacit agreement that

.

.

.

our background and our ways.

only misguided confused folks would live away from their people, their

own.
—bell hooks ( Yearning 90)

Oh,

I

would

entertain the thought of separation as really clean, the

components untouched by each

go away with

my own

ours! But then

own

I

other,

unmixed

people to our land to engage

ask myself

people, the only people

who my own
I

people

can think of as

would be

as they

in acts that

are.

my own

When

I

two

if I

were cleanly
think of

are transitionals,

liminals, borderdwellers, “world”-travellers, beings in the middle of
either/or.

-Maria Lugones

2

could

(“Purity” 469)

my

Liberals and pacifists often challenge
the notion of “one’s

own people.”
Liberals “don’t like labels”; pacifists
say, “face your enemies with love.”
Both say, “people are people.”

I

by specters of cattle cars packed

am

to the top

roots in the knowledge, as early as

who
no

think Jews are haunted-intelligently

I

with our people.

Some

of

so~

who

did not want us to exist-millions of them.
For these people, there

love. It’s easy for

me

I

can remember: there are people

to think in terms of

“my people” and

is

“our

enemies.”

-Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz ( 77 - 78 )

In asking

and trying

people” (politically speaking)
possibilities implied
to

answer the question of what

to

I

will, in this dissertation,

by the question;

that

take

is, I

it

that

might mean

to

a) affirm the

communitarian

it

both
it is

desirable to “have a people,”

have a collectivity from within which one constitutes one’s

meaning, and can engage

in resistance,

and b)

“have a

self,

reject accounts of

develops social

what

it is

to

“have a

people” which reify categories of identity or which depend upon the
illusion of unity within
socially constructed categories of identity, and
as interlocked.

I

which thus cannot countenance oppressions

will argue that while the implications of these

two

intentions

may

be

in

tension with one another, resisting domination calls for their resolution.
*

The question of what
different axes:

it

having a people

it

means

to

*

have a people arises out of two debates along

arises both out of a debate

at all)

*

between liberalism (which cannot countenance

and communitarianism; and out of a debate between

essentialist

accounts of identity and accounts which recognize oppressions as interlocked and identities
as inseparable mixtures.

While

I

will in later chapters discuss extensively

by liberalism and by communitarianism,

I

will say briefly here that

I

what

is

implied

take liberalism to

include a principle of non-interference in each individual’s freedom to choose his/her

conception of the good, and to include the belief that one’s values and ends are

in fact the

products of one’s private choices rather than the result of being socially constituted

3

own

amongst a people;
view of the moral
communitarian

take what

I

I

will call traditional

self as socially constituted or

self

is

always a

communitarianism

formed

in

self with certain values,

to

depend upon a

community, so the

never a choosing subject which

could exist prior to making a choice of values
or ends. The communitarian self cannot
be
understood without reference to there being “a
people” amongst and as one of
self is constituted.

While communitarianism provides a way of rejecting

individualism, the sense of
offers has tended to rely

whom the

liberal

community-of having a people-which communitarian

upon

their being

some shared

or

common

theory

among members

identity

of the community. Communitarian theory has portrayed
constitutive communities as
distinct

from one another, as clearly bounded, and as

internally

homogeneous-that

not cut across by group differences. Although contemporary
political

challenged some of the traditional communitarian notions of

some of the communitarian assumptions have been

community

is itself

movements have

who makes up

to recognize that

constituted within several communities, and that any given

cut across by relevant group differences. Political

are communitarian in the sense of their being

movements which

movements of particular peoples whose

identities are constituted together, not just of collections of individuals— for

women’s movement,
some

unity based on
on.

And

yet

when

differences, there
political

el

movimiento

is

is

is

I

unity

for

women, being Raza and
,

so

is

way

to

conceive of the “we” of a

taken to imply that no collectivity or

think this has been one effect of recent critiques of essentialism-

-many

feminists, for instance, have

up the

possibility of collectivity in feminist

crucial to the self; however,

example, the

Chicano movement), and so on-have called

the danger of being left without any

possible;

social

challenged by the recognition of intersecting group

movement. Lack of a priori

“peoplehood”

(the

essential characteristic of identity: being a

the unity

a community,

retained; significantly, the discourse

and practices associated with these movements have tended not

community members may be

as

is,

come

to think that rejecting essentialism

movement.

community must

My claim is that

community

not be bought by sacrificing

4

means giving

complex

is

identities, simplifying

them

into essential core identities.

having “a people” which does not make
will require

engage

in

needed

is

is

this fatal sacrifice. Vital political

de veloping a constitutive community

will require learning to

What

that is not

an account of

movement,

based on one unified

then,

identity;

it

meaning-making together without necessarily making

only one meaning.
Creating such a sense of collectivity while rejecting
both abstract individualism on
the one
first

hand and essentiahsm on the other requires walking
a

(individualist) option is seeing just anyone-regardless
of

-as equal candidates for being

ruling out

someone

line

all

between two options: the

features of social identity-

each other’s “people”; and the second

or including

someone automatically

speaking) just because of a feature of social identity.

I

as “one’s

(essentialist) option is

own”

(politically

hear echoes of the

option

first

in,

for instance, June Jordan s insistence that since
“partnership in misery does not necessarily

provide for partnership for change,”
the need that

we

find

Where

fuels political

of social

is

must instead be

between us” (“Report” 82) and

personal strength of what

she asks

it

we can do

the love?” (like

change has

for each other

“who

are

my

at least the possibility

that “the ultimate

that

we

connection must be

will be “carried there

one by one” (“Report”

by the

Elsewhere

84).

people?”) and answers that the love that

of developing anywhere, regardless of lines

identity:

If
I

I

am

a Black feminist serious in undertaking self-love,

should gain and gain and gain in strength so that

able and willing to love and respect, for example,
feminists, not professionals, not as old or as

have neither job nor income,

me

women who

that the strength that should

I

may

it

seems

as

I

are not Black.

all

men who

that

am,

are not

women who

And

it

seems

come from Black feminism means

can, without fear, love and respect

me

without fear be

women who

young

to

that

to
I

are willing and able,

without fear, to love and respect me. (“Where Is” 174-176)

The

first

option, then,

downplays

the relevance of the social constitution of identity, and

underestimates the effect that socially constructed features of identity (gender, race,

5

etc.)

have on forming our experiences, positions

we might

in the

world, perceptions, motivations, and,

say, possibilities of seeing each other
as “our

own .”

It

infers

from the claim

that

gender, race, and so on do not simply determine
our possibilities of solidarity that in fact
they have no bearing on

it

at all.

The second of the two options makes

the opposite assumption: race, gender,
and

other features of social identity do exhaustively
determine

Kaye/Kantrowitz expresses
Jordan’s question of

when she

“Where

Is

enemies

is

no

love.

It’s

my

as if she

“no,

it

is

are.

Melanie

answering June

cannot be just anywhere,”

did not want us to exist-millions of them. For

easy for

me

to think in

terms of ‘my people’ and ‘our

people’ are simply determined by a shared enemy.

two options, recognizing

developing a

new account

1

But beyond critiquing

the complexity of socially constituted identities requires

of what sort of constitutive community grounds the

possible to both affirm that there

is

a

“we” and yet refuse

self.

essentialist definitions of

Is

it

who

the

is?

As Marfa Lugones has
Bethel’s

“we”

who

our people

(77-78). This second option, then, takes the sharing of a
social identity to imply

too much:

“we”

It is

The Love?” by saying

writes: “there are people

these people, there

these

sentiment in places.

this

who

argued, white

“What Chou Mean We, White

women,” then

theorists’

response to Lorraine

Girl?” question has been to say that there can be no

to feminist theory; the response has

essentially

women

there can be no

been

that if the

“we”-no

“we”

is

not

“we who

are

collectivity to the politics of

feminism-

and we must instead speak only out of our own experience. This response solves “the

problem of difference”

in feminist theory

without solving the problem of their being a lack

of true solidarity in feminism, a solidarity which can happen only

Although

when white women

have used June Jordan’s and Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz’s words in illustrating the two options I
I have chosen represent only strands of their thoughts,
and not their whole positions. Each of them do express more ambivalence than I have shown them to
about who may or may not be among “their own.” I choose these particular passages not to critique each of
these authors, but to illustrate two different reactions to the “who are my people?” question.
described,

I

I

think that for each of them, the words

6

really see

women

there can be

of color (and similarly along other lines
of privilege).? The response that

no “we”

is

harmful;

it is

like saying to

anyone who does not have

their identity

completely exhausted within one distinct constitutive
community that they are sentenced
lonely individualism.
to

And

so

answer the question: who
I

then examine
I

the

clear to

at all;

I

me

that

it

is

important to ask and

first

begin with Aristotle’s account of the self as a social
animal and

amongst “a people,”
I

again

making sense of the concept of

some contemporary communitarians’ development of the

have been.

try

“we”?

then go on, having established that

constituted
self

is

becomes

attempt to do this in this dissertation by

"having a people"

people.”

it

to

to consider

it

makes sense

to think

idea of having “a

of the self as socially

what some problematic ways of describing

this

focus on the conceptions of “having a people” that have
been prevalent

within radical political movements, both to critique them and
to try to develop an account of

having a people

that

can ground the possibility for collective resistance

to oppressions as

interlocked.

^This

is

a loose interpretation of Lugones’ argument in

Ethics ed. Claudia Card. 35-44.
,

7

“The Logic of

Pluralist

Feminism”

in

Feminist

CHAPTER
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

I

AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY

A. Introduction
In developing an account of having
“a people”

oppressions as interlocked,

I

am going

place. Aristotelian ethical theory.

conviction that

it

I

to

who

are positioned to resist

begin in what might appear to be an unlikely

begin here because

I

want

to start

with a solid

does make sense to speak of having a people, of being
socially constituted

by a community or polis. Aristotle provides a thorough
account of what
constituted in this way, and his description of

community with

others

is

humans

it

means

to

be

as political animals constituted in

useful for a rejection of the liberal ideology that says
that there

is

no such thing as having a people. However, not just any conception
of having a people
will

do for thinking about how

Aristotelian theory in part to

to resist oppressions as interlocked.

draw on

it

and

in part to critique

Aristotelian version of having “a people”— that
I

can then complicate

this

is,

it;

I

thus begin with

by beginning with an

having fellow participants

account by asking in what ways

is

it

developing an account of constitutive community that does not erase such
*

his Politics

.

for

identities.

*

Nicomachean Ethics were intended

As he

as a necessary part of or prelude to

tells us,

... if politics

makes use of the other

should do and from what
this

*

polis—

inadequate for describing

complexly constituted, given intersecting group differences, and

social identities as

Aristotle’s

in a true

end must be the good

we
for

sciences, and also lays

should refrain,

its

man. For even

coincides with that of the individual,

it

is

if

end must include
the

theirs;

and

good of the community

clearly a greater

and more perfect

thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while

8

down what we

it

is

desirable to

secure what

good

is

people or a state
Such, then,
science

is

in the

aim of our

(NE 1094b5-l

In keeping with fineness

something finer and more sublime.

[polis] is

the

case of an individual, to do so in the case
of a

investigation;

and

it

is

a kind of political

l). 3

and sublimeness, then,

this

chapter

is

a political reading of the

Nicomachean Ethics

My assumption is that one
we must

look

at his ethical

theory for

theory with an understanding of
just a

my

comment about how

must read

political implications,

its

how

it

Aristotle’s ethical

is

and

political

and look

works together;

at his political

informed by his view of morality. This

these two works of Aristotle’s should be read; rather,

is

it

not

reflects

recognition that politics are informed by morality, and that
questions of morality are

always

To

political.

read the Ethics as something other than a grounding for a
political

theory, or to look at the Politics without an understanding
of Aristotle’s ethical theory

would be

More

to depoliticize morality

precisely,

it

would be

and

to pretend that politics

to claim that

one could somehow construct a

form of political organization) not based on any

and

politics

can and should remain neutral on the question of the good;
because

every arrangement of the
sees the

two

Aristotle,

As

I

that the state

liberal theory sees ethics

and

however (and

I

agree with him on this point),

His political theory, then, suggests the impossibility of the

which according

to liberal theory has

members’ conceptions of the good or on

human

by imagining

any other

denies the fact that particular conceptions of the good inform

state. 4

as inseparable.

liberal state, the state

it

state (or

particular conception of the good.

will point out, liberal theory tries to separate ethics

politics as separable

can be empty of moral content.

no influence or effect on

its

the possibility of attaining this or that version of

flourishing.

All references to the

Nicomachean Ethics except where otherwise
,

noted, are from the J.A.K.

Thomson

translation.

4 See, for
instance, John Rawls’ argument in

A Theory of Justice

,

where he intends

for the state not to be

based on any particular given conception of the good; he stipulates that parties in the “original position,”
who deliberate about the best form for society, do not know what their conceptions of the good are. The

form of society they decide upon

is

supposedly not based on any particular conception of the good.
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am

I

theory

interested in Aristotle politically because

potentially useful for political theorists

is

directed towards questions of community.

himself does not take his theory

who

I

think that his ethical and political

are radical

and whose radicalism

is

say potentially useful because Aristotle

I

in the direction

of what

I

would

call a radical construction

of community, of communities that would strive to
be free from relations of domination

and subordination and
Aristotle

s

extreme inegalitarianism and

problematic for radicals

can question Aristotle

and

at

same time

the

would promote

that

who oppose

the full and varied flourishings of all

his reliance

hierarchy and

upon homogeneity makes him

who

respect diversity.

quite

However, one

inegalitarianism and his refusal to recognize or encourage
diversity

s

find

much

that is valuable in his theory for radical thinking
about

community.
I

be looking, then,

will

at several

components of Aristotle’s

ethical theory that

have

important political implications and that are valuable claims for radical
communitarians.
will consider, for instance, his recognition of the sociality of

human

argument

members of a polis must

that the

purpose of a polis

is

the

good

life

a conception of the good so that they might aim at

it

and

that

together;

and

existence; his

his belief that

virtue

depends upon the passions, which are constructed or trained

polis.

I

I

share

moral

in the context

of the

will argue that these claims could serve as a basis for thinking about the following

important question (which Aristotle, of course, does not address):

group of people

form what

who

Aristotle

are diverse with respect to their experiences

would

call a true

polis- that

is,

a

community

how

is it

possible for a

and social locations
that

is

to

not a mere

conglomeration of separate individuals, but rather one where human flourishing or the

good

life is

the

aim of the community?

I

will consider

how

Aristotle avoids seeing this as a

relevant question in part because he fails to see a certain sort of diversity within the

committed

species; he

is

species, so

members of the human

ultimate

good

for

man,

to the claim that

that

is,

human

one has an essential purpose as a member of a

species

all

eudaimonia.

have one purpose, which

is

to attain the

Meanwhile, however, he only takes
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certain

people to be fully

human and

his considerations of the

well-trained

free

to therefore

good

have the possibility of reaching eudaimonia.

then, Aristotle feels justified in only
addressing certain

life,

whom Aristotle

men, those

already considers to be most disposed

towards moral virtue and therefore most capable
of reaching eudaimonia.
Aristotle has not conceived the polis to be
a place

the question of
are excluded

what the good

is,

from participation

different social locations

for those

may have

among

where

who may

in politics.

It is

is

differ

over

on the question of the good

life

not relevant, for Aristotle, that people in

significant homogeneity.

the political participants in a

politically contested in order for

will argue that

I

political struggle takes place

different conceptions of the good, for

participants in political affairs there

heterogeneity

In

community

members of a community

It is

that

among

when

the

there

is

what the good

or polis to

come

is

must be

to a shared

understanding of the good towards which they might strive together.

B. Political Animals

One of Aristotle’ s most central
animal [politikon zoon
that he

]

does not even consider someone

need because he

is

state [polis]" (Pol

“.

.

.

he

who

that this

oneself alone living a solitary

good

“By

life,

is

is

is

is

man

is

by nature a

political

so strongly committed to this claim
if

he does not

live in political

unable to live in society, or

must be

1253a 27-29). Aristotle

sense of the self involved here:

who

either a beast or a god; he

is

has no

no part of a

looking, in the Ethics for the supreme good
,

something “self-sufficient.” But he has a social

self-sufficient

we mean

not what

is

sufficient for

but something that includes parents, wife and children,

friends and fellow-citizens in general; for

^ All

the claim that

be quite human

to

sufficient for himself,

man, and recognizes

is

(Pol 1253al-2). 5 Aristotle

relation with others; he writes,

for

claims

man

is

by nature a social being” (NE 1097b8-

references to the Politics are from the Benjamin Jowett translation.
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12).

for a

His search

man

in the Ethics for

to be flourishing in

While

liberal theorists

what human flourishing

is,

then,

is

a search for what

is

it

community .^

may assume

that a state is

formed because

self-interested

individuals rationally arrive at the belief
that by forming a state they can
better achieve their

individual self-interests, 7 Aristotle

is

clear that this does not accurately
characterize the

motivation for forming a polis-, the sociality of
practical

need

for

one another. As he says

existence, originating in the bare needs of

good

life” (Pol

human

existence

in the Politics,

life,

1252b 28-30). Because man

is

.

and continuing

.

is

deeper than humans'

the state \polis)

comes

in existence for the

a political animal, “men, even

into

sake of a

when

they do

not require one another's help, desire to live
together” (Pol 1278b20-21). Aristotle's

account of the polis

One could argue
argument

that

in the Politics indicates that

Book X,

that the ultimate

he has a sense of the importance and

chapters 7-8 of the Ethics stand

good

for

man can

in contradiction to Aristotle’s earlier
only be attained in a polis. In these chapters he claims
that

the contemplative life is in fact the happiest life (NE
1 177al2-19 and 1 177bl5-25)
and that “the wise man
can practice contemplating by himself’ (NE 1 177a34-35).
Aristotle admits that “no doubt he [the wise
man] does it better with the help of fellow-workers,” but maintains
that “for all that he is the most selfsufficient of men” (NE
177a35-bl), seemingly employing a different sense of “self-sufficient”
than he does
earlier (NE 1097b8-12). Aristotle does call into question,
however, whether the contemplative life
1

is

a

human

life

or whether

it

is

claims here that moral virtue
1

1

divine, requiring of

humans

that

we

“put on immortality”

(NE

1

truly

177b35); he

secondary

precisely because “activities in accordance with it are human”
also writes that the contemplative life “will be too high for human
attainment; for any
lives it will do so not as a human being but in virtue of
something divine within

78a8- 1 0).

man who

is

(NE

He

him” (NE

177b26-28).

He

does, on the other hand, argue that contemplation “will be the perfect
happiness for man"
(NE 1 177b23-24), and although he thinks contemplation requires that we “put on immortality,”
he says
this in the context of arguing that “we ought not to listen to
those who warn us that ‘man should think the
thoughts of man,’ or ‘mortal thoughts fit mortal minds’” and that we should “do all that
we can to live in
1

conformity with the highest [i.e. the divine element] that is in us” (NE 1 1 77b3 1 - 178al).
So he seems to
be arguing both that the contemplative life is not a truly human possibility and that we
should try to live
the life of contemplation in spite of its being in the realm of the divine, for the divine
element is within us.
In any case, we can see that it is debatable whether or not, even in these chapters, Aristotle
is maintaining
that human happiness is attainable only in a polis. And, it is clear throughout the rest
of the Ethics that he
1

community is what makes the good life possible, and that self-sufficiency cannot mean
For instance, he asserts that “it is also surely paradoxical to represent the man of perfect

thinks that the
solitude.

happiness as a solitary; for nobody would choose to have all the good things in the world by himself,
because man is a social creature and naturally constituted to live in company. Therefore the happy man also
has this quality. ... It follows, therefore, that the happy man needs friends” (NE 169b 18-23). It is
1

beyond the scope of this paper to fully discuss the inconsistencies between Book X, chapters 7-8 and the
rest of the Ethics I am, throughout this paper, favoring Aristotle’s claims that self-sufficiency is a social
state and that human flourishing is attainable only in community.
;

7

In much contract theory, this is the standard reason given for why humans form a state. See Hobbes’
Leviathan chapter 14; Locke’s Second Treatise of Government chapter 8, § 95; or Rousseau’s The Social
,

Contract

.

,

Book

liberalism), also

I,

chapter

makes

2.

John Rawls,

in

A

Theory of Justice

similar assumptions about

human
12

(a central text for

society (chapter

1).

contemporary

centrality of the relations

between members of a polls. Members of
a polls have

which can be characterized

as a type of friendship, although
the intensity of the friendship

between fellow-citizens may or may not be
high (NE
friendship, Aristotle mentions that
“friendship also

communities together” (NE
sort

of a

1167b
there

friendly feeling,

2-3).

is

relations

He

155a22-23).

1

as “friendship

159b25-l 160a8). In discussing

1

seems

be the bond that holds

to

describes concord (or unanimity), which

between the

citizens of a state [polls]"

A pohs is not just a gathering of people with no relation between

(

is

a

NE

them, then;

expected to be friendliness between citizens:
“friendship and justice seem ...

to

be

exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and
between the same persons; because in every

community

(NE

1

terms

there

is

supposed

159b 25-28). In
is

this

to

be some kind of justice and also some friendly
feeling”

way, Aristotle’s polls

is

neither like

what

in

contemporary

called a state nor a city; the contemporary term
‘community’ better connotes the

presence of the sort of relations that are indicated by Aristotle's
use of the term
Ideally,

members of a polls (and

here Aristotle refers only to citizens;

are not a part of the polis, although they are necessary for
citizens of a state [polis] are to judge

must know each

enough

it

9

and

to distribute offices

other's characters” (Pol

1326b 15- 17). The

in size that citizens all

know one

when

another, for

all

)

8 For

this reason.

However,

I

will

know one

slaves

another: “if the

polis, thus,

must be small

this is not the case,

When

“both the

the population

clearly ought not to be” (Pol

is

very

1326b 17-

sometimes use the term ’community’ as a parallel term to Aristotle's ’polis.
from one another. For instance, 'community' is seldom

’

the terms are also quite different

considered to be a unit of political organization the

more

which

women and

according to merit, then they

election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong.
large they are manifestly settled at haphazard,

'polls .' 8

interested in the possibilities for the

deep

way

a state

is.

However,

as will

become

clear,

I

am

and social relations which we find in communities
than 1 am in the political structure of (liberal) states. For this reason, I am interested in the ways that
Aristotle's theorizing about the polis is relevant to issues of community, rather than issues about the state.
9 For
instance, note that Aristotle claims that “.
in a state [polis] or any other combination forming a
political

.

unity not everything

is

a part, which

is

.

a necessary condition.

property, even though living beings are included in

.

.

.

And

so states require property, but

my
And elsewhere he states, “a slave is a living possession [i.e. a piece of property]” Pol
1253b31). He also states that a polis is a “community of equals,” ( Pol 1328a37) and clearly, slaves and
citizen class women are not the equals of citizen men; thus, slaves and citizen class women cannot be
it .

is

emphasis).

considered to be a part of

no part of a state” (Pol 1328a 21-36,

(

this

community of equals.
13

A polls

20). ">

territory.

live in

To

not just a collection of living
beings

It is

to or association with

one another;

pohs more than just

328a37-38).

is

the polls be

As

I

that the

He emphasizes

this point:

embedded

made up of equals,

at the

“a state [polls]

in these claims,

2) that these

purpose of the polls (and what

will suggest,

all

good life-which they can aim

“a community of equals, aiming

highlight several points

and 3)

to say

more than

that they

have significant

members of a polls

a collection of people residing in
proximity;

but a union of them sufficing for the purposes
of life”

)

is

rather, they

not just the fact that there are relations
between

claims that a polls

1

reside within a certain

all

one another.

these people share an aim-the

1

who

say that a collection of people
constitute a polls

some proximity

relations to

the

is

one of the reasons

is

also the fact that

for only as a polls.

best

life

(Pd

members

Aristotle

possible” (Pol

1

328b

1

6- 1 7).

that Aristotle is

are aiming at)

that Aristotle requires that there

would

I

members of the polls have

its

make

not a mere aggregate of persons,

is

namely

it

that

like to

demanding

that

a shared aim,

is

the

good

life.

be a community of

equals could be that he believes that without this there
cannot be true friendship— the

deepest kind of relation that there
implication of his claim that

is.

I

will also discuss

members of a polis aim

they must share a conception of what the good
It is

counted as

what Aristotle considers

together at the

to

be the

good life-namely,

that

life is.

possible that Aristotle’s motivation for requiring that the only people
to be
lull

members of the polis be

free

can only be the desirable degree of depth
basis for political

3),

and the best

see

how

community

sort

is

(i.e.

not slave)

men

lies in his belief that there

to the association if this

a sort of friendship

(NE

1 1

is

met.

55a22-23; 1 59b25-28;

of friendship takes place between good

Aristotle’s description of a polis as a

requirement
1

men (NE

1

1

If the

167b2-

156b7-24), one can

“community of equals, aiming

at the

best

life

possible” (Pol 1328a37-38) might spring from his desire for there to be significant
1

°Similar claims have been

made by communalist

anarchists, who argue for politics being done on a local
between all members of a political community. See, for
instance, Colin Ward’s “The Organization of Anarchy” in Patterns of Anarchy or Murray Bookchin’s “A
Note on Affinity Groups” in Post Scarcity Anarchism

enough

level so that there can be relations

,

.
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relations— friendships— between citizens,
and for these citizens to have the possibility
of

aiming for the good

life

together.

I

requirement that deep association
likeness (or,

more

point out here
this is

is

will look later at

what

I

take to be problematic about his

(that of friendship, including
fellow-citizenship) require

precisely, like goodness, or likeness and
goodness).

that his motivation for

such a requirement

may

I

want

to

be, in part, his belief that

necessary for the purpose of achieving depth in
the sense of community (the

relations with others)

which

constitutes the polls.

that likeness is required for such

deep

relations,

I

While

will reject Aristotle’s

I

relations

which constitute the

whose organizing

association.

principle

that sense, constitute a polis

argument

will agree with Aristotle that an

association should count as a polis (or a community)
just in case there

city

What

A liberal state

is

depth to the

(such as the U.S. or any state or

liberalism, including abstract individualism) does not,
in

is

because

it

prohibits the sort of depth of relations that consists

of understanding oneself to be morally formed in relation
to others rather than choosing

one

values by exercising an individual will.

s

Aristotle, there are

humans)

goods

humans

for

that are attainable only in

So

1

(Aristotle

I

start

with this point of agreement with

would more

likely say “a

good”

for

community; theorizing about human flourishing should

involve thinking about someone attaining such flourishing in a social context,
in a fabric of
relations to others.

1

'This critique of liberalism will be

consider the example of Rawls’
principles of justice

individual

member

A

much more

which are meant
to,

fully

Theory of Justice
to

developed in the next chapter. Briefly, though,
which parties to the “original position” elect

in

ensure that the institutions of their society will allow each

as fully as possible, pursue their individual conceptions of the good.

institutions are not intended to, nor

do they guarantee,

Such

member

of society could hold and pursue
collectivity (or the social constitution of self-identity) as a conception of the good— for such a good is not
conceivable as a product of individual choice. It is not among the “primary social goods” that the principles

of justice are aimed

at

maximizing.

that a

Furthermore, institutions based on the conception of justice— of

individuals’ approaching one another through a
possibility of relations like friendship.

Justice

,

framework of rights and justice-may actively inhibit the
Michael Sandel argues this point in Liberalism and the Limits of

p. 35.
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Aimin g Together

C.
I

That

is

for the polis

is,

the purpose of the polis

counts as a polis
is

ife

I

depends upon our being able

to give

an account of

flourishing-or, one might say, that politics
depends upon ethics

particular understanding(s) of

also

Good

also begin with another assumption
that Aristotle shares: that considerations
of

what the best form

human

at the

if

there

of

its

intercourse of

members.

men

the fact that there

humans. Just as an association only

for

is

to the relations of

concerns

it

itself

its

members, so an association

with the virtue, including the justice and

Aristotle illustrates this point

by contrasting the

with that of other “gregarious” animals: the difference

is

1).

and promote human flourishing(s), given some

what the good

some depth

is

not truly a polis unless

injustice,

to create

is

(NE 1094b5-l

social

lies, in part, in

moral content to the social relations between men, while there

is

not for

other animals:

Now,

that

man

is

more of a

gregarious animals
vain,

and

man

is

speech. ... the

is

political

animal than bees or any other

we

evident. Nature, as

the only animal

power of speech

whom she
is

often say,

has

makes nothing

endowed with

man

and unjust, and the

that

like,

an association

is

and vice of its members--then

polis.

Aristotle writes:

Those who care
in states.

for

Whence

(

Pol 1253a 7-18,

it is

not a truly

human

good government take

it

may be

is,

political

of just

community,

further inferred that virtue

without

end the community becomes a mere

truly so called,

16

this

my emphasis).

that

into consideration virtue

which

this

evil,

is

without concern for the

state [polis]

is

it

and the association of living beings who have

constructed without moral content-that

virtue

And

he alone has any sense of good and

sense makes a family and a state \polis 1
If

the gift of

intended to set forth the expedient and

inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.
characteristic of

in

must be

is,

a

and vice

the care of a

and not merely enjoys the name; for
alliance

which

differs only

in place

from alliances of which the members

convention.
(Pol

1

.

.

and has no

real

power

to

make

live apart;

the citizens

citizens to be

its

must be a particular conception of the human
good toward which
concern

itself

with the project of directing

conception of moral excellence and flourishing
would
a polls, an association cannot just leave

its

society, having a

for the sake of

common

that

it

it

is

concern
of

its

is

exchange” (Pol 1280b30-32).

po ssible

d esirable
itself

with the

fail to truly

be a polls;

in this respect,

“It is clear that

liberal political theory,

under such a neutral

moral

there

A polls

the polls aims.

in order to

be

doing nothing but

a state [polls]

In agreeing with Aristotle

for the state to remain neutral

to live

good and just,

is

not a

place, established for the prevention of mutual
crime and

going against two major assumptions of
that 1)

good and just

citizens towards a particular

its

members alone

keeping members from interfering with one another.

mere

only a

is

280b4- 11).

In order for a polls to serve the
purpose of enabling

that failed to

and law

state

on

this point,

am

namely the assumptions

on the question of the good

state, rather

I

life

community

than in a

and

that

2)

does

and with the possibility of “happiness” or flourishing

members.
There

is

a connection between believing that humans are, in a strong sense,
social

beings and believing that the state/community/po/A should act to promote a
particular sort

of

human

refrains

flourishing.

from

meddling

in

It is

only

when one

thinks of the state as an entity that at

interfering in individual affairs that

one imagines

any individual's conception of the good

state is a state

of

members of the

is,

lives, to

human

believing that the self

A

neutral

prevent

which involve

other’s virtues and vices and thus with each

flourishing.

is

best

away from

flourishing.

state rather than to foster relations

members concerning themselves with each
other’s possibilities of attaining

as staying

human

designed to (supposedly) keep out of individuals'

interference between

existence-that

life,

it

its

Having a more

social sense of

human

constituted in relation to others-leads one to

want more than non-interference, more than

neutrality,

from a community.

Aristotle does

believe that our selves are constituted or formed differently depending upon the social

17

context

we

we

are in; for instance, our moral
dispositions develop differently in contexts

are permitted to engage in vicious acts
than they

perform virtuous

(NE

1

acts;

it is

do

in contexts

we

our selves, attention to the form and values of
the community

interference

we

from the

are required to

the constitution of the polis that affects
our moral constitution

103al4-l 103b26). Assuming that the social
context

context in which

where we

where

are in serves to constitute

is

attention to the social

ourselves are constituted. Thus, rather than
demanding nonstate or

community,

does form us morally and that given

this,

would

I

it is

like to

active

recognize that the community

engagement

independence from) the constitution of the community

in (rather than

that allows

one agency

in one’s

own

moral formation.

What

the values of the

the reasoning to construct a
thrive in it— should be, as

I

ground, and the politics of
it

depends on

good.

As

I

who

the

community are-and what conception of the good

community

such a

it

depend on who gets

members of the polis

are

to

It

come

how

might

should be politically contested

to the table to discuss

and what informs

does not consider

he does not consider

how

inform their conception of the good and thus

it.

That

to hold

their conception of the

the political contestation of the

how

different groups of political participants

opposed conceptions of the good.

I

will consider later

good

what

the effects

as politically contested.

What

to point out here is that, unlike liberal theorists, Aristotle at least is after a polis

acknowledged

to

promote the continued development and enactment of that conception of the good. At
is,

to

be designed according

for Aristotle,

meant

to

to a particular

I

which

is

least the polis

is,

people’s different social locations might

are of Aristotle's refusal to see the conception of the

want

that this or that kind of person

place, largely because he does not allow that political participants could

differ significantly, so

may come

way

will argue, contested ground.

will argue, Aristotle

good might take

in

underlies

conception of the good and meant

be a training ground for [some] humans

to

develop

moral excellence and experience happiness or flourishing. For contemporary radicals who
are communitarians, Aristotle's idea of the polis
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may

be

in

many ways

a better starting

point than the liberal state: a state that
does not acknowledge itself to be aiming
particular conception of goodness or
happiness.

The

failure to

acknowledge

at

any

that the state

is

not neutral but rather does effect
members’ moral constitutions leads believers of liberal

ideology to

concerns

fail to

itself

with the virtue and vice of

engagement and

human

see the importance of active engagement
in determining
its

insist that the state is not

flourishing.

The

members; they cannot both

way; as

is

it

call for

conceived by

of course

it

fails to

liberal theorists,

it

is

I

am

some

particular conception of the

starting then, with Aristotle, with the social self

knowing what conception(s) of the good
construction of a
in the

community

or polls.

I

community or polls —rather than

life— of

human

good

carry out this

not truly the

social realm, the realm of relations with others
recognized to be the context in

selves are forming according to

the state

concerned with promoting some version of

liberal state is intended (although

intention) to stay out of our

how

which our

life.

and with a concern for

flourishing— should inform the

share the belief that

it is

in the

realm of the social-

in individuals' private lives that the question

of

moral excellence and of human flourishing should be addressed.

D. The Training of the Passions

One
about

is

additional claim of Aristotle's that radical communitarians ought to be excited

the claim that our emotions can and should be influenced

differently in different social contexts.

Such a claim supports the notion

socially constructed rather than “natural,”

desires

which stand against

constructed there

is

by reason and be trained
that, desires

being

one has the possibility of ridding oneself of

radical transformation of the status quo, for if desires are

the possibility of their being reconstructed differently in a different

social context; so, for instance,

with a conception of the good

one can attempt

in

to

change one’s desires

which one believes, by attempting

context which constructs one’s desires.

I

will look,
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now,

at

how

to

to

be

in

accordance

change the

social

Aristotle conceives of the

training of desrre

by looking

at the role that

des.re and reason play in moral
excellence for

him.

An

action, for Aristotle, can only be a

good action

reason and in accordance with the right desire.

which determine
this clear

its

when he

rightness, but rather

because they have a certain quality, but only

if

he knows what he

it,

does

it

doing, 2)

if

he chooses

cannot be the efficient cause of an action, for
this, in

thinking about

how

to

was chosen

for the right

not the consequences of an action

done

in a just or

temperate

makes

way merely

the agent also acts in a certain state, viz.

and chooses

from a fixed and permanent disposition” (NE

Because of

it

the character of the agent. Aristotle

it is

states, “virtuous acts are not

is

It is

if

it is

1

it

for

its

own

sake, and 3)

1) if

he

if

105a30-34). Right reason alone

desire that

moves humans

to act.

produce a right action, one must think about the

desirative faculty of the soul. Right desire alone can
be the efficient cause of an action,

but not of a

good

action, for an action

be a right action only

(NE
in

1 1 1

lb4-l

our power”

1

if it is

may be

voluntary but not chosen, and an action can

a chosen action, and choice requires both reason and desire

12a 18). Aristotle defines choice as “a deliberate appetition of things that

(NE

1 1

lie

13al0-12). Reaching the point of choosing a right action, then,

requires both right reason and right desire.

Thus according
desire there can be

to Aristotle

no good

alone cannot compel us to
the right things. That

action.

act),

is, it is

one must be concerned with

Since pleasure compels us to do things (and reason

one must be concerned with whether one

not enough to

pleasure at the thought of doing

desire, for without proper

it

know what

the right action

so that one feels the desire to do

speaking of training oneself to be virtuous, one
properly feel desire.
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is

it

feels pleasure at

is;

(NE

one must
II, iii ).

really speaking of training in

feel

Thus

how

to

in

Training the desires
exercise of which one can

one

u-m

to

is

a matter of influencing them through
rationality-through the

know what

actions are right (but which, by

do those actions)~and then acting on them repeatedly

One must tram

).

the desires, for the

stands against the passions

(i.e.

serve to lead one towards the

apparent good

wish” (Met

1

is

wrong

desires

is

man

i.e.

in

of good character

good

is

the primary object of rational

(NE

every situation what appears to him
if

is

man

the truth”

13a24-30). Properly

Thus a
is

right action is the

properly trained or

“judges every situation

(NE

feeling the passions correctly
is

1 1

desirative faculty

105b5-8). Such a

1

control, then (assuming that right desire

1 1

13a29-30).

were not

in one’s

necessary for right action) moral theory could be

nothing more than a description of which people are virtuous and which are not.
if

one

is

II

-

only the apparent good

is

(NE

important to notice that

It is

(NE

072327-29).! 2 Thus untrained (or improperly trained)
desires might lead one

which would be committed by a man whose

rightly;

habit

continent or incontinent)-

trained desire leads one to pursue the right ends, the
real good.

healthy, a

become

until they

move

Aristotle states in the Metanhvsics “the

the object of appetite, and the real

toward the wrong end, toward what

action

cannot

may-depending on how one

depending on whether one

wrong end. As

itself,

It is

only

taking the training of the passions to be in a person’s control that one can take

moral theory

to

their character.

be prescriptive, and

it

is

responsible for, one can

the actions that

only then that one can hold people responsible for

Setting aside the question of whether Aristotle's classification of actions as

voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary

someone

is

is

justified as a basis for deciding

still

which actions

agree with Aristotle that one's character (and thus

one chooses because of one's character)

is

something for which one

is

responsible.

The sense of responsibility
not train our desires

man's character
*

2 W.D.

Ross

is

all

here, however,

is

not an individualistic one; since

by ourselves, but rather do so

understood to be his

own

in the social

responsibility only

translation.
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if

we do

context of the polis, a

one understands “his

own
polis

mean

to

is

his

own

res Ponsible for

social self-his self in

making
taking

in states” (Pol

their citizens

him

to

relation to others.

each man's character; there

Aristotle claims that “those

and vice

its

who

is

a collective responsibility.

in

them

(NE

the proper habits

1

103b3-5),

I

am

be saying that the polis has the responsibility of
forming each member’s

good statesmen

the true statesman

this subject [the nature

abiding people

(NE

men whose

train the desires;

1

When

1280b5-6) and when he asserts that good legislators
play the role of

good by developing

actions. Aristotle sees

character,

whole

care for good government take into
consideration virtue

moral character, of developing each member’s habits so

characters:

In this sense, the

man who

of virtue]; for he wants to

1 1

by the proper

as taking responsibility for fellow-citizens’
moral

thought of as a

is

that they are pleased

make

has taken special pains to study

his fellow-citizens

good and law-

02a8- 1 0). Thus questions of morality— of producing

desirative faculties are healthy— become questions of

and these are questions

to

be addressed as a polis

(cf.

NE

men

how

of good

to properly

179b32-

1

180b27).

Because men
with

its

members’

s

dispositions are formed through habit, the polis must concern itself

activities

and the habits

acquired through practice, and thus
to practice.

“We become just by

it

polis

performing just

(NE

intention of every legislator, and those
the difference

Aristotle sees

it,

its

temperate by performing temperate

members

to

members

is

either

aim

at the right

whereas a

produce members with

acts will

good by habituation;

their citizens

not carry

for courage,

it

out

fail

this is the

of their object. This

between a good constitution and a bad one”

a constitution

members

its

103b 1-2). So, for instance, a polis whose

who do

polis with such a constitution are trained.

habituating

acts,

enact cowardly activities will not train these

courageous dispositions. “Legislators make

As

1

whose members must perform courageous

what makes

through them. Habits are

matters what sort of acts a polis allows

ones, brave by performing brave ones”

members can

that are acquired

(

NE

1

103b

is

3-6).

good or bad depending on how members of a

A polis with

a

good by acting
22

good
in

constitution

is

accordance with

one which
virtue.

is

Implied by

this is the

constitution of

to feel pleasure at the

proper things

is

a matter of

lives.

One can
one

members. Learning

its

and these habits are acquired depending on the
constitution of the polis under which

habit,

one

claim that the constitution of a polis has
an effect on the emotional

think of Aristotle’s polis, then, as a training
ground, a context in which

desires are trained in accordance with

s

this in

contemporary terms,

feel the passions

amounts

Aristotle's

some

particular conception of the good.

claim that the polis

to the important idea (central to

is

a training ground for

much

To

put

how we

feminist and other political

theory) that desires are socially constructed, and that
the particular institutions of a society

construct our desires in particular ways. Since desires are
socially constructed, the claim

continues,

we can

reconstruct our desires by changing the social setting which
forms or

informs our desires. So, for instance, emotions that people have
been trained to
misogynist and racist society are not

As Alison Jaggar

puts

it

in

in her article

feel in a

accordance with a feminist conception of the good.

“Love and Knowledge”:

Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values

that

predominate tend to

serve the interest of the dominant group. Within a capitalist, white

supremacist, and male-dominant society, the predominant values will tend
to serve the interests

of rich white men. Consequently,

we

are

all

likely to

develop an emotional constitution quite inappropriate for feminism.

Whatever our

color,

we

are likely to feel

what Irving Thalberg has called

“visceral racism”; whatever our sexual orientation,

homophobic; whatever our

class,

we

The emotions

we

somewhat

are likely to feel

contempt

women. (159)

that a society trains us to experience are those

society’s status

are likely to be

are likely to be at least

ambitious and competitive; whatever our sex,
for

we

quo version of

the

human good— a

members of society from ever experiencing
our emotional constitution

in particular

the

emotions that support

version that

good

life.

may exclude

certain

Jaggar continues, “[b]y forming

ways, our society helps
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that

to ensure its

own

perpetuation" (159). However,

if

emotions can be trained and re-trained, then
there

reason to reorganize society so that

ends which

we

can endorse, which

it

emotions

fosters

may

very well

that will lead us to act in pursuit
of

mean

conception of the good that informed the community

is

in

acting in resistance to the

which we had formerly been

“trained.”

What

how much

this points to is

is at

change the constitution of the polis - or the

stake

institutions

will serve to tram our emotional constitutions.
in

which one engages— the

As

polis- which form in us certain dispositions, that

pleasure at this or that thing. Aristotle argues

produce

form from

So

that will

tries to

is

it

the earliest

is,

which form

the activities

is

in us the habits

their characteristics that

(NE

1

little

that desires

of feeling

activities a

importance what sort of habits

vast difference, or rather

all

we

the

103b21-26).

institutions

when one

and practices

making decisions about how one wants

is

in a

determine the resulting

then, can be purposeful in the sense that

comprise a community, one

an important claim for people

it, it

Hence we must give our

change the constitution of a polis, or the

be constructed. The claim

community-which

that:

age— it makes a

difference in the world

decides upon or

in a

Aristotle conceives

a matter of no

it is

The construction of desires,

deciding upon or trying to

and practices

like dispositions.

certain quality, because

dispositions.

is

which are condoned or encouraged or required

activities

like activities

when one

desires to

can be purposefully constructed and reconstructed

who want

to radically

is

change the way we have been

constituted by the current institutions and practices of our society, a society which has

developed

in

most of its members emotions such

as greed

and possessiveness, jealousy,

the desire to control or be controlled, a deference to authority, an aesthetic appreciation of a

very small range of body types, and so on;

emotions are natural and not changeable.

makes no sense
habit,

it

to call

it

‘natural.’

this

If

claim goes against the argument that such

something can be changed by habituation,

Since, as Aristotle argues, moral goodness

cannot be said that any particular moral
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state is a natural one:

is

it

a result of

“none of the moral

virtues in
to

or

engendered

in

us by nature, since nothing that

behave differently by habituation” (NE

community should

members should

take

community aim at?»that

is

train

striving towards this conception of the

good

to investigate

might be done

by nature can be made

is

what

sort

of emotional constitution

is,

should

how

what conception of the good

really asking:

we

go on

it

develop. In considering what the emotional
constitution of the

of a community should be, one

will

what

103al8-20). The question of what form a
polls

1

tied to the question of

is

is

our emotions so that
life

we

life

its

members
should the

feel pleasure at

or at that conception of the good life?

Aristotle has determined

what the good

life is,

and how

I

this

differently.

E. Consulting with Aristocrats

commits himself to

Aristotle
his character is

on him (NE

1

formed

in

to be a particular

the conclusion that

is

order to construct a

particular conception of the

happens

to

of

human

good

it

is

man whose
life.

men

is

brought up

in,

possible to purposely set up a particular

character will be in accordance with a

Aristotle thus

acknowledges

man was

life.

Thus when

must acknowledge
particular idea of

chapter

it

is

is

the

this or that

conception

based on a particular conception

men who have been

men

to

be his students, he

trained in accordance with a

be morally virtuous.

will look at the passages in the Ethics

iv,

ways depending on

in particular

Aristotle calls for “well-trained”

to

just so

trained in a certain way, one should not be surprised

that he is calling for

what

nobody

and these circumstances can be purposely arranged so

that he has desires that reflect this training— training that

I

that

with desires that lead them to act in accordance with

flourishing. If a

of the good

the particular influences

that different upbringings result in

have certain desires: desires are constructed

circumstances one
as to create

way-in accordance with

103b 1-6). One implication of the claim

different characters

upbringing

the claim that a man's desires are trained— and thus
that

Aristotle writes:
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where Aristotle does

this.

In

Book

I,

We

must

known
is

start

to us

known

from what

is

known. But things

known

are

to us.

So

if

anyone wants

political science generally,

make

to

two

in

and known absolutely. Presumably we must

start

senses:

from what

a serious study of ethics, or of

he must have been well trained

(NE

in his habits.

1095b 1-6)
In this passage, Aristotle recognizes that he
cannot begin with a universal as a

principle, but

must begin with what

will problematize in a

What

reasons. His

and
to

to

the

“we”

to “us,” the students of ethics
is

and how

Aristotle overtly tells us here about the "we"

been well trained,

who

moment who

known

is

who have been

aim here

is

this affects his

is that it

be good.

He

how

to

be good

enjoy and dislike the right things ...

(NE

1

is

on ethics

are intended for those

politics, then, is not

is; it is

which

An

an invitation to engage

an invitation to learn

how

to

choosing a group which

is

a character to
this set

habits

if

that has

men

it

is

some

for his

to study ethics

and

over the question of what the

become good given

the conception of the

men who have been

homogeneous

be good-

to

trained in accordance with

from Aristotle

in contestation

its

work on

of [citizen]

who have been

invitation

Aristotle has developed. In choosing

in effect,

want

so they can correctly act on their desire

we must have

selecting a group

a particular conception of the good.

good

men

179b24-31). In hand-picking

students, however, Aristotle

good

well trained, Aristotle

is,

in a certain respect: they already share a

disposition towards a certain conception of eudaimonia. Their similar emotional
constitutions

I

makes them tend towards

am not arguing,

the

same good.

here, that Aristotle develops his account of the

consulting and adopting the perceptions of these well trained
that these

men have

I

study of ethics.

argues later that “the mind of a pupil has to be prepared in

affinity to virtue”

politics.

habituated to feel the proper pleasures for the proper

just to point out that his lectures

to study

and

must consist of men who have

are already prone towards virtue-they have proper habits and
they

who merely need

first

men

good

life

by

without acknowledging

already been trained in accordance with a particular conception of the
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good; on the contrary, Aristotle does not rely
upon anyone’s already existing perceptions
or
habits in the process of

what
only

am pointing

I

men whom

good;

out

coming

to give

that

he

he considers

to

in so doing,

who would come

is

).

Rather,

be well trained and disposed towards

his

account of the

together for the purpose of struggling over a
conception of the good.

hls account of th e

good

see

if his

account

good
is in

whose

basis

is

rely

on consultation with well trained men

life,

Aristotle does

men

with

is

a strange move, since

whom he consults

have already been trained

a particular conception of the good.

Thus

held notions of what the good

Aristotle’s account has everything to

do with what

people whose beliefs Aristotle examines.

checking with men’s actual

beliefs, beliefs

And

will

is

be

in

sort of training has

matters

it

which people Aristotle consults with and how these people have been

whether or not commonly

in

check with men’s perceptions of the

harmony with them. This

Aristotle ought to recognize that the

greatly

vii

I,

he creates for himself a homogeneous student
body, rather than a group

^-velo P in £

in a social context

(NE

inviting to the discussion or study of ethics
and politics

is

Although Aristotle does not

life to

an account of eudaimonia

trained;

harmony with

been had by the

yet he does not problematize this process of

which have already been formed

in

accordance

with training they have had.
It is

towards the end of Book

I

of the Ethics

that, after carefully

account of the ultimate good for man, Aristotle confirms

men's actual

beliefs.

He

this

developing an

account by checking

it

against

writes:

We must examine our principle not only as reached logically, from a
conclusion and premisses, but also

Aristotle

“what

is

is

about

it;

while

if

it

is

if

a statement

false they

is

of what

said about

when he checks

it.”

soon reveal a discrepancy.

We

need

to

(

NE
life

commonly

said

harmony with

it,

1098b9-12)
corresponds to

wonder, however, whose voice Aristotle

to see if “all the data are in
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is

true all the data are in

concerned, then, with whether his account of the good

commonly

listening to;

because

in the light

harmony” with

his

account of the

is

good
in

life, is

he checking only the perceptions of those

accordance with his conception of the good?

perceptions have not been formed according to
yet he does not question

what

perceptions he consults.

He knows
some

sort of training has

He does

who have

is

good and

been had by the people whose

slaves, for instance,

we can

be sure that there are some

women— whose

and citizen class

not considered to be relevant for Aristotle.

There are questions

we who

no one whose

not, for instance, purposefully consult with
the

humans— male and female

conception of the good

is

particular conception of the

perceptions of a diversity of beings. Quite the opposite:
sorts of

there

already been well trained

to ask, then, about Aristotle's choice of

are the students of ethics,

about the question of the good

life.

who
It is

who

belongs in the

are included in whatever discussion there

clear that

it is

only free

men who

is

to

be

are even

considered to be possible candidates for the well-trained-men-pool-of-potential-students-ofethics.

More

than

this,

likely than others to

we can assume

have been properly

that

some

free

men

were, in Aristotle's eyes, more

trained. Aristotle is not setting

up a

political

context in which differently trained beings-people whose emotional constitutions have

formed

in different social

contexts-might struggle over an account of the good

might thereby have a basis for struggling over the question of what constitution
the polis.

By

and

life

is

best for

including in his group of students-and in the group of people whose

perceptions he considers to be relevant-only well trained
trained according to his account of

homogeneity among

human

political participants.

diversely trained group of

humans do

men

(i.e.

men who have been

flourishing) Aristotle ensures a certain sort of

What would

the serious consideration of a

to Aristotle's process of

data” are "in harmony" with his account of happiness?

checking

to see that “all the

What would happen

if

Aristotle

paid serious attention to the conceptions of the good that were held by a diversity of

human

beings, and

means

to reach

if

he constructed the political realm to be a place of struggle over what

eudaimonial

how human

diversity

I

is

will

keep these questions centrally

addressed by Aristotle.
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in

mind

as

I

go on

it

to look at

F.

Aristotle

and

for each person

person, whatever

(

what the good is-and he

false claims are true

So, for instance, there

good

G ood for Man and the Good

and

that

and

also a relationist-in the sense that these

is

person takes

person happy

On

is.

beings; for instance, happiness
is

that

that there

(NE

it

to be, or that

III, iv).

may have

actually not be, for he

happiness ( eudaimonia )

true

false in relation to certain beings in certain
circumstances.

whatever

is

we can make

a particular good for humans; Aristotle would not
agree that the

is

makes

eudaimonous ) but

does not allow

for Fish

an objectivist-in the sense that he does think that

is

false claims about, say,

true

The

the

different for

for each

is,

A man might think he is happy
wrong conception of what

the other hand, happiness
is

happiness

is

humans than

relative to different sorts of

it

is

for gods.

What

Aristotle

be different ultimate goods for different humans.

A relationist objectivist stance

such as Aristotle’s

is

potentially a

good one

for

radical communitarians. Unlike liberals, such communitarians have rejected
the possibility

of neutrality on the question of the good
neutral in this respect, and

it

is

one

is

is, it is

acknowledged

that

no

state is

recognized that the construction of any community

(purposefully or not) promotes
that

That

life.

some

particular conception of the

good

always working from a particular conception of the good

life.

If

it is

given

(say, for instance, a

conception that includes the claim that any form of oppression, of dominance and
subordination, diminishes

needs objectivism

human

flourishing and

in order to label

or false claims. So, for example,

I

want
it

flourishing.

is

It is

what racism

not just that

is,

and racism

it

is

this

is

is

for

life),

one

flourishing as true

propaganda

is

not just an expression of someone’s conception
as

good or

propaganda

is racist

human

good

to say that the proliferation of racist

of the good, where anyone’s conception
claim that

thus not a part of the

claims about what promotes

not an exercise of freedom of speech;

in this case, “it is a true

is

is racist

me, given

not a part of the good

29

true as

anyone

and

that

it

my conception
life.”

else’s.

I

want

to say

works against human
of racism; rather,

this

Another example: as long as

there are
that

some women saying

pornography

women

feel

it is

is

that they like

pornography, liberals cannot make the claim

harmful to women; instead, they are stuck claiming,
“well,

good

them then

for

collective formation of values, and

it

is

who

good

for them.” Radicals

share a conception of

who

human

if

some

are interested in

flourishing that

excludes dominance and subordination, will not want to
agree that whatever someone says
is

good

“they

them

for

may

think

is

necessarily

it is

good

good

One might want

for them.

have thus become habituated

to feeling pleasure

is

in

misogynist practices and they

when faced with

some women may experience pornography

pornography industry

be able to say, instead,

for them, but perhaps they think this only because
their

emotional constitutions have been formed by participation

thus although

to

violence against

as pleasing, actually, the

working against women’s flourishing.” Of course, there might be

a real disagreement over whether or not something does promote the good

example, for instance, there could be
not pornography

is

claim

I’ll

is right.

keep

political contestation

my own

is

right (not just that

it is

come

engage with one another

In

of your

own

it

right for oneself) there

is

is

to a shared understanding; at

important to not over-value the state of being in agreement

the cost of ignoring or erasing anyone’s conception of the

13

in the privacy

it

political

This struggle can be an interesting place: in the fact that each person would

time, however,

liberal path

in this

opinion”; rather, one would engage in the struggle over which

the sense that participants in the struggle are aiming to

same

So

over the question of whether or

you keep your opinion and practice

be arguing that what she or he believes

the

life.

harmful to women. But notice that one would not end such a

struggle by saying, “well,

home, and

women;

in discussion or struggle

good

13
.

In this

at

way, people can

over what they believe, neither taking the

of maintaining individual opinions without engagement, nor taking the

such a struggle over which claim

questions of epistemic privilege.

own judgment because

I

I

is

may

right,

think

it

I

would

am

also be important to consider the complicated

right about something, but

recognize that someone else

is in

meanwhile question my
The contestation

a better epistemic position.

must be informed by a recognition that many different features of our social positions affect our perceptions
and epistemic abilities, but what the effects are will seldom be clear or simple, so relying on
“epistemological privilege” seldom is an easy way to resolve a struggle, and may itself be problematic.
See, for instance, Bat-Ami Bar On’s “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege” in Feminist Epistemologies
,

eds.

Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth

Potter.
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totalitarian,

the

aim

homogenizing path of needing

to be in this place of

is

to be in a state of agreement.

engagement. The

liberal rejection

complete relativism prevents one from making any

word— i.e. having
at all.

It

to

do with a

true polis,

of objectivism

say that
favor of

in

political (in Aristotle’s sense of the

and not just a mere association of people) claims

prevents a certain level of political engagement.

One

also needs relationism in order to

phenomenon such

as oppression,

Aristotle recognizes that virtues

make claims about

phenomenon which

must be determined

circumstance; however, unlike Aristotle,

many

One could

I

would

social

and

political

function relative to social position.

in relation to the

like to

complicate

person and the

this

by saying

that

times they must also be determined in relation to significant social
categories

race, class, gender,

and so on).

inspiring resistance

(i.e.

(e.g.

of

For instance, one might speak of having the habit of

to the status quo), or the ability to

expose hidden assumptions of

oppressive ideologies, or the tendency to have a radical imagination as examples of virtues
for oppressed or subordinate people

who

engaged

are

in struggles

of resistance, even while

they are not necessary or even desirable virtues for those actively involved in dominating
others

14
.

Furthermore,

I

want

to recognize that

what the good

is

can be politically

contested, and that people’s social locations might affect their sense of what the good
that

is, it

might place them

of the good

want

life

in a particular spot in the political struggle

to their social position.

If

one were

realm— unlike

men— then

to

the polis

would have

14

Ann Ferguson

Aristotle,

be a context

which conception(s) of human flourishing

would bring

may

in

life

may be

I

constructed in relation

who

only includes free (not slave)

which contestation would take place over

the polis

is

designed to create and promote, for

to the political arena different conceptions of the good.

As

I

suggests “being uppity” as another virtue for the oppressed but not for dominators. She
is both oppressed and an oppressor, which of the virtues

also notes that to the extent to which one person

apply

good

this sense,

to include all people (including people of different

social locations) in the political

different people

over what conception

ought to inform the construction of the community or polis. In

to recognize that people’s conceptions of the

is;

be complicated.
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have pointed

out, Aristotle

does not conceive of the polis as a place for

this sort

of

contestation, for he does not allow for heterogeneity
(with respect to social positions or

life

experiences which would form in people diverse
emotional constitutions) within the

realm

political

community

s

If there

.

were diversity within

shared conception of the good

the political realm, the struggle over a

would need

life

to

be informed by reflection

about the effect that social position has on the formation of
values.

wants a diversity of people
then one needs a

aiming together

some
the

select

ways

in

to

way of not

at

be

full

only seeing variation within the

to be representative of all

which

Aristotle does recognize variation

humans.

with, Aristotle does recognize that

who

way, not

all

is

unlike Aristotle, one

political participants-

human

species but also of

a shared conception of the good without simply taking (as Aristotle
does)

exercised varies depending on
all

members of a community-full

group

To begin

If,

humans-not even

the person

is

humans who

First,

however,

I

am

going to look

at

among humans.

how

the different virtues are to be

and what the circumstances

are.

In this

are capable of moral virtue-are alike. This

a piece of Aristotle’s relationist stance. In a discussion of the general rule that virtue

always
people.

lies in the

He

mean, Aristotle makes
“.

writes:

.

.virtue is a

it

what the mean

clear that

is

varies for different

purposive disposition, lying in a mean that

us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent

determine

it”

(NE

1

106b36-l 107a3,

to us” as “relative to us as

human

my

relative to

man would

use to

emphasis). Although one might read the “relative

beings,” that reading

Aristotle’s illustrative analogy clearly

is

shows

that

is

not supported here, for

he means

we must each

find the

mean

relative to our individual selves:

Supposing

that ten

pounds of food

allowance for an

athlete,

pounds; for even

this is

.

.

In this

a large and two pounds a small

does not follow that the trainer will prescribe

perhaps too

to receive it— too little for

to train.

it

is

much

or too

Milo but too much

for

little

one

for the person

who

is

six

who

only beginning

way, then, every knowledgeable person avoids excess

32

is

and deficiency, but looks
thing, but the
It is

because virtue

mean

is relative to

mean and chooses

for the

(NE

relative to us.

the person

and

it-not the

also context-dependent that one cannot

is

give rules for moral conduct which could be
automatically applied in
'‘questions of conduct
is

healthy”

(NE

1

and expedience have as

104a 4-5). Because of

this,

mean of the

106a35-b8)

1

little fixity

circumstances:

all

about them as questions of what

“the agents are compelled at every step to

think out for themselves what the circumstances

demand” (NE

Despite the fact that Aristotle sees enough variation

1

104a8-9).

among

those people

who

are

capable of virtue to argue that virtue must be determined
relative to each person and
circumstance, he does not follow through very far on

does not, that

admit there to be variation

is,

considering what the good

Book

chapter

I,

life is,

of the Ethics

vii

Aristotle

is

in

is

this

recognition of diversity.

what the ultimate good

members of a

all

a search for

humans

what

the proper purpose of

as belonging to a certain species,

species share a certain essential purpose-but different

to consider is

happiness for
that

“what

is

man

that

human goodness,

we

obviously; for

set out to discover”

wholesome or good

is

humans. 15

(

NE

different for

1

it

on species

man

is,

and

In

.

it

The methodology of this

species do not have different essential purposes. Aristotle writes:

we have

for

clear that this varies depending

turns out to be happiness, as a virtuous activity of the soul.

search involves differentiating

is

He

was

the

where

all

members of one

“.

.

the

.

good

for

goodness

man

that

or

102a 13- 15). Even while he asserts

human beings and

for fish”

(

NE

1

141a22-

15

This is not entirely true. As becomes evident in Book X, Aristotle does present two different, competing
accounts of the ultimate good; one account claims that happiness is a contemplative activity, the other that
it is the exercise of moral virtue.
Thus one could argue that the philosopher (who contemplates, or
theorizes) and the politician live according to different conceptions of the
this

argument. The

first is that

Aristotle’s

argument

in

Book X,

good

chapters 7-8

I have two responses to
problematic enough (see

life.

is

I am not convinced that we can really take him to be claiming that humans— who are, as
he has argued again and again, political animals-can really live the contemplative life, a life which does not

footnote #6) that

NE

require [political] relation with other people

(

recognizing these two accounts of the good

life as

good
only

life is

in

1

177a27-l 1 77b

human

1

).

Secondly, even

possibilities,

my

point

Aristotle

is

,

is

not a politician,

i.e.

which thus remains

one who participates

full

in politics;

of homogeneous beings. So

I

he

am

Aristotle necessarily does not recognize the existence of different accounts of the

arguing that he does not design the polis to be an arena
life

if

that the question of the

not contested within the political arena for the philosopher, to the extent to which he engages

contemplation,

political arena, an arena

good

is

takes place.

33

in

which

is

not present jn the

not arguing that

good

political struggle

life; rather,

I

am

over the question of the

25), he does not

make

the sort of divisions within a species

which would allow him

to

recognize different goods for different
humans. Rather, the one ultimate good for
humans

which

that

is

It is

is

aimed

at

clear that Aristotle

by the man with a morally virtuous disposition
(NE
favoring a homogeneous political

is

here, for

it is

only

such a community that there would be one standard
measure of what the proper

in

pleasures are;

if

there were heterogeneity then differently
trained people

emotionally constituted so as to feel pleasure
the standard measure: “the

is

community

13a25-30).

1 1

yardstick of what

is

fine

man

of good character ...

and pleasant” (NE

Meanwhile, however,

is

it

at different things.

1 1

good

different for different

life;

But Aristotle’s good man

a sort of a standard and

is

13a32-33).

not that Aristotle sees no variation

respect to the good, for he certainly does see different
their relation to the

however,

it

humans, but rather

is

would be

humans

among humans

with

as significantly different in

not that Aristotle believes that eudaimonia

that

is

he thinks different sorts of humans are

differently placed vis-a-vis the possibility of reaching the one
yardstick version of

eudaimonia. Thus when he
about

it

thinking about

human

flourishing, he

with respect to a select group of humans, those

human, those who
“no one assigns

human

is

consideration of

human

1 1

77a8-9). 16

who

He

Aristotle

lives.

to a slave a share in

(NE

life”

live fully

really only thinking

is

whom he considers

makes

this clear

to

when he mentions

happiness-unless he assigns to him also a share

virtually eliminates diversity

when

it

comes

good

because
16

I

am

for

we

(the best,

W.

D. Ross translation here, for

all

it

humans

Thomson

happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a

do not lead

Aristotle thinks that slaves

necessary for moral virtue— in the
for the sake of a

good

[i.e.

a

life

life,

way

lives of their

that fully

life

only:

that

in

1

in

in looking at

280a3

1

-34).

34

it is

human,

do.

if life

own”

to

have the

because slaves do not

“nobody

[~NE

1

1

live

human

attributes a part

77a8-9] .)

It is

clear that

which they exercise choice, which

He

is

says in the Politics “a state exists
:

only were the object, slaves and brute

but they cannot, for they have no share

of their own]” ( Pol

fully

translation reads:

of his

own— lives

human people

and not for the sake of

state,

life

be

to

emphasizes

cannot reach eudaimonia. (The J.A.K.

animals might form a

to a

most virtuous) group of humans; the “diversity” disappears

see that he does not quite take

using the

lives that they
in

one

that

in

can reach eudaimonia. Since Aristotle only recognizes diversity

terms of hierarchy, when he discusses the good for humans, he feels justified
the

be fully

in

happiness or

in a life

of free choice

purpose that “humans” have, that

is,

reaching eudaimonia. In

Aristotle explicitly states that pleasures
experienced

by some

fact, in

discussing pleasures,

select people are truly

pleasures, but pleasures experienced by
others cannot be considered to be fully

acknowledges

1

it

is

human; he

that pleasures differ for different people,
but then dismisses this diversity

asserting that “whether the perfect and
supremely

one,

human

happy man has one

more than

activity or

the pleasures that perfect these that can
properly be described as

by

human ” (NE

176a26-29).

Thus

Aristotle sees

arena, for any variation in
hierarchical variation
fact,

it

humans

as diverse, but this diversity

someone’s placement

makes them not

quite

human.

potentially eudaimonous, there

Furthermore, anyone
the right sort of being but

is

(i.e.

is

who

not good (or well trained)

who

are

would take

life

is

man— or who

excluded from the realm

The

place.

circle

is

is

in

closed:

trained to have a disposition towards virtue, trained to be pleased
by

realm where any discussion about the good

life

is

a pre-requisite for being in the political

would take

place, but

only similarly trained beings are participants in politics that politics

which conception(s) of the good

polis and the training of

its

life

slaves (male and female) are

among

members of the polis

17
.

that

the people

is,

who

is

it is

precisely because

not a matter of

should inform the construction of the

members. Those who have no

eudaimonia (given a particular account of it),

they are not

a

are the only people

not the right sort of being— a citizen

striving towards a particular version of the good)

struggling over

is

arena of the polis altogether-in

political

the polites,

eudaimonia

significant homogeneity.

is

who

who

Among

which any possible discussions of the good
being well-trained

vis-a-vis possible

which takes them out of the

not within the political

is

potential for reaching

women

of the citizen class and

are excluded

from the

Their conception of the good

is

all

political arena;

not relevant for the

17

See footnote #9 about how they are necessary for the polis without being a part of the polis. It could be
argued that in being a part of the household, where households are what make up the polis (Pol 1253a39),
citizen class

women and

all

slaves are a part of the polis.

However,

I

think

we need

to look at the claim

households which make up the polis in light of Aristotle’s claims that a slave is a piece of
property (Pol 1253b31) and “states require property, but property, even though living beings are included
that

it,

is

it

is

not part of a state”

(

Pol 1328a35-36), and his definition of a polis as a “community of equals” ( Pol

35

in

Among

polls.

the people

who remain

respect to the conceptions of the

Thus

as political participants, there

good

life at

which people aim, or

the following question does not
arise for Aristotle:

group of people to
flourishing

all

be members of a polls

a contested issue; that

is

group of people,

in a discussion of

construct the community, of

how

is,

(in the true

how can

what

how

is

no diversity with

Aristotle sees none."*

possible for a diverse

is it

sense of the word) in which

there be engagement,

to strive for together,

to train the passions?

But

how

of

this is

among

human

a diverse

(accordingly) to

a question that

I

think

should be raised.

Who

G. Friends

There

another

is

composition of the

polls.

way
I

in

it

have noted

(NE 1 155a22-23;

to friendship

which

1

Are Mirrors

clear that Aristotle favors a

is

that Aristotle conceptualizes

159b25-28;

1

167b2-3).

homogeneous

community

So looking

to

be related

at Aristotle’s

view of

friendship will be instructive in seeing what he values
about community.
Aristotle recognizes the existence of

friendship based on

goodness (NE

utility,

(NE

1 1

those

1

in virtue

158b 12-28). Friendships can also

differ in

sort of friendship

which

are similar in their

is

157a3 1-32). Aristotle

goodness and whose

mean

and proper sense

calls this friendship perfect:

are good, and similar in their goodness,

the polis to

properly so called, and

is

of their goodness, whereas the rest are friendships only by

1328a37). Considering these claims,

make up

1

for the sake of the good: “friendship in the primary

(NE

who

one

between good men who

between good men
analogy”

(NE

59b29- 1 1 60a8). However, despite Aristotle’s recognition of a variety of

that is friendship

is

is

156a6-22). Furthermore, there are friendships between equals and
another

1

sorts of friendships, there is only

friendship

different types of friendship; there

friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based on

type of friendship between unequals
intensity

many

that all

I

think

we cannot

is

(NE

1

156b7-8). These

interpret Aristotle’s statement that households

members of the household

18

perfect”

“only the friendship of

are political participants in the polis.

Again, since philosophers— whose idea of the good life is that it consists in contemplation-are
extent to which they are really leading the contemplative life, political participants.

36

not, to the

friendships are characterized by equality,
for

good men

are,

by

virtue of their similar

goodness, equal to one another; friendships
which lack equality are only called friendships
to the extent to

inferior party

inferior to

which they develop a

sort of equality

must love more than he/she

good men

(e.g. children,

(NE

loved)

is

What
parties

(NE

1

good men). Good men who

pleased with his

good men

is

friend as

a second sell to

the

same or

in true friendship

who

are

good

own conduct and

similar”

(NE

him (NE
’

Aristotle thus requires

found

together,

and again,

the polis ) being
the

good but

to

is

parties

1

the importance of the

one

conduct that resembles

it,

and the conduct of

156bl6-17). Aristotle describes a good man’s

170b7),

1

is

also please one another “because

i.e.

someone just

homogeneity among

like himself.

And, the homogeneity

true friends.

extends into the sort of friendship that can be called concord

hold a community together just as

this

by having the

are friends provide reflections of

(unanimity) or “friendship between the citizens of a state”

homogeneity serves

who

158b 12-28).

another; Aristotle argues that friends
is

in the friendship

Aristotle emphasizes in his discussion of
friendship

similarity (qua

everyone

158b24-28). Thus anyone

1

wives, etc.) cannot be said to have
perfect friendship

with good men; they can only approximate
equality
love proportionately

through proportionate love (the

homogeneity

is

(NE

it

1

167b2-3); that

is,

holds a pair of true friends

based on the participants’

good men and thus (because they do not hold a

(in the political

arena of

variety of conceptions of

rather share one) being similar in their goodness. Aristotle writes:

This sort of concord

men, because they

friendship between citizens]

[i.e.

are in accord both with themselves

is

found among good

and with one another,

having (broadly speaking) the same outlook. For the wishes of such people

remain constant and do not ebb and flow

what

is

just

like the tides;

and they wish

and advantageous, and also pursue these objects

But bad men cannot be

in

a very limited extent.

.

.

.(

concord

NE

1

37

(just as

167b5 -9)

in

for

common.

they cannot be friends) except to

It

becomes very

trained

men

clear in this passage that Aristotle's
inclusion of

ensures homogeneity; they

or friendship

based on

is

all

this similarity.

share a conception of the good and
their concord

By excluding anyone who

according to a different conception of the
good-that

bad man

we might

(or,

add, not a free

no one but good or well

man

is,

holds and acts

anyone who

in Aristotle’s

all)-Anstotle creates a

at

homogeneous

community. Furthermore, such a community-where

there

cannot be a place where the conception of the good

contested, for such concord

odds with

is

A

truly a

community with

relations of moral

just a collection of people living in the

which

is

same

political

concord based on similarityis at

and

it

the context in

is

Aristotle puts

like cattle in the

same

is

who

is

He

area.

its

tie to

we

1

that the

community, the realm

it

is,

it is

for the

the realm

good

life.

For as

humans, quite unlike “being pastured

has lost
is

and
its

historical context in

meaning— so

said to be a

promising. His polis

is

that

which the term

any collection of people

“community ’’-Aristotle’s
just the sort of

live in associations structured

community we

good
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in

are

are the

In such a context, the possibilities for collective action

profound participation of community members

description

according to liberalism, where non-

interference in each other’s lives and neutrality on the question of the
state.

is

a training ground for moral

aim together

for

it

170b 13).

one another

may sound

likely to be lacking if

premisses of the

members, and not

has presented a description of the self

are developed;

are able to

live in a social

so overused that

with some incidental

of what a polis

which men

(NE

field”

For those of us

“community”

engagement between

living together (as friends do)

it,

a polis can be constituted so that

not just a place of exchange and mutual benefit; rather,

is

which members emotional constitutions

virtue;

how

most profound ways. He has argued

social in the

of social relations,
in

a

Vision of Community: The Polis RevkpH

Aristotle has developed a valuable account of
is

is

political contestation.

H.

it

is

eyes

and for the

one another’s lives— in the formation of

one another’s dispositions and values-are
obscured.
communitarian

The

possibilities, Aristotle’s description

descriptive claim about

how

a self

is

In the attempt to

uncover these

of the true polis appears

socially constituted

is

creation of a

I

in the public

realm

development of a conception of human flourishing
which can inform

community

But as

be valuable.

a necessary basis for the

normative claim that members of a community
ought to actively engage
in the collective

to

constituted to promote such

have argued, there

his discussions of ethics

and

existence of homogeneity

its

flourishing.

another side to Aristotle’s polis. Aristotle
creates, in

is

politics, a tie

among

human

the

between the

possibility of a true polis

members. The deepest

and the

sorts of relationships-

fnendships— in the polis are possible, Aristotle has
argued, only when members are similar
to

one another, when they share and

those

who

reflect

one another’s goodness. Furthermore, since

are to be favored for inclusion in the
political realm are

men who

are well-trained

according to a given conception of the good, the polis
can be thought of as a place of
concord, not of political struggle over which conception(s)
of the good should guide
collective action. Differences in life experiences and
social locations are not

the basis for collective thought about

what human flourishing could be;

differences are the basis for exclusion from the political arena.
is

achieved only through the significant homogeneity of

context for the contestation of the conception of

community (and
The

link

all

of the social relations within

at all,

it)

when

it

is

true polis, for Aristotle,

members;

it is

flourishing on

not meant to be a

which

thought to be similar

in

it

some

is

is

seldom used

in

is still

strong, at

any strong

quite often in reference to a group of people

respect.

the

are based.

Although the term “community”
used,

as

rather, these

between the concepts of “community” and “homogeneity”

least in the U.S. today.

sense

human

its

The

welcomed

who

are

For instance, one may think of a community as a

place of shared culture, and take culture to be a unifying set of practices, both in the case of

mainstream communities and

in the

case of communities of marginalized groups.
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One
there

can, of course, think of cases in which,
within what

a professed

is

(an association

commitment

to diversity.

«

However, when

is

it

called a
is

which merely enjoys the name “community”) which

community,

a liberal
is

“community”

diverse, the diversity

depends upon each individual’s (or group of individuals’)
staying out of each other’s way,
leaving one another to hold separate, different
values without interference. The strong

sense of

community

is lost.

engaging with one another

There

to

not a

commitment

to the diverse

form each other’s values or

one another’s dispositions; there

meaning of human

is

is

group of members

participate in the

development of

not meant to be a shared, collective struggle over
the

flourishing.

Communitarians who are drawn
of the strong sense of community in

to Aristotle’s

who

and

it)

account of a polis (precisely because

are radical in the sense of

opposing

hierarchy and thus opposing Aristotle’s inegalitarianism and his
requirement of

homogeneity need
together

at

to

develop an account of

how

a

community could

struggle to

some good without presupposing homogeneous members and

conceptions of what the good

is.

The

thus similar

critique of Aristotle’s polis suggests

about what such a community might look

like; to

begin with,

it

makes

it

aim

some

things

clear that to even

begin imagining such a community, one needs to break the conceptual link between

“community” and “homogeneity,” but

community

is

doing

(polis ) that Aristotle has developed.

which the shared conception of the good

polis in

here

that in

that a conception of the

community not something
,

Such a

to

good

life is

this

One
is

something

*^Even

retain the strong sense of

leaves oneself free, then, to imagine a

open
to

to collective formation.

collective formation of values

be discussed or developed

would mean leaving oneself open
It

would mean being

whatever conceptions of the good one might begin with.

in these cases,

The idea
in

be presupposed before the members of a polis come together.

constructed in one’s relations to others unlike oneself.
into question

one must

however, there

is

It

to

be

willing to call

would mean

often an emphasis both on the community’s unity and on

its

For instance, the “women’s community” is often described by feminists as a place where there
unity— as women— amongst members but also diversity-as, e.g. people of different races, cultures, or

diversity.

economic

classes.
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is

paying attention, during the process of
engaging with others,
people have developed different virtues
and aim
Finally,

it

would be a process

in

which the

link

at different

s citizens

virtue, but they

do

describing. This engagement,

profound

sort of

to

participate in developing in

do not engage

in the sort

I

would

why

conceptions of the good.

be between fellow citizens in polls.
*

one another the tendency towards

of collective formation of value that

I

am

like to suggest, requires a very
difficult

knowing or experiencing of fellow members of a
community,

knowing other members

is

not like looking in the mirror, as

friends in Aristotle’s polls. In a diverse

different

between members of a community could
be

even more significant than Aristotle imagines
there
For Aristotle

to the reasons

it is

for the

and very
for

good men who

are

community, knowing other members means

crossing into worlds of sense unlike one’s own,
and understanding those worlds of sense
to

such an extent that they enter into the formation of
one’s

conception(s) of the good

life at

which

the

self

community might

and of the community. The

strive together, then,

can only

emerge out of a process of real engagement between members
of the diverse community.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONTEMPORARY

POLIS:

CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITY

A. Introduction

The
in

Aristotelian ethical tradition takes

its

contemporary shape, among other places,

communitarian theory. The communitarians draw on

Aristotle’s account of the polis in

developing a description of community rather than
drawing on contract
of the state or on deontologists’ accounts of

human

rights.

At the base of communitarian theory,

human

nature and thus

in liberal theory.

human

John Rawls,

relations

in

then,

which

is

developing his

relations as built
is

theorists’

accounts

upon duties and

a conception of

community and of

fundamentally different than those found
(liberal) theory

of justice, takes up and

revises Kant’s deontological theory, dropping Kant’s dependence
on the transcendental

subject and replacing
original position,

it

with what Michael Sandel refers to as the unencumbered self
of the

a self

much

like the abstract individuals in contract theory

having any relation with one another, nevertheless are able

form a

state

which

to

will regulate their relations. In a parallel

choose

to

who, prior

make a contract

to

way, communitarians such as

Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre take up and revise Aristotelian theory, dropping
a greater or lesser extent) Aristotle’s dependence on the existence of a given

and replacing

it

with the idea that

particular histories

human purposes

human

will

its

telos

and communities which “encumber”

the self with particular values

how

and
its

develop their virtues and vices, and thus determines the possibility of a

member reaching
socializes

(to

or ends are given by or developed in

conceptions of the good. While Aristotle’s polis serves as a training ground for

members

to

the

end of endaimonia,

members

but

it is

the

also the place

communitarian community not only “trains” or

where human ends and conceptions of

the

good

actually develop — unlike the Aristotelian telos, they are not a “natural” given prior to

their

development through

history.
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While

liberal theory

such as that of Rawls has no way of
making sense of the idea

of having “a people ” communitarian
theory sees having a people as central
the self

is

constituted as a self with a history of a
people and a

Thus communitarian theory suggests

having a

community of a

some understandings of what

at least

to

it is

self;

people.
to

have a

people, to have a sense of collectivity about
one’s self-constitution and about one’s
ability
to

develop values and act on them, and so

place to begin trying to answer the question
a people

body of theory seems a

this

am

I

pursuing; what understanding of “having

describes the sense of self and of collectivity
that could

resistors?

I

am

potentially fruitful

empower political

interested in finding a description (and further,
a prescription or at least a

normative suggestion) of a self who has a collectivity
within which to work on morally
constituting or training the self with habits of resistance
to oppressive status quos, but

want

to insist that

such a community cannot require homogeneity as
Aristotle’s polls does.

The communitarian model of the community
to use

Michael Sandel’s terms-gets

my demand that

politics

However,
the

as

community membership

formed;

They might
it is

I

those

say,

who

“my

share

not

is

is

find

am looking

for;

it

meets

membership

from one another based on
it

to

be too easy

static,

and

that

homogeneous, so

to

their multiple,

answer the “who are

history and thus

may be

whom my

my

identity— my self— is

values,” without noticing that their

multiple, or that their histories can be told in a

is,

the

communitarians see the

self as

in particular social groups, see identities as the result

moments

my

communities are not clearly bounded

people are those with

my

as

not complicated, for most of them, by the recognition

variety of perhaps inconsistent ways. That

particular histories, as

I

upon a sense of community

differ

They

identities are fluid, that their selves

constituted by

some of what

will argue, also tend to fail to recognize the

made up of beings who

people?” question, for the question

entities.

to the core of

just as Aristotle relied

intersecting group memberships.

that

as constitutive rather than merely cooperative-

be collective rather than individualistic.

contemporary communitarians,

community

I

in a narrative that has taken place
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of

over time and which

includes other people; however, they
sidestep the crucial questions: which
narrative do

explain our identities?

tell to

Which of the many

occurrences form our identities?
identities

identities?

particular histories

many

I

will argue that to state that

and communities

community and

yet

is

by the description of

itself as

it is

What

is

it

crucial to

do we

that

to account for

where the

essential not to ignore questions such as the

dilemma of the mixed

daughter of a dark skinned mother

examine and
that

to ask,

are

hold on us

in

which

we

a

when our

constituted in
the self

is

it is

exhausted

whenever

resistant self springs from.

I

will argue that yes,

the collectivity of the constitution of our identities, but

writes: “the mestizo, faces the

made

go on

and

recognize complicated mixtures of community or group
identities— then

must recognize
is

is, if

in

by our locations

one single community-as

in

Thus, agreeing to an extent with the communitarians,

it

is

come

identities

what story

is its

account for the self that

developed

communitarian theory has no way

that

tell;

and what

community’s values;

social

of different social groups do our

are constituted

story

constitutes us

How does one

resistant to that

we

not enough, for

Which of our communities

communities are multiple?

fails to

is

possible histories constitute us?

character in?

one

in the intersections

congeal and then again when do different
groups and group

change our

of our

Where

and moments of

histories

we

critique

listen to?”

(

I

will

one

add the claim

one Gloria Anzaldua poses when she

breed:

which

collectivity

does the

Borderlands 78). This chapter will thus

communitarian theory, with the aim of seeing how the claim might be

indeed the self

is

constituted in community, amongst a people, but

who

the

people are and what the self becomes constituted as must be more complicated than the

communitarians recognize.
is in

the

may

one

is

constituted in the

community depends on who one

community. So while one member may be constituted

internalize, accept

in the

How

community

reject the

in the

community so

as to

and animate the community’s values, another member may be constituted
as a rebel,

someone who experiences and perhaps

community’s values. Such a member may choose

and form an intentional (also constitutive) community,
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but,

I

internalizes

to leave the

and yet

community

will argue, the choice

is

made

as the particular person she

unencumbered

is,

not as an

unencumbered

self.

self (contrary to the claims of liberal
theory) cannot possibly exercise

choice, for the “choosing” self cannot
exist prior to

its

ends, and thus the right

choose one’s ends) cannot be conceived of
prior

right to

believe that the enc umbered self

However,

I

Sandel argues that the

will argue that the

is

also

hampered

to the

(i.e.

the

good. But he seems to

in her ability to exercise choice.

encumbered (encumbered with-but not exhausted
by-a

conception of the good) self does retain agency,
for instance, the agency required to
change
or even leave a community.

The

insistence that the

developing a communitarian
the self can

move

encumbered

political theory

in

which

what a community values and how

One

is

is

it

acts

essential to

radical, for without recognition that

one cannot account for how radical

radical politics of resistance

be able to conceive of the communitarian
change.

can exercise choice

in relation to its constituted values,

change might be brought about. Since a
change

self

on these values),

is

about change

it is

essential that

for

one

self as capable of resistance, of bringing about

also cannot think about radical change without the idea of the

and the constitutive community,

(e.g.

unencumbered selves (were they

encumbered

to exist)

self

would be too

independent, too unaffected by each other and by their social context to possibly
change

one another, and a merely cooperative

(as

opposed

be a place where nobody would interfere with or
point of radical, communitarian politics,

where

it

is

selves

try to

will argue,

appropriate to engage in changing one’s

collectivity out of

So

I

to constitutive)

I

which members can

will turn

now

Me encumbered

constituted self will
collective (that

is,

to

act

communitarian theory,

to

make

own and

to

the

community

others’ values,

and

a place
to

form a

make

sense of the claim that our

The concept of the

collectively

useful, then, for the assertion that our political selves are

that there is

such a thing as having a people, politically speaking), and
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to

change one another’s values. The

on these values.

or collectively constituted.

become

is

community promises

for the further claim that the
possibilities of

whom that collectivity

might be made up of are

numerous.

IL Michael Sandel:

A Rej ection of the

Unencumbered

Michael Sandel draws an illuminating distinction
between the

community and

the communitarian sense of

community” versus
to others in the

its

“constitutive

community, and

Self

liberal sense

of

community, dubbing them “cooperative

community.” The difference

lies in the relation

the conception of the role of the

community

of the self

in relation to

members.
Liberalism, Sandel argues, emphasizes the priority of the right
over the good. That

is,

the purpose of a

“community” of people under

rights are protected, not to provide a

the good. Central

his/her
to

own

pursue

it,

among

way towards

ensure that individual

is to

achieving some particular conception of

the rights that an individual

must have

is

as long as

one does not

interfere with others’ like rights)

to there actually

The

principles

is

(and

secured
is

already

which regulate individual

cannot be justified by reference to any particular conception of the good; the

procedure by which these principles are arrived

at

must be a neutral one, a procedure which

does not favor any one conception of the good over another one.
fair one, is,

in detail the failings

of

of course, a great pre-occupation of

all

such attempts.

liberal theorists

delve into the problems with liberal theory here,

community and of the

self only to contrast

In order to conceive of the liberal

I

want

them with

community

How

liberals,

Many communitarian

have exposed the failings of the arguments of

justice, there

is

being any conception of the good that

held by the individual or by the community.

procedure a

the right to choose

ends or conception of the good. Thus the right to decide what the good

independent of and prior

rights, then,

liberalism

to

and

make
I

this

will not discuss

authors, including Sandel,

such as Rawls. Rather than

to discuss the liberal senses

the

of

communitarian sense.

as regulated

by neutral principles of

must be a corresponding conception of the individual subject as capable of
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choice (so he/she can choose a conception of
the good) prior to having any conception
of
the good, any values. Sandel calls such
a self an

encumbered by any

who would

particular values or conception of the

call for a neutral state as

unencumbered

self,

The

good-for

original position

is

Rawls’ attempt

I

have and the person

to the original position

must be able

who

mind

in

I

am”

is

not

only such a self
It is

this

for the parties in the

are to be

to justify the right prior to the good.

from which principles are chosen, and

between the values

is

from which regulative principles of justice

However, Rawls must make an assumption about persons
fair position

it

self

providing a realm of free individual choice.

Sandel claims, which Rawls must have

original position, the fair position

chosen.

“unencumbered self ’-a

in

order to

that is that “there

make
is

sense of this

always a distinction

(Sandel, “Procedural...” 18).

to exist (conceptually, that is) without

or in fact any other distinguishing characteristics. Such a self

is

The

parties

having values,

unencumbered,

free as a

choosing subject to select any possible conception of the good.
Sandel’s claim

cannot

exist,

that the

is

even conceptually, except

But the unencumbered

characteristics.

ends: “For the unencumbered

personhood, are not the ends

What such

19).

self

self,

self is a conceptual impossibility; a person

as a person with particular values
self is thought to

what matters above

we choose

a self calls for, then,

is

my

it,

identity

myself as a

“[ojnly
is

free

if

the self

is

all,

what

is

most

only the right to choose

prior to

its

am the

person

essential to our

its

ends, and

who

I

may have

at

any moment can

it
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think of
the

own values— depends upon

the

does not make sense

(without values) choosing these values.

I

Thus

moral agent capable of choice) from what

has certain values, then

As

this right.

and independent agent, capable of choice” (“Procedural...”

(a

only a

it is

ends can the right be prior to the good. Only

never tied to the aims and interests

who I am

to its

but our capacity to choose them” (“Procedural...”

possibility of choice — i.e. the possibility of choosing one’s

separation of

and

be a self which exists prior

conceived as unencumbered which would ground an argument for

Sandel puts
if

unencumbered

my

to

19).

values are; for

if

speak of a subject

I

One may

think, then, of the

unencumbered

self as possessing a set of
(chosen)

values, but not as con sisting of a
person with those values.

change without disrupting the

In so far as

once related

identity of the person. Sandel

possess something

I

to

it

-that

rather than
it

first

yo urs -and

I

am

still

the

subject

s

I

same

The

actual identity of the

the subject

within them

answer
is

it;

am

possess a certain

in a certain

means

point

latter

who had

(

Liberalism.

at
trait

way-it

is

in a certain

that if

I

way-

lose a thing

I

this is the sense,

55)

all is

unencumbered

community. The community,

develop or change one

“Where

it

I

I

chosen values can be possessed and dispossessed
without disruption of the

reconstitution in a
to

say that

am distanced from it

I

identity of the subject, for the identity existed
prior to

values.

To

am related to

also that

T

it.

paradoxical at
but unavoidable on reflection, in which the
notion of possession is a

distancing notion.

The

to say that

mine rather than me. The

is

possess,

is

comments:

a conception of the good],

[e.g.

and distanced from

or desire or ambition

mine

The possessed values could

is

and independent of the acquisition of

self, then, is

for an

unencumbered

s identity, for in fact identity is

regarded as prior to

The

transparent.

to this question is given in

its

ends.

.

.

never open to constitution or
self, is

never a place

secure prior to community.

[t]he

relevant moral question

bounds of the
is

not

‘Who am

advance) but rather ‘what ends shall

I

and

self are fixed

I?’ (for the

choose?’ and

this

a question addressed to the will” ( Liberalism... 58).

The
subject

is

identity of the subject, then,

unencumbered and

community must

the right

is

is

not tied up with

its

community.

In fact, if the

prior to the good, then whatever goes

on

in

stop short of “interfering” in the choosing subject’s conception of the

good, for nothing must impede the freedom with which the individual chooses a conception
of the good. As Sandel writes:

The Rawlsian

self is not only a subject of possession, but an antecedently

individuated subject, standing always
it

has.

One consequence of this

of experience, to

make

it

at

distance

a certain distance from the interests
is

to put the self

invulnerable, to fix
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its

identity

beyond

the reach

once and for

all.

No commitment could
without

it.

No

grip

me

so deeply that

transformation of

the self does not

self as

least conceptually,

my

identity.

independent of others

need the community for much, for

could not understand myself

purposes and plans could be so

life

unsettling as to disrupt the contours of

Given such a conception of the

I

Liberalism.

in his/her

can exist

it

(

62)

formation of values,

have an

(i.e.

..

identity), at

independent of the community. The community of others
might be

something which the unencumbered

self will

choose -for instance,

if

companionship or co-

operative satisfaction of material needs were part of his/her
chosen conception of the
but the choice itself

values the

is

antecedent to the community. The choice

community may have already developed

unencumbered

self

may choose

or even need the

is

not informed by any

in the individual.

community

good-

Thus while

the

to satisfy needs, the particular

character of the needs themselves are not created in the community.
Sandel summarizes:

This notion of independence carries consequences for the kind of

community of which we

we

are capable.

Understood as unencumbered

selves,

are of course free to join in voluntary association with others, and so are

capable of community in the co-operative sense.

unencumbered

self is the possibility of

bound by moral

ties

community where

What

membership

in

is

denied to the

any community

antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any

the self itself could be at stake.

Such a community-call

it

constitutive as against merely co-operative-would engage the identity as

well as the interests of the participants, and so implicate
citizenship

more thorough-going than

the

its

unencumbered

members

self

in a

can know.

(“Procedural” 19)
Subjects

who

co-operate, then, are very different than subjects

together, for subjects

who come

first,

In co-operative

community, “[w]e

are distinct

and then (circumstances permitting) we form relationships and engage

co-operative arrangements with others” ( Liberalism.
In contrast, subjects in a constitutive

the

are constituted

together merely co-operatively must have been separate,

distinct subjects prior to their union.

individuals

who

community. Sandel writes

..

53).

community have

that:
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in

their

very identities

at stake in

community would describe

not just a feeling but a

mode

of

understanding partly constitutive of the agent’s
identity.
view, to say that the

community

is

members of a

society are

not simply to say that a great

On

bound by

many

self-

this strong

a sense of

of them profess

communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims,
but rather

that

they conceive their identity— the subject and
not just the object of their
feelings and aspirations-as defined to

which they

some

extent by the

community of

For them, community describes not just what they

are a part.

have as fellow citizens but also what they
(as in a voluntary association) but

are, not

a relationship they choose

an attachment they discover, not merely

an attribute but a constituent of their identity. ( Liberalism...
150)

Sandel conceives of the encumbered
it

is

not just that

it is

in

community

described as something which

some

particular

community.

is

It is

who

further.

“discovered,” as

if

already

the play or tension
self

and being a

made

necessary to

self

who

know more

precisely what

it

means

Sandel, and to think about whether Sandel’ s encumbered self
liberal abstract individual

who

C.
In Sandel’ s

encumbered

self,

fails to

self

who

actively-

finds herself as a given, a
I

would

to

is

like to investigate

be encumbered for

the only alternative to the

unencumbered.

The Self Too Encumbered

move from

he

is

community;

within the confines of

between being a

already has certain values and characteristics, that

It is

the

that the self is constituted, but in fact the self is

and yet collectively-constitutes her
person

some sense given by

self, then, as in

the liberal,

to

unencumbered

Move

self to the

communitarian,

adequately account for the ways in which the self— without

being conceived of as an abstract individual— has the sort of moral agency which can allow
the self to
rather

it

change or

really is

agency

in his

agency

that

resist.

Sandel’ s

from unencumbered

move
to

is

not so

much from

individual to collective, but

encumbered; the difference

is

that there

is

a loss of

move, because he does not have a concept of collectively formed or acted

can account for radical change. Thus he rejects the claim
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that

we

are ‘free to

choose’ and replaces

summon

or

it

command

the idea that

we

with the claim that

we

are ‘not free to choose, because

we

did not

our history or character’; he does not see
the possibility of rejecting

are ‘free (from interference) to choose
as an individual’ and replacing

with the claim that ‘freedom

is

a social product, so

collectively with others a history or context

we

are capable of choosing or creating

which we dp

in part create.’

only alternative which Sandel sees to the liberal
individual

encumbered by an

identity given within a

it

community-to

a self

is

who

It

seems as

if

the

completely

is

the point of losing the kind of

agency required for change. 20

The meaning of “encumbered”
encumbered

self; the

applies

all

too well to Sandel ’s account of the

Ameri can Heritage Dictionary gives

this definition

of what

it is

to

encumber:

Encumber

tr.v. 1.

To weigh down

unduly; lay too

hinder, impede, or clutter, as with useless articles or
3.

To handicap

much upon.
unwanted

additions.

,

s

encumbered

self,

it

To

or burden, as with obligations or legal claims. [Middle

English encombren from Old French encombrer, to block up.

Sandel

2.

seems,

is

.

.].

characterized as burdened with obligations or moral

commitments, hindered from changing

in radical

ways. Not only

is

a self thus

characterized harmful to radical imaginations (which need to see the possibility of
resistance
in the self), but the self thus characterized

is

simply not

bom

see evidence of collective change whenever one looks for

it,

out in reality:

it is

possible to

one can see selves being

constituted and reconstituted— burdened but also breaking free from burdens— in

accounted for when one recognizes only the effects

community has on

a particular

that

one

single,

ways not

bounded and consistent

self.

90
zu Amy Gutmann makes a similar criticism of Sandel, although hers
is coming from a liberal perspective.
She claims that Sandel’s method “invites us to see the moral universe in dualistic terms: either our
identities are

independent of our ends, leaving us

totally free to

choose our

life

plans, or they are constituted

by community, leaving us totally encumbered by socially given ends.
The critics thereby do a disservice
to not only liberal but communitarian values, since the same method that reduces liberalism to an extreme
metaphysical vision also renders communitarian theories unacceptable” (“Communitarian Critics of
Liberalism” in Avineri and de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism 130).
.

.

.
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It is

that the

not from a liberal point of view that

encumbered

self is to

liberal, for different reasons,

I

am

rejecting the dictionary’s implication

be understood as weighed down with
obligations

would shudder

at the

obligations). In fact, one might argue
that the

thought of

this clutter

(for the

of involuntary

word “encumber” was defined from

the

point of view of liberal ideology, from
which position any moral pull must be seen
as an
obligation and any obligation must be seen
as a burden on the free individual.

commitment which holds moral weight does
understand that to be a person simply

is to

not have to be seen as a burden

be a person

in social relations

if

A
we

with others and

thus with responsibilities or moral pulls (which
the deontologist can only recognize
as
duties or
rather

obligations”).

what

movement
Thus

I

am

is

It is

objectionable

is

not that having moral responsibilities are
objectionable, but
that these responsibilities

burden

in a

way

that prevents

or change or the exercise of agency in determining
what the responsibilities are.

not disagreeing with Sandel that in fact the self

who

is

understood to exist and

have been formed within particular social relations does “come
with” moral
but what

makes Sandel’ s claim

that

we

incur moral responsibilities simply from being

constituted in relation to others too simple

tensions in which

is

which might

Such an irrevocable
perhaps to

move

encumbered

the fact that he does not see conflicts or

constituted as complicated

relation (out of context of other relations

position

is

commitments have moral weight

context in which one

pull

pull

on one

in

encumbered
is

makes

it

impossible to see any one social

one way or another) as pulling on us irrevocably.
a hindrance, an impediment to change or

out of an oppressive situation.

mistakenly believes that the self

for us; to see the social relations or

one might have or other features of one’s social

would be a burden,

self as being

responsibilities,

My claim is that Sandel

in just this

sees the

burdensome way, precisely because he

thoroughly constituted by one consistent set of values,

within one clearly bounded and homogeneous community, a community in which one
“finds” oneself, but which one does not create.
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Sandel emphasizes the involuntary nature of
our moral commitments and
obligations.

He

writes:

But we cannot regard ourselves as independent
cost to those loyalties and convictions
the fact that living

by them

the particular persons

is

in this

whose moral

way without

great

force consists partly in

inseparable from understanding ourselves as

we are-as members

of

family or community or

this

nation or people, as bearers of this history, as
sons and daughters of that
revolution, as citizens of this republic. Allegiances
such as these are

than values

I

happen

to

beyond the obligations

human beings

as such.

have or aims
I

'espouse

I

at

any given time’. They go

voluntarily incur and the ‘natural duties’

They allow

that to

some

I

owe more

requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements
instead in virtue of those

more or

less

commitments which taken together
(

more

I

owe

I

to

than justice

have made but

enduring attachments and

partly define the person

I

am.

Liberalism... 179)

Marilyn Friedman has pointed out

communitarians have

in

mind

that the sorts of

communities which Sandel and other

are very traditional communities,

and

that the social relations

they acknowledge are traditional ones. She sees the communitarians’ philosophy
as

problematic because they do not give

much

thought to which communities are or should be

the locations of our self identities. In particular, she thinks that communitarian philosophy

does not serve feminists well, for the communitarians do not see

communities form

how

traditional

ethical thinking in non-feminist ways. Theorists like Sandel

and

MacIntyre, Friedman argues, tend to take for granted that communities are based on given
structures such as those of family, neighborhood, school, church or even “nation.” These
traditional

embody

communities-which Friedman

refers to as

traditional values, including values of (different kinds of)

subordination. She points out that “feminist theory
for

communities of place-tend

change

in all the traditions

is

to

dominance and

rooted in a recognition of the need

and practices which show gender

differentiation;

many of

those are located in just the sorts of communities invoked by communitarians, for example,

family practices and national political traditions” (281). Feminists, she argues, should
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therefore be

wary of communitarian theory which
assumes or claims

that the self is

constituted only in these traditional
communities. Friedman argues that within

communitarian theory, these

traditional

communities are accorded “a kind of morally

normative legitimacy” (279); in claiming

many communities make

illegitimate

this, the

communitarians

moral claims on

of domination and subordination”
(279).

It is

their

fail

“to

acknowledge

members, linked

to hierarchies

the recognition that such moral
claims are

problematic for women-since the hierarchies
of these communities subordinate
that

mot ivates Friedman’s

rejection of

that

Sander s claim

that these are the

women-

communities which

hold moral weight. While Friedman wants
to retain the communitarians’ claim
that the self
is

constituted in community, she

as a

community and about

is

motivated to reject their assumptions about what
counts

the “legitimacy of the moral influences

which communities exert

over their members” (280).

However,
on one

is

it is

not just that the oppression of traditional communities’
moral weight

a motivating reason for critiquing communitarian theory,
but

false that traditional— homogeneous, clearly

the only

communities which form

us.

In fact,

exist, a fact

on

communities damages both the

traditional

is

also simply

bounded, and relatively static— communities are

communities

which

it is

it

generally false that such

is

homogeneous

obscured by the erasure of group difference. The focus
validity of

communitarian theory and

its

usefulness for a politics of resistance. Because the communitarians picture
communities as
traditional

and homogeneous, they imagine a member of a community as simply inheriting

a set of values, or discovering themselves
values.

On

us explain

embedded

in

and thus constituted by a

set

of

the other hand, seeing group differences intersecting within communities helps

how

resistance to

community values

understand moral agency that

is

is

not individualistic.

always learn or become constituted with only one
oppositional values, even

when

possible— that

there are also

My claim is

set

provides a

that, in fact,

in a

way

to

one does not

of values; there are always

dominant values
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is, it

community.

It

has perhaps been more true in the past
than

would be

likely to be born, live,

and die surrounded only by others

significant ways. Isolated, rural

ways
now,

communities could,

which individuals within

in

to find instances

contemporary

is in

it

the

in the past,

community were

life that

a person

like him/herself in

have more control of the

constituted.

It is

much more

rare,

of such isolated communities. The communitarians
seem, then,

to

be basing their claims about community on some
romanticized, out of date (one might even
say pre-colonial) version of what a

community

is.

about traditional versions of what a community

is,

homogeneity of values even

in these

cut across by group differences

However, even

if

one would be mistaken

communities. All communities

which

affect

one were thinking

how members

imagining

in

are, to

are constituted.

some

degree,

There

is

probably no community in which there are no conflicts of
values created by group
differences (whether or not anyone conceives of the group
as a group), however

suppressed these conflicts

may

be.

There

are, for instance,

always or almost always

differences of gender, age, social role, and so on within the most
homogeneous-appearing

communities, and different members of a community
different

enough ways so

One may speak

that they

in

make

statements

the values of the

community, as

However, pointing

never reveals the whole picture.

To claim

whole

am

21

Which group
is

may

point to institutions

in the claim: “heterosexuality is

to the

that there is

community believes

dominant values of a community

an identifiable value of a community

not hold those values.

not claiming that there

values (although

any, there

like: “this

not at odds with claiming that members, or groups of members, within the

is

community may
I

21
.

doing ideological critique one

institutionalized in this society.”

as a

life in

of the “official” values of a community as a whole; for instance, in

of the cow”; or

which define or control

experience day to day

develop different values

(crude) anthropological fashion one might
in the sacredness

may

it

is

is

some way

also probably true that

some

differences are socially relevant, which,

a sense of community, are

all

in

if

which individuals develop idiosyncratic

characteristics of people

best be

any, are socially recognized, and within which,

dependent on changing
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would

historical

and material conditions.

if

called idiosyncratic, for not ad
differences are socially significant group
differences), but
rather that the presence of overlapping
group differences

means

that

it

never makes sense to

speak of oneself as belonging to only one
community or only one socially significant
category in which one’s self would be fully
constituted.

dmmnant

just

only

when

a

community’s

values are taken to be the only existing
values in the community that there

appearance of a

am

It is

member of the community

is

the

being constituted simply with those values.

I

arguing that resistance to hegemonic values
always exists (even when unconscious),

may

not always be visible; Sandel’s account
of

community

indicates that

it

is

it

not

visible to him.

Recognizing

that

people are constituted within the intersection of several
group

differences maintains the communitarian claim
that selves are constituted socially, in
relation to others rather than individualistically;
however,

it

destroys the illusion that one

just finds oneself to be the inheritor of a set of
given values. This

tensions or conflicts between the values of intersecting
is,

when

so because the

groups-when they

are evident, that

they are not thoroughly erased by a hegemonic value
system-do not allow an

individual to be constituted only with one given set of values.

The communitarian

assumption that a community’s values are “discovered” as a given
that

is

some

set

of values

is

is

equivalent to saying

thoroughly hegemonic. The fact that there has always been

resistance, that beliefs, values, emotions, styles or

hegemonic value system have always
does achieve complete hegemony

ways of being not sanctioned by

existed, tells us that

no

set

the

of community values ever

22
.

-"-Alison Jaggar has argued for this claim that although our values are socially constituted, there is never a
complete hegemony of one set of values: there is always the possibility of developing resistant values. She

speaks of these values in terms of the emotions we are constituted to feel, and dubs resistant emotions
“outlaw emotions.” She writes: “We absorb the standards and values of our society in the very process of
learning the language of emotion, and those standards and values are built into the foundation of our
emotional constitution. Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend to serve
the interest of the dominant group.
Consequently, we are all likely to develop an emotional constitution
quite inappropriate for feminism.
By forming our emotional constitution in particular ways, our society
.

.

helps to ensure
constituting us

its

is

own

perpetuation.” However, the picture of dominant values thoroughgoingly

incomplete:

acceptable emotions.

.

.

.

.

“it

ignores the fact that people do not always experience the conventionally

In other words, the

hegemony

that

56

our society exercises over people’s emotional

There
critic

is

a confusion that takes place in the
rush to reject liberal individualism.

of liberalism

may

The

mistakenly equate the liberal
pre-occupation with preserving room

for “individuality” with the very
different claim that intersecting
group differences should

not be erased in community.

not as an unencumbered individual
(whose idiosyncratic,

It is

“freely" chosen values cannot be accounted
for once one recognizes that
the self
constituted) that a

but rather

is

it

as

member of the community becomes

someone who

is

is

socially

a resistor of the community’s values,

socially constituted, but constituted
by a complicated

mix

of socially developed values. In rejecting the
possibility that the unencumbered
self

“chooses” individual values, Sandel has also thrown
out the possibility

“encumbered" or constituted
pull

in

a

way

that allows

that a

person be

for-or calls for-exercising agency

in the

between conflicting systems of values.
I

have so

far

emphasized the way

in

Sandel does also attempt to describe ways

which Sandel sees values

in

which a person

is

as a given; in fact,

“always open, indeed

vulnerable, to growth and transformation in the light of
revised self-understandings”
(

Liberalism... 12). This

encumbered
or

move

derive,
in

how

I

self.

is

his attempt to account for

His description of

how change does

how and how much

the

encumbered

in relation to his/her constituted values is very limited,

will argue,

the self

is

from Sandel’s

constituted.

failure to see intersecting

self

can change

however. These limits

group differences as a factor

Without an understanding of intersecting group difference,

Sandel can acknowledge that the encumbered
but he can only see this

take place for the

movement

self

moves

a bit in relation to given values,

as extremely limited, as the

weighed down or burdened with given moral weights but

is

encumbered

self

is

seen as

not also seen as being fed or

sustained with collective, resistant values.

constitution

is

not total” (Jaggar, Alison. “Love and

Knowledge”

Jaggar and Susan Bordo. 159-160).
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in

Gender/Bodv/Knowledge

.

eds. Alison

Let us examine Sandel’s explanation of
moral agency.

to

have character

command, which

As

conduct. ...

and

is

to

know

carries

that

I

move

He

in a history

consequences none the

a self-interpreting being,

in this sense to distance

writes that:

myself from

am

I

it,

I

neither

less for

my

summon

choices and

my

able to reflect on

but the distance

nor

history

always

is

precarious and provisional, the point of reflection
never finally secured
outside the history itself.
person with character thus knows that he is
implicated in various ways even as he reflects,

A

This passage

who we
is

are,

is

what he knows. ( Liberalism

179)

ambiguous, for he

us that

and

that

at

once

tells

we

and

feels the

moral weight of

“neither

summon

nor

room

movement.

through reflection and interpretation there

the nature of the reflection and the subsequent

movement

that

is

for

command”

needs analysis.

I

It

will

argue that while Sandel develops an account of agency
and the role of reflection for the

encumbered

self, the

account

thus unable to explain

Sandel seems

how

is

the

to use his

which constitutes oneself

inadequate, for

encumbered

it

self

claim that one

s

erases the sources of real resistance and

could be constituted as

resistant.

distance from the history and

community

always precarious and provisional” to ignore the significance

is

of serious and successful resistance to a constitutive community’s values. Even
thinks of the most extreme examples of constitutive communities

complete control over

their

is

members’

identities (and

where one

which

set

if

one

try to exercise

of values appears

to

have complete hegemony), one can see resistance which involves enormous moral change,
or change in the moral constitution of the

While such change may begin

self.

something

as

“precarious and provisional,” one need not dismiss the significance of moral change just

because the ground

its

community values can

subjects stand on feels shaky. In fact, resistance to dominant
often be characterized by the feeling of having the ground

continually pulled out from underneath one’s

23 Sandra Bartky calls

this feeling

feet. 23

“double ontological shock,” something which she notes

that

frequently experience as they go through the changes of values and of self-identity involved

in

women
coming

to

have a feminist consciousness. Double ontological shock is “first, the realization that what is really
happening is quite different from what appears to be happening; and second, the frequent inability to tell
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As an extreme example of a community which
would appear
members with only one

of values, think of the cult communities

set

takes place; growing up in such a

community means being

to constitute its

which

in

subject to the

ritual

abuse

community’s

attempt not only to have one’s identity
thoroughgoing^ constituted by the community’s
sadistic “values,” but also to

stamp out any

of community-inflicted

abuse can and do

the

ritual

community, re-constituting

possibility of resistance.
resist their

However, survivors

communities’ values and leave

their identities within other

communities. The writings of

such survivors often stress that despite the enormity
of the forces which have fragmented
them, programmed them for suicide or for perpetual
loyalty to the abusive community, they

cm break with this history of sadism. 24
community has on

its

members

I

am

I

am just

ground as preventing moral change;

moral status quos,

may be

this living

source of resistance

I

who have

“left” the

community), for

sees no resistance.

would suggest instead

He

that although

a condition of the lives of those

who

with ambiguity can be a creative, even

if

sees shaky

walking on

are resistors to the

painful and difficult,

itself.

Furthermore, Sandel seems to characterize the hold the community has on

members
he

is

it

pointing out that Sandel looks only at the hold

community values have on someone, and so he

shaky and unsure ground

not denying the hold that the

(including survivors

obviously does have a strong hold,
the

While

as a legitimate hold, for as he has said, any “person with character.

.

.

its

knows

that

implicated in various ways even as he reflects, and feels the moral weight of what he

knows”

(

knowing

Liberalism... 179). Sandel never suggests that there might be a
that

one

is

implicated by one’s community; the moral weight

is

problem with
never

characterized as oppressive.

what

is

really

happening

Philosophy and

Women

24 As one survivor
impulse to suicide

,

at all”

eds.

writes:
is

a

(Bartky,

“Toward

a

Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness,”

in

Sharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweis, 256).

“WE ARE NOT THE SUM OF WHAT’S BEEN DONE TO

programmed response

to

what’s been done to us;

we

US.

.

.

The

are brainwashed to ensure the

As Audre Lorde wrote so eloquently: we were never meant
That doesn’t mean, however, that we can’t or won’t or aren’t surviving. Whole.” (Girl
Insurrection, “Some Notes on Abuse,” Valiev Women’s Voice Fall 1993: 5)

protection of cult hierarchs by killing ourselves.
to survive.

.
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"
there

is

Will

be useful

to explore Sandel's

for an agent to actually bring
about

Sandel draws a distinction between agency

He

cognitive sense.

explains that “if

might 'come by' them: one

The

first

is

1

change

we might

how

in

the other

how much

posstbiltty

his or her identity is constituted.

in the voluntarist

am a being

by choice,

sense of ‘coming by'

account of agency to see

sense and agency

in the

with ends, there are at least two ways

by discovery, by 'finding them

call the voluntarist

I

out'.

dimension of agency, the

second sense the cognitive dimension” Liberalism...
58).25 He has rejected the
(

plausibility of the voluntarist sense of agency,
for

prior to having any ends, which, he has argued,

is

it

requires that the choosing self exist

a conceptual impossibility. Sandel’

alternative explanation of the relation of the
subject to

are given in advance,” in

into

(this

would be

acknowledging
lights

Thus
the

its

inward upon

reflection.

unintelligible) but

(

purposes as

making

itself,

its

reflecting

on

which
itself

self

ends already before

in

through

is

its

it,

this

agency

consists.

own

the self

In reflexivity, the self turns
its

own

I

its

object of inquiry and

is

just asking

“who am

has.

I?”, for

Understanding

.

.

whose

identity is constituted in the light of

seeking self-understanding” ( Liberalism...

process of self-reflection that a subject can “play a role

it

am

in

shaping

identity” ( Liberalism 152).

appears promising because Sandel does recognize that

interesting that Sandel claims there are

other ways, as

and inquiring

laws and imperatives, and

Sandel then moves to what could be a promising consideration of
self-reflection;

already

is

understanding what ends one has been constituted to have-is what

is,

the contours of

that

what ends the subject (already)

comprises the exercise of agency: “For the

It is

ends of the self

Liberalism... 58)

to this question determines

oneself-that

59).

its

by

the subject exercising agency in the cognitive sense

answer

that “the

self-command not by choosing

constituent nature, discerning

its

is

which case,

the subject achieves

given

ends

its

“

at least ”

arguing that there are?
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this

process of

this is a

two ways. Does he leave room

process of

for there being

self-interpretation (with possibilities
for multiple or conflicting
interpretattons), that

an individual process (others can
participate

can be a revtsion of

even gone so

my

identity (the

in

my deciding who I

bounds of

my

self are not

may

when we account

given in advance).

He has

refer to a plurality of selves within
a single, tndtvtdual

human

of the

betng, as

for inner deliberation in terms of
the pull of competing identities.

(Li beralism... 63).

What

find to be problematic in

I still

Sanders account

that while he

is

sees the process of self-reflection as collective
in the sense that others participate
with
it,

he again

not

am), and that the result

far as to tell us that “for certain
purposes, the appropriate description

moral subject

is

it

fails to

me

in

ask the relevant question: “ which others?”
This question can only

appear unimportant to him because he imagines the
community as not cut across by socially
significant

group differences.

If there are significant

community-differences which mean

that selves are systemically (not
idiosyncratically)

constituted with different values-then

of self-reflection with,

if this is

whom we

much whom I engage

matters very

it

the process through

Sandel, then, has recognized that

with

group differences within a

we “have

which

my

identity

a people”-and that

participate in shaping our identities-but he

still

is

it

in the

process

shaped.
is

these people

does not recognize the

necessity of questioning

who

constituting one’s self

not seen as including the day to day navigation of conflicting ways

is

the people are or should be. For Sandel, participating in

of being constituted which arise out of the intersection of multiple communities;
navigation involves gravitating towards

cannot be that he thinks that

it

some people and perhaps away from

does not matter which people

he would not deny that

who

the people are

who I am;

that

he sees

so

it

must be

completely antecedent
then,

is

am

who my

to the constitution

done with a people, but does not

people are,
I?” but

who
I

the

community

cannot ask “with

is

(i.e.

of

what

their

shape

ends are)

my
is

others.

my

identity.

what constitutes

within which

my

for this
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Sorting out what

(even

identity

is

my

constituted.

I

is

identity

in part) in sorting out

is

It

identity with, for

people are as a given, something that

itself consist

whom am I?”,

I

this

is,

who my

can ask “who

a given. Although Sandel

recognizes that there
that this

last

how

describes

my ends

friend

is

in

my

shaping

agency must include shaping or deciding

This

what

some agency

is

point

it is

are.

becomes

that a friend

who I am,

he does not acknowledge

whom I am constituted with.

clear in Sandel’s discussion of friendship,

me know who I am-that

can help

Aristotelian thinking surfaces once

quite like Aristotle’s friend: a mirror.

I

will

more

now

is,

where he

can help

me know

Sander s theory; Sander

in

look

at

Sandel’s account of

constitutive friendship.

Sandel criticizes Rawls for being committed to the claim
that others cannot really
participate in one’s act of “choosing” a good, and then
points out that

Rawls lacks a deep

sense of friendship, in which intimacy would involve
participating

one’s friend’s self-

and

reflection

self-constitution: “If arriving at one’s

own good

is

in

primarily a matter of

surveying existing preferences and assessing their relative intensities
is

[as

it

is

for Rawls],

it

not the sort of inquiry in which another, even an intimate other, can
readily participate.

Only the person himself can ‘know’ what he

really

wants or ‘decide’ what he most prefers”

(Li beralism... 171). But friendship, Sandel argues, can be

well as sentiment” ( Liberalism... 180)
attachments.

It is

if

we

.

.

understand friendships to be constitutive

face a powerful constraint.

good of a

friend and stand ready to advance

good

Liberalism. .. 180-181).

(

He

it,

However much

I

might hope for the

only the friend himself can

may

shaping each other’s conceptions of the good.

particular ends

Having

participate in

a matter of choosing them, but rather a matter of knowing what

my

preferences,

suitability to the

person

constitutive sense) can

I

I

have not only

(already)

know my

know what

the

contrasts the limited, liberal conception of friendship

with a communitarian sense, according to which friends

consulting

insight as

only “for persons presumed incapable of constitutive attachments” that

“acts of friendship.

is”

“marked by mutual

am”

(

to

weigh

my

is,

knowing and
in this case, not

character

is:

“In

their intensity, but also to assess their

Liberalism. .. 180). Since a friend (in the

character, a friend can
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know and shape what my ends

are.

Knowing what
is,

what

a friend wants, then,

the

is

their character is given their history,

same

as

knowing who

the friend

is,

that

and therefore what ends they have. But

Sandel stresses that understanding a friend’s character
and thus their ends

is

a matter of

sharing a history with the friend, or being
constituted together in the same community.

Where

they have a shared history, friends

know one

another partly by knowing their

shared history, and thus their shared values or ends.
Sandel writes:

For persons encumbered

in part

by a history they share with

knowing oneself is a more complicated thing
wants].

also a less strictly private thing.

It is

bound up with exploring
knowledge

I

seek

is

my

identity

together

we

my
It is

in this

way

identity.

(

I

the

to others.

who knows me

my

well,

and

I

face as they bear on

identity.

He

(subject and) object of self-reflection

is

open

my

friend

constituted with

my

who knows

know

that the ‘me’

to revision or shaping, he

well?” or

who

is

the

does not similarly

whom I deliberate cannot be presumed to be

advance. Just as the possibilities of

once raises the

simply “consults] a friend

“which of my friends knows ‘me’ well?” 26 While he emphasizes

is

is

Liberalism... 181)

[him] well.” However, he never considers, “which ‘me’ does

identity

life history,

opaque

less

am, and of the alternatives

question of which friend he deliberates with.

my

my

his description of constitutive friendship, Sandel never

recognize that the friend with

existing

and assessing by turns competing

that a friend participates in constituting

Throughout

and

consult a friend

I

deliberate, offering

descriptions of the person

me

among

Where seeking my good

and interpreting

less transparent to

Uncertain which path to take,

[than choosing

others,

identifiable in

identity are multiple, so the possibilities of

whom

must also be multiple.

26 See, for instance, Maria Lugones’ “Playfulness, ‘World’ -Travelling and Loving Perception,” where she
describes being different “selves” in different “worlds.” Her friends in one of her “worlds” would assure her
that she

is

a playful person, while her friends in another of her “worlds” will

bit playful.

It

seems a contradiction

to her that she

is

her she

is

not in the least

this contradiction

is not one unified self; the different “worlds” have constituted her
example can stand in contrast to Sandel’s assumption that one is constituted within one
clear in Lugones’ example that it makes all the difference in the world (so to speak)

resolves with the recognition that she
differently. This

tell

both playful and not playful, but

community. It is
which friend she deliberates about her

identity with.
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It

much who

matters so

members of a community
members were only

the friend

are so socially significant. If the
differences

individual idiosyncrasies, or

having different ends, then

it

within the

community

if

the differences

would not be so important who

be no systemically manufactured

whom

precisely because the differences
between

is

way

which the ends

in

I

were not connected

the friend was. There

to

would

come up with depends upon

do the deliberating with. But

I

between community

socially significant

group

differences— such as differences of race, ethnicity,
age, gender, sexuality, religion, and so

on— are

tied to differences in identity

the realm of people

question: with

Mfom is my

Sandel
ability to

whom my

s

know

friend

is

identity is or

someone

like himself,

But

reflect a

this

at

you and come

seemingly shared history

In the United States white children like

told

we were just

Aristotle

Sandel’s friendship

is

whose

back

have

to ask the

like

community

Sander s

each other only

similarities are important.

me

on

is

it

friends look

their shared

is

it

likely to

As Spelman

notes:

got early training in boomerang perception

Blacks”

at least

to the friend in the

“boomerang perception,”

as

that

Black people were just

( Inessential...

like

us~

12).

friends are “similar in their goodness”

also based

a friendship to be constitutive,

history; one’s

oneself and assuming the

to myself.”

(NE

1

156b7-8),

a degree of similarity. However, Sandel never

considers or argues for the desirability or undesirability of
that the constitutive

I

not likely to be a neutral one;

is

by well-meaning white adults

never, however, that

As with

right

to themselves, seeing in

dominant group’s sense of which

when we were

someone with a shared

Knowing another by knowing

one another and come right back

history.

can be constituted with, then

what Elizabeth Spelman describes

perception in which “I look
at

group differences exist within

dependent upon seeing oneself as similar

is

sense of having a shared history.
is

in ends. If these

identity constituted/to be constituted?

a friend well

other to be like oneself

and

homogeneous

in the relevant

must be based on
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this similarity for

similarity,

ways and

he assumes

therefore that for

on having a shared

history.

For Sandel, one’s constitutive community

Only a mainstream

(not marginal within the

is

those with

whom one

finds oneself.

community) member of a mainstream

marginal within the larger society) community
could find

something desirable about opening oneself up

it

plausible to

assume

(not

that there is

in friendship to the less-than-private,
un-

mdividualist process of reflecting upon and
constituting oneself with others

whom one

finds oneself with, without also having
agency in determining

with. For

subordinate people

who have
who
very

may

“find” that they are in

is

their dominators, with those

a stake in continuing to constitute the
subordinate as subordinate.

are thoroughgoingly mainstream folk

much whom one

constituted.
to find

community with

whom one

takes to be one’s

own

For such folk can afford not

themselves

among

folk with

unproblematic being constituted

in

dominant ideology favors and who

who can remain

whom

blind to the fact that

people, the people with

to consider

It is

whom they

it

whom one

are with

and

only those
matters

is

still

be likely

they not only share values but also find

accordance with those values. Someone
in turn believes in

and takes as

his

own

whom

this

dominant

ideology can travel around to anyplace that subscribes to a similar
ideology and easily
claim, “where ever

by or who
not

all

others

rejects

I

go,

I

always find folks

I

connect with,”

etc.

Someone who

dominant ideology must choose connections much more

is

rejected

carefully;

it

is

that frequently the case for such folks that without purposely seeking
out particular

who

share values, that such connections will

Furthermore,
also implausible that

question of

it

it

whom one

is

come

not just undesirable to have

accidentally.

whom one

can be a given. The presence of diversity
is

with.

a morally significant question
different groups within a

in a

Which members of the community
when

with as a given,

is

I

community

community.

In a (counter-factual) completely

is

creates the

am constituted

there are systemic differences of values

it

with

between

homogeneous

community, there would not be any morally relevant difference between being with one

member

of the community and being with another.

It is

systemic differences within the community do exist that
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only through a failure to see that
I

can

fail to

notice what rides on

is

the question ot

of

whom am with;

whom am with,
I

a question

who I am

the question of

I

whose answer cannot be

relevant differences between the
possible people.

across by group difference (as

am claiming

I

never completely given prior to

my

Thus

that all

in fact

depends on the question

a given unless there are no
in

any community which

communities

“shaping the contours of

my

whom am

are),

cut

is

I

with

is

identity.”

Whom am constituted with cannot be such a given because
I

shifts

of consciousness and with

instance, if

I

am

my mind

to the

whom

racial differences

in the

which leads

community.

me

me by my

to see

my race

If

changes both with

actually with day to day. For
I

might think

some of them being people of color)

(despite

norms of white/anglo

about racial differences (allowed to

people”

whom I am

a white person in a pre-dominantly
white community,

just with other “people,” all of

assimilate in

shifts in

it

culture.

my

It is

I

am

I

lack of consciousness

white skin privilege) and not the lack of

myself as constituted simply as one among other
consciousness changes then

I

might begin

to notice

the particular mixture of values, experiences, and
so on of the people as racialized people;
I

now

describe

some of us

whom am with,
I

I

would note

shift

now

conscious, and

Change
just

I

change

am

in

may

my

One could

given

change

other Jews in the
realizing

it

I

did not identify (strongly) as a Jew;

significant part of

who

I

was. In this sense,

same way

that

I

whom I am with

was just with “people,” now

myself with those of

in

I

am

my own racial

whom I am constituted

whom I am with. Who I understand

always been “with” other Jews, growing up as
I

say that

in itself change.

with continually inform each other. For instance,

However,

I

identification of

in consciousness, then, affects

who I am

race has functioned to constitute

of focus. Whereas before

with racialized people, the extent of
is

way

differently, although in intersecting ways.

changed because of my

group

the

if

it

is

would make

one sense

I

to

be and

could say

I

whom

have

did in a largely Jewish community.
I

did not really understand Jewishness as a

false to say that

that

I

was constituted with

claim now, although

absorb and become constituted with what
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in

myself

with, not

I

can

now

I

did without

recognize as Jewish values,

manners,

style,

and so on. There

is

a difference between being unconsciously
a

a group or

community and being consciously,

difference

makes

for

because of a change

We cannot,
we

one sense

in

which

I

can say that

in focus or attention that

as Sandel claims that

actively,

we

member

of

and purposefully a member. This

whom I am

comes with

with changes just

a change of consciousness.

do, just “find” ourselves in a

community,

for

continue, throughout our lives, to find different
descriptions for that same community,

to find different understandings of

than

who we

are

is.

These

be described as a sort of a

whom we

are with. In this

shifts in definition

shift in

whom we

of

who

way,

is

it

the people of the

no more a given

community

are can

are with. Furthermore, the shifts are
certainly

not just definitional; they are not just shifts of
understanding. For along with shifts of

consciousness

come

actual shifts of

who

the people are that

I

am

with day to day. For

instance, recognition of gender as an organizing
element of oppression

only describe differently
the

who makes up

community, not just people”),

ties,

for instance, ties with the

it

the

may

women

community (now gendered

lead

me

to

in particular.

form different

may make me
subjects

sorts

to

women— and

make up

of community

My practices change as my

consciousness changes, and the practices involve developing and sustaining

people— say,

not

refusing to sustain connections to those

who

ties to certain

constitute

me

as

subordinate.

We can only avoid the definitional shifts of whom we are with if we never become
conscious of the significance of group differences within our communities.
to

consciousness of group differences (and

other group differences),

we

communities we are with.
exercise the
question,

I?”

And

which we come

we do come

we may become conscious of some,

are confronted with the question of

our recognition of

same agency with

“who am

reflection in

If

If

whom we

respect to changing this as

which members of which

are with

we can

but not

is

problematic,

we

exercise in answering the

yet while Sandel gives a description of the process of selfto

understand and revise the bounds of our

self,

he does not

give a description of the companion process of understanding and revising the bounds of
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who our
change
doing

people are.

who my

people

we do

this;

It

is that

are,

he does not consider the importance
of

nor does he consider the

fact that

we do

not just find ourselves with a given
community.

my

having agency to

in fact act as

Coming

agents in

to a

consciousness which compels us to reject
mainstream ideologies which inform our ways
of
constituting ourselves and others
reamres that

community. For a

failure to exercise

agency

we

in

exercise agency in having a people or
a

determining

an acceptance of the mainstream or dominant
people

And

ourselves.

for

someone who cannot

between communities or
agency

she

is

our people are amounts

community

find herself in the

in

which we do

mainstream-if she

is

to

find

caught

rejected by whatever mainstream there
is-the exercise of

having a people cannot be avoided.

in

It is

histories

if

in the

who

not just in friendship but in constitutive

and values must be shared

community

within the

community, Sandel

(for

it

is

community

in general that, for Sandel,

not just with one’s friends but in a wider sense

in general that one’s self is constituted).

In defining constitutive

writes:

In so far as our constitutive self-understandings

comprehend a wider subject

than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city
or class or nation
or people, to this extent they define a

And what marks

such a community

community

is

in the constitutive sense.

not merely a spirit of benevolence, or

the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain ‘shared final
ends’

alone, but a

common

vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit

practices and understanding within

reduced
It is

the

“common

practices.

.

.”

if

which the opacity of the

participants

is

never finally dissolved. ( Liberalism... 172)

vocabulary of discourse” and the shared “background of implicit

that provide the

ground for community members

to

be constituted together. 27

“ Sandel certainly believes that shared understandings and history

make for constitutive community, and
community must be thought of as clearly bounded and homogeneous. However, even Sandel is not
the most rabid of communitarians in making this assumption. Michael Walzer, for instance, is absolutely
obsessed with the question of membership (who is in and who is out) in a community, and with
maintaining the community as a bounded world within which all meanings are common meanings. He is
that the

on communities as clearly bounded worlds because he is primarily concerned with questions of
and believes that to theorize about distribution we must do so in reference to a bounded world.
He writes that “the idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distributions take
place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all among
led to focus

distribution,
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In arguing that exercising

whom one

agency with respect

being constituted with,

is

or not one can

still

I

to one’s identity

have not yet necessarily called into
question whether

only be constituted with others like
oneself.

can exercise agency

determining

in

must include asking

who

the friends are that

have suggested

I

one

that

reflects with, or in

one

moving

within certain parts of a community, or in
leaving a community altogether
and creating or
joining a different one.28 However,

all

of this

is

potentially consistent with attempting to

continue to be constituted with others like
oneself.

community

constitutive

whom one

have argued that

who

one’s

need not be a given, and have thus opened
up the question of

might be constituted with. This leaves open
the question of whether

community

that constitutive

more

will discuss

similarity

is

I

can, cannot, should, or should not be
based on similarity.

why

I

think that basing a constitutive

community on

I

a given

neither possible nor desirable in a society
characterized by intersecting group

is

differences.

fully later

argue

to

The

illusion of this similarity

is

certainly possible, but

it is

achieved only by

focusing on the mainstream of a community, or on describing
community members only in

themselves. That world.
is the political community” (31). This
political community-a bounded worldts the only sort of constitutive community of
which Walzer speaks. It seems natural to Walzer that
members of a political community share one unitary culture and want to keep their
boundaries clear so as to
avoid sacrificing the distinctiveness of their culture. In speaking of
neighborhoods (in order to make an
analogy to political communities) he claims that “their members will organize
to defend the local politics
.

.

and culture against strangers

(38). He reasons that 'the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends
upon
cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life” (39). He has absolutely no
way of accounting for cultural mestizaje. Furthermore, he writes that “we who are already
members [of a
political community] do the choosing [of whom to admit into the bounded
world], in accordance with our

closure and, without

it,

understanding ol what membership means
have.

Membership

as a social

conversation; and then

emphasis).

It is

we

good

is

are in charge

clear that this

is

in

our community and what sort of a community

constituted by our understanding;

(who

its

else could be in charge?) of

a dangerous situation for anyone

who

value

its

is

is

we want

fixed by our

distribution” (32,

to

work and

my

not in the mainstream of the

community, or for anyone who is considered to be on the outside of it and may want in. If there
“we" who have shared understandings (and who manifest no diversity or cultural mestizaje ), it is

political

to be a

only going to be achieved by erasing everyone
political

community

which Walzer

is

as both

homogeneous and

especially committed

who

is

clearly

not definitive of that norm.

bounded

is

a dangerous

The

is

illusion of the

weapon, but

it

is

an illusion

to.

28\Vhen I speak of “leaving” a community, this “leaving” could be literal, as one leaves a geographically
based community of place, or it could be a matter of a shift of focus or attention; one could “leave,” for

community while remaining physically amongst the same group of people, but
whose perceptions and actions carry moral weight. See, for instance, Marilyn Frye’s
“To Be and Be Seen” of women shifting their focus onto each other in the “background”

instance, a patriarchal

shifting one’s sense of

description in

while what she calls phallocratic reality takes up the “foreground.”

community

is

and how one’s

self

becomes constituted or

the shift of focus.
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There

is

reconstituted within

a shift in

who

community

one’s

that

accompanies

terms of what they share, not
similarities

terms of their differences, as

in

consider that

it

to the critique of

whom I constitute

matters

could exercise agency

fact,

description of their

exhausted them.

There have been two parts

I

if the

in

Sandel here. First of

all,

he does not

myself with, and therefore does not explore how

whom my constitutive community consists of;

shaping

he describes the encumbered self as for the most
part unable to

move

and, in

in relation to

given values. Secondly, he characterizes constitutive
friendship and constitutive

community

as based

on having a shared or

common

history,

and so he never explores the

question of whether one can be constituted in relation with
people from

whom one

is

different in significant ways.

D

;

Alasdair MacIntyre and the Quest for Unitv: At

Alasdair MacIntyre, like Sandel, recognizes that

embedded

turn

when

now

to

morality

is

is

to

have “a people”

liberal

self,

like Sandel,

and

He

in a political sense.

contrasts the

defined by his

(I

to

modern

who

is

we might

To succeed

“self’

is,

and ends

depth which

is

I

historically

potentially useful for understanding

Like Sandel, MacIntyre argues that the

what

it

modem

cannot be understood as having any “people”— is

self primarily to the self of heroic societies, a self

use the word advisedly) social roles and the given virtues of these roles.

MacIntyre’s task could be described as that of modifying a
that

what a

MacIntyre gives an account of the

his account

(and emotivist) self— the self

illusory.

some depth back

social roles

replaced by the emotivism found in modern, liberal societies.

MacIntyre because

and socially constituted

are constituted as beings

and communities, with particular

in particular histories

defining those roles. His account gives
lacking

we

Whose Expensed

begin to redevelop

in regaining a sense

it

lost version

of the moral self so

here and now, amidst the moral disarray of modernity.

of the self as constituted with a history and a community of

a people (and an attendant catalogue of the virtues) would displace
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modem

liberalism, but.

as

I

will argue, if

self that derive

it

is

done on MacIntyre's terms,

from the presence of interlocking,

MacIntyre begins by contrasting the

comes from nowhere and

pre-modem
roles.

He

who

self,

.

.

.

self

will also erase the complexities

socially significant

(illusory) emotivist

consists of nothing

of the

group differences.

self-whose moral sense

more than an assortment of attitudes-with

the

defined by a particular placement within
social history and social

is

writes of the

it

modem,

whatever

may

emotivist

self:

criteria or principles or evaluative
allegiances the emotivist

profess, they are to be construed as
expressions of attitudes,

preferences and choices which are themselves
not governed by criterion,
principle or value, since they underlie and are
prior to
criterion, principle or value.

can have no rational history

commitment

to another.

But from

this

it

in its transitions

all

allegiance to

follows that the emotivist self

from one

Inner conflicts are for

it

state

necessarily

confrontation of one contingent arbitrariness by another

conceived, utterly distinct on the one hand from
lacking on the other any rational history of
certain abstract and ghostly character.
In rejecting

( After.

its

social

pre-modern, traditional societies.”

such societies understood selves

to

self thus

embodiments and

own, may seem

to

have a

33)

..

He does

the

self,

MacIntyre

so for two reasons. First of

be defined socially and so a pre-modern

understanding of the self is an alternative

because he sees selves as constituted

aufond

The

such ghosts and developing an alternative understanding of the

harkens back to
all,

its

of moral

to the ghost-selves

in part

by

of modernity. Secondly,

inheriting a particular past, he

must look

at

“our” 29 history, a history which goes back to heroic societies.

For MacIntyre, there

One can

learn

from heroic

first that all

particular

is

a

societies,

morality

and

later

on problematizing

in

which heroic

societies

had

it

right about morality.

MacIntyre writes,

is

always

to

some degree

tied to the socially local

that the aspirations of the morality

universality freed

29 More

way

from

all

particularity

this “us.”
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is

and

of modernity to a

an illusion; and secondly that there

is

no way

to possess the virtues except
as part of a tradition in

inherit

them and our understanding of them
from a

which

series heroic societies hold first
place. If this

which we

series of predecessors in
is so,

the contrast

between the freedom of choice of values of
which modernity prides itself
and the absence of such choice in heroic
cultures would look very different.
For freedom of choice of values would
from
the standpoint of a tradition

ultimately rooted in heroic societies
appear
-of those
[sic].

So

it is

(

more like the freedom of ghostswhose human substance approached vanishing
point-than of men

After.

126-127)

not just that heroic societies had an account
of morality that

“morality” of ghosts and so will be a useful tradition
to consider as
alternative to

modem

liberalism, but furthermore there

the history of heroic societies to understand one’s

claims,

it

is

our

history a history
,

What, then,

is

is

more than

in

developing an

the

a sense in which one must turn to

own moral

by which “we”

is

self because,

MacIntyre

are partly constituted.

the pre-modern understanding of a moral self?

a self

It is

whose

given social position and history places him/herself at a
moral starting point. MacIntyre
writes:

In

many pre-modern,

membership

traditional societies

in a variety

himself or herself and
grandson,

member

through his or her

of social groups that the individual identifies

is

identified

by

others.

I

am brother,

of this household, that village,

characteristics that belong to
in

it is

human

this tribe.

These are not

beings accidentally, to be stripped

order to discover ’the real me’. They are part of

partially at least

cousin and

and sometimes wholly

my

my

away

substance, defining

obligations and

my

duties.

Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social
relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an
outcast.

To know

oneself as such a social person

a static and fixed position.

journey with
to

At

first

set goals; to

It is

however not

to

occupy

to find oneself placed at a certain point

move through

make progress-toward

is

a given end.

life is to
(

make progress— or

on a

to fail

After. .. 33-34)

glance MacIntyre’s description of the pre-modern self looks promising as a model

for a contemporary, socially constituted self. First of
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all,

he does recognize that one person

can have many “interlocking” social roles

moral subject as able

to

once; and secondly, he also characterizes the

at

move and change

within certain given social relationships.

MacIntyre’s project continues to look promising as
he goes on to consider Aristotle’s
understanding of ethics and politics; he

communitarian sense of what a polis

interested in preserving Aristotle’s

is

while also critiquing and rejecting certain aspects of

is

Aristotelian theory.

According

to MacIntyre, there are three related

Aristotelian conception of the polis as a

assuming

that

is

He

some

that others

way

in

which

If

we

community.

and well-being do consist

that “all

some very

is

( After...

162).

we need

we

must,

to provide in order

general account of what

human

However, MacIntyre argues, “This

in

and the way

which

in

rival

and incompatible beliefs on

topic beget rival and incompatible tables of the virtues” (162-163).

introduced into Aristotelian theory the idea that
it

given, the question of what

agreement on the matter,

grounds his

our cultural history of deep conflicts over what human flourishing

in

“natural” way, then

all,

one’s knowledge of what man’s telos

by saying

to this question

flourishing and well-being consists in”

some

that

of

can be preserved?” (After. .. 162). He mentions

account of the virtues and vices

view ignores the place

First

reject [Aristotle’s metaphysical biology], as

that teleology

have responded

to justify an

way of grounding

other

puts the question out.

there any

for political

one does not accept Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology”

teleology, one needs
is.

model

problems with adopting an

must

arise out of

human

say

it

going to develop a communitarian sense of

good or

human

flourishing

how can one

a

if

is

is

a

it

advance

where no single

might be an open question.

a given? Thus

how

So MacIntyre has

telos is not given in

society; but

that

in

telos is

If there is

appears that MacIntyre

not
is

community develops a conception of the

good without presupposing agreement.

The second problem which MacIntyre
want

to preserve a

form of Aristotelianism,

is

raises for

contemporary communitarians who

stated: “If a

good deal of the

detail of

Aristotle’s account of the virtues presupposes the now-long- vanished context of the social
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relationships of the ancient city-state,

moral presence

world

in a

in

which there

thus recognizes that a constitutive

very different than

it

somehow go back

how can

Aristoteliamsm be formulated so as to be
a

no city-states?” ( After.

are

community

(polis) in

did in Ancient Greece; he

to the

pre-modern

is

self of the

..

MacIntyre

163).

contemporary society must look

not laboring under the illusion that

good

ol‘ days.

Again,

this

we can

looks

promising because one might expect that an
examination of how the conditions of

contemporary society

a conception of political

groundwork

laid the

fails to

community which recognizes group

for this recognition, but in the

differences between a

he

from those of Ancient Greece would lead a

differ

differences.

end he never

Greek polis and a contemporary

theorist to

political

MacIntyre has

really explores

United States.

in the

Among

what the

community must

acknowledge some of the (contingent, but nevertheless
present)

contemporary society

develop

be, since

characteristics of

the relevant features of this

contemporary society, for any theory of constitutive community,
must be the presence of
intersecting group differences, such as differences
of race, gender, class, ethnicity, age,
religion, etc. 30

constitutive

I

will return later to

these features of society cannot be ignored in a

community.

MacIntyre

assumes

why

that

s third

objection to Aristotelian ethical and political theory

harmony, not

conflict, is a

desideratum in the polis. MacIntyre argues

there are the questions posed
the unity and

is that it

by

harmony of both

that:

Aristotle’s inheritance of Plato’s belief in

the individual soul

and the

city-state

and

Aristotle’s consequent perception of conflict as something to be avoided or

managed.
conflict in

.

.

The absence of this view of the

human

life

centrality of opposition

and

conceals from Aristotle also one important source of

We

should note that many of these group differences-in different formations and by different namesexisted in Ancient Greece as well, although the differences were erased by thinkers such as Aristotle, who
strove for homogeneity among participants in the polis. Aristotle accounts for the existence of different
-

“groups” of humans (citizen men, citizen class women, male and female slaves [whom Aristotle did not
recognize as genderized— see E. Spelman, Inessential
question of
training

how one

is

Woman

,

ch. 2], etc.), but this

constituted or trained in the polis, for the polis

ground for one kind of humans, for

citizen

men.
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is

is

irrelevant for the

really only constructed to be a

human

learning about the one important
milieu of

human

practice of the

virtues. (164)
In critiquing
to

go

in revising a

some of Aristotle’s assumptions, MacIntyre
has pointed

conception of political community as
constitutive.

claimed, in sum, that contrary to what
Aristotle believed, there
there

is

no context of a given polls

(in

disagreement over what human flourishing

I

part

no naturally given

community. Rather, he
there

is,

is

ways with him-that

not (nor should

is

a heterogeneous society without

However, MacIntyre goes on

to

is

(and should be)

argue-and here

is

an overall unity

which would explain how
MacIntyre

,

be found; one just needs to develop an account

And

this is precisely

what

sets out to do.

MacIntyre begins
unity in

to

conceive of that overall unity.

to

is

despite our lack of a given telos a given
polls and a
,

given unity, there

telos,

thinks, there is

and with a variety of practices, and there

conflict within political communities.

where

MacIntyre has

contemporary society), and there

there be) any a priori unity within
a political

clearly given social structures

is

in a direction

our

moral

his quest for unity

tradition.

He

by looking head on

at the

apparent lack of

notices that in his depiction of the history

which has led

up

to

by

different thinkers or writers) reflect very different
conceptions of the virtues. MacIntyre

our present sorry state of moral disarray, different points

wonders whether these

in the history (as

presented

different tables of the virtues are “different rival accounts
of the

same thing” or whether they

are “accounts of three different things” (185).

He summarizes:

We thus have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront:
a virtue

is

social role

a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her

(Homer); a virtue

move towards

the

is

a quality which enables an individual to

achievement of the specifically human

natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the
is

new Testament and

telos,

whether

Aquinas); a virtue

a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success

([Benjamin] Franklin). (185)
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MacIntyre's task
vtrtues

and yet

to

virtues belong to

He aims

is

to

acknowledge the differences

demonstrate that

one

all

from these

conceptions of the

these points in h, story with their
corresponding

tradition, a tradition in

to “disentangle

in these

rival

which there

is

to be found an overall unity.

and various claims a unitary core
concept of the

virtues” in order to “provide the
tradition of

which

conceptual unity" (186). This conceptual
unity,

have written the history with

I

we

learn, is to

its

be achieved by casting out

those virtues which do not comprise the
tradition-by distinguishing, one might
say,

between those virtues which are

essential to the tradition

and those which

are only

accidental. MacIntyre claims that the
conceptual unity of the tradition “will indeed
enable

us to distinguish in a clear
the tradition

way

those beliefs about the virtues which
genuinely belong to

from those which do not”

(

1

recognizing heterogeneity just enough to

86).

There

know how

part as essentially comprising the unitary
tradition

is

a clue here that MacIntyre

to “deal” with

it-how

is

to designate

and how to throw out the part

that

one

does

not belong.

It is

helpful to look at

how MacIntyre

the recognition of heterogeneity

To develop

quest for unity.

which he

is

he calls a

practice,-^

first,

his

argues for his conceptual unity, to see where

comes from, and

also

how

it

gets lost or overridden by the

account of which virtues comprise the moral tradition

describing, MacIntyre focuses on the necessary background
concepts of what
1

a narrative order of a single

partial definition

A

human

life,

and a moral

tradition.

His

of a virtue depends on the concept of a practice:

virtue

is

an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which

tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices

and

the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.

(191)

*2

i

“By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and

goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre,
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187).

Because a

virtue

is

defined in terms of a practice, and
because there are

practices in contemporary society,
the virtues are

many-and

many

varied

they do not yet appear to be

unified in any way, for in fact they
can be incompatible with each other.
But MacIntyre has

been led to

this preliminary

account of the virtues because of

his critique

of Aristotle, and

MacIntyre’s account of the virtues does avoid
two of the problems which he cited
Aristotelian theory. First of

all,

teleological (MacIntyre calls

it

by locating virtues as developed within

multiplicity of
will often

goods

it

is

a “socially teleological account”) without
being dependent on

Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology .”
conflict: conflict springs

practices,

in

from “the

And

secondly,

multiplicity of

in the pursuit

it

includes a description of the source of

human

of which the virtues

be contingently incompatible and which

practices and the consequent

may be exercised-goods which

will therefore

make

rival

claims upon our

allegiance” (196-197).
In this preliminary account of the virtues
as located within specific

practices,

MacIntyre recognizes heterogeneity

practices call for and sustain different
the

human

in the

and various

form of group differences:

virtues.

What

is

missing

is

a recognition that

group differences are systemic; humans do not just randomly
participate

practices, but rather practices are tied to systemic, social

gender, race, class, and so on.
the heterogeneity of practices

As

I

will

go on

to argue,

and corresponding virtues

his failure to see that this unity can only be

bought

different

in different

ways of grouping people— by
MacIntyre’s readiness to resolve
into an overall unity derives

at the price

from

of a systematic dismissal of

certain practices-and thus certain persons-as not genuinely belonging.

So

far

MacIntyre has, by noticing a multiplicity of practices and corresponding

multiplicity of virtues, recognized heterogeneity and conflict. But he

is

troubled by the

heterogeneity-the lack of unity-in this preliminary account of the virtues.

He

has found a

place to account for heterogeneity and hence conflict, but he wants to go on to find a larger

which

unity in

human

life.

this

He

heterogeneity has a place.

writes:
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This larger unity

is

to

be found

in a

whole

The most notable

difference so far between

could be called Aristotelian

that although

is

my
I

account and any account that

have

exercise of the virtues to the context of
practices,
that

I

have located

their point

in

no way

it is

in

terms of practices

and function. Whereas Aristotle locates

point and function in terms of the notion
of a type of whole

which can be called good. And
a

human being

lack

who

it

fail in

I

have said so

far.

which can be achieved through

own

life

For such an

a variety of particular ways

practices and in respect of the kind of

such excellence. His

life

lacked the virtues?’ must be given a kind
of answer

would not merely

the kind of excellence

human

that

does seem that the question ‘What would

which goes beyond anything which
individual

restricted the

human

in respect

of

participation in

relationship required to sustain

viewed as a whole would perhaps be

defective. (201)
If

it

is in

a whole

life that

virtue

must be located, then the

fact that

any person participates

in

a multitude of practices-with perhaps conflicting
virtues-must be problematic. MacIntyre
is

concerned about there being “ too many conflicts and too much
arbitrariness” (201). In

particular, he fears that “the claims of

such a way that one

may

one practice may be incompatible with another

find oneself oscillating in an arbitrary way, rather than

in

making

rational choices” (201).
It is

clear that for MacIntyre, conflicts created by having multiple
practices are a

threat to the unity of

virtues

whole human

which can be evaluated only

He remarks

that those

experience too
“there

my

may

much

people

conflict

life.

And

lacking such unity-and thus lacking the

as manifested in a

who have

arbitrariness to their lives.

be tensions between the claims of family

between the claims of politics and those of the

arts.

these examples can lead one

is

having

split allegiances.

Anyone with

me

defective.

allegiances to different particular practices

and an overall

away from

whole life— can make

seeing

.

life

He

and those of the

.”(201).

gives examples:

arts.

.

.

or

But what MacIntyre and

that there is in fact nothing arbitrary about

multiple identifications in different communities or

with different histories experiences the pull of different practices with different
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corresponding virtues, but there
Furthermore, the
identifications,

is

call for unity, for

must be heard as a

instance, if the practices

imbedded

nothing arbitrary about

anyone who acknowledges

in

lesbian

“my

their multiple

some of these

call to cast off

Jewish history beckon

accordance with “my” virtue-say, to marry
a Jewish
order to perpetuate

the differences are systemic.

it;

identifications.

me

man and

to

in

Jewish children

in

raise

people” in the face of cultural annihilation-while
the practices of

community beckon me towards another virtue-say,
recognizing and

my conflicting

allegiances,

throwing away “pieces” of

my

In recognizing exactly

possible to see

how

and no

nothing arbitrary
it

entails

identity.

how MacIntyre

in the unity

is

going to create unity out of conflict,

in

human

which they

are

some

it

is

identifications. Unity is to

We are characters in (and partial

of narrative.

authors of) narratives with a long history;

by a narrative history

is

resisting

call for unity will resolve the situation
if

his solution requires people to reject

be found, MacIntyre argues,

are tied

For

develop one way

compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory
motherhood-then there
about

group

actions are not isolated events, but instead

embedded. He

asserts that “narrative

history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and
essential genre for the characterization

of

human

she

is

others

actions

(208), and adds that

a character in a
(213).

number of narratives

oneself, that

at the

less) than the co-authors

the resolution of arbitrariness
is,

same

time,

(or not discover) that he or

some of them embedded

We are authors of these narratives in a collective sense; that is, “we

never more (and sometimes

Thus

“someone may discover

which ones

fit

for

men

is

am

‘Of what story or stories do

I

to do?’ if

I

own

we have

what they are

to learn

others respond to us and

how
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fit

MacIntyre writes;

authorship;

I

can only

can answer the prior question

find myself a part?’

I

life.

practices

We enter human

with one or more imputed characters-roles into which

drafted-and

how

not about their

are

narratives” (213).

comes from discovering which

answer the question ‘What

is,

own

the character in the narrative of one’s

The key question

that

of our

in

in

society,

we have been

order to be able to understand

our responses

to

them

are apt to be

construed.

through hearing

It is

what the

stories.

.

.

that children learn or
mislearn

cast of characters

may be in the drama into which they have
been born and what the ways of the
world are. (216)
•

It is

clear

from

•

•

the fact that

MacIntyre sees narrative as providing unity
and replacing the

arbitrariness ot participating in
multiple practices that he does not
recognize split allegiances

as re-occurring

now

in the

form of multiple

about a cast of characters to form their

own

stories they hear are themselves
multiple

who

are “split at the root”~to

borrow

that unity

If “the unity

of a

human

Through

identities, but

stories, children learn

what do they learn when

and contradictory? For instance,

the phrase that

mixed Jewish and Gentile heritage-the
provide unity.

narratives.

root

which

life is

Adrienne Rich uses

is

is

When

unity).

to describe her

the unity of a narrative quest”
(219), then
stories

amongst

But narratives can be multiple and conflicting
just as practices can.

MacIntyre goes on

with the recognition that “I

qua individual”

for those people

revealed in narrative history will not

can only come from hearing/living a unitary
story (or several

which there

the

am

to the third stage in his

account of the virtues, he begins

never able to seek for the good or exercise the
virtues only

(220); he needs to look, here, at the social circumstances that
construct

different narratives (and thus identities).

people are constructed

in a

At

this stage, if

he were to recognize that some

multitude of communities he would be led to see the
production

of different, conflicting narratives as

all

describing one person’s

recognize multiple communities as providing social identity.

But

it is

life.

He

But he does not

writes:

not just that different individuals live in different social

circumstances;

it

is

also that

we

all

approach our

bearers of a particular social identity.

someone

else’s cousin or uncle;

I

am

of this or that guild or profession;

I

nation. 32

me

Hence what

is

good

for

-

I

am

own

circumstances as

someone’s son or daughter,

a citizen of this or that city, a

belong

member

to this clan, that tribe, this

has to be the good for one

who

-Note that some of these relations are more constitutive of identity than others. Iris Marion Young
distinguishes between social groups, associations, and aggregates. A “guild” or “profession” would be
counted as an association, not a social group. Only social groups are constitutive of identity. Relations of
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inhabits these roles.

my

tribe,

As such

inherit

from the past of

my

family,

my

city,

my

nation, a variety of debts, inheritances,
rightful expectations
obligations. These constitute the

and

given of

point. This

is in

part

what gives

While MacIntyre has not acknowledged

on one person’s

I

life

my

life its

that the pull

my

my

life,

own moral

moral starting

particularity. (220)

of different constitutive communities

creates conflict or dis-unity just as
the pull of different practices does,

he does see conflict as thriving within
constitutive communities.

He

argues that our

particular social circumstances are
part of particular traditions, and
traditions are not static;

they change. Thus MacIntyre argues,
the idea of a tradition
conflict within traditions create change.

He

is

not necessarily conservative;

describes a “living tradition” as “an historically

extended, socially embodied argument, and an
argument precisely

which constitute

that tradition” (222),

and notes

that “traditions,

in part

when

about the goods

vital,

embody

continuities of conflict” (222). Traditions can
die out, MacIntyre thinks, but they

because of the

failure to sustain the relevant virtues:

do so

“Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness,

lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual
virtues— these corrupt traditions” (223).

MacIntyre, then, has partially opened the question of which
traditions

can see by his description of
the context in

which

how

inherit, but

traditions exist: the context of cultural imperialism, for
instance,

weakness and lack of virtue a
from forces such

one

traditions die that he has completely failed to recognize

serves to wipe out certain traditions systematically.

are killed

we

He makes

it

tradition will die, while failing to

as cultural imperialism.

He

seem

as if

by an

acknowledge

which

internal

that traditions

notes the “virtue of having an

adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one”
(223) but

does not mention that

it is

cultural imperialism

which destroys many people’s sense of
squashed the

political question

and subsequent compulsory assimilation

the traditions to

of which story one

gives a person an identity, as soon as he raises

members of associations to one another can be
of members.

it.

tells,

which they belong. He has thus
which

According

to

liberal relations, relations
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tradition or

community

MacIntyre, the traditions

which do not bear on the

identity

which sustain

the virtues are those

which survive, and

these tradittons which

is

it

we

inherit.

It is

now

dominant communities’
the narrative

why

possible to see

embodied

the call for unity systematically
erases

The

traditions.

in that life,

are characters in narratives,

we

inherit or discover ourselves within,

is

and communities. And

this is

life is

it is

as people with certain histories

and

this history

define our identity and our moral commitments.
virtues thus requires the discovery

human

MacIntyre has asserted. But

we

it

unity of a single

The

all

but the

the unity found in

not as individuals that

and social roles which

and our social roles legitimately

unity required for a full account of the

and acknowledgment of ourselves within our

where the

call for unity

becomes

histories

a call for erasure of

heterogeneous or multiple traditions and communities.
For a tradition to provide unity

must not be a mixture of perhaps contradictory

histories; for

matrix to guide the virtuous living of

must not consist of social

my

competing allegiances. And when there
tell

a unified story,

not die,
are

I

am

I

am directed

life

is

it

roles with

a mixture of histories to inherit and yet

to those traditions

which

traditions

I

must

sustain virtue and therefore

do

and make others hegemonic.

Because he believes there must be a unified story

is

location within a social

not directed to ask what the political forces of dominance and
subordination

which annihilate some

most

my

it

visible story, the history

rooted in heroic societies.

to

be

told,

which has virtuously survived. This

He

MacIntyre
is

why

tells

the

“our” tradition

has told us that “living traditions, just because they

continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate and

determinable character, so far as

does not ask, ‘which past?’

It is

it

possesses any, derives from the past” (223). But he

clear that he disregards this question by his assumptions

about which past “we” share, which past “we”

whether

we acknowledge

it

inherit.

or not, what the past has

He

made

writes, for instance:

us and

we cannot

“We

are,

eradicate from

ourselves, even in America, those parts of ourselves which are formed by our relationship
to

each formative stage

in

our history.

If this is so,
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then even heroic society

is still

inescapably a part of usall.

some version of Lorraine
examples throughout
Europeans;

•”

my

emphasis). This claim can only trigger
echoes of

Bethel’s refrain:

book

his

(130,

are

“What ’chou mean we, white

which claims dominance

knowledge two exceptions

The

in After Virtue

in the

on those people who

It is

not an analysis of the situation,

Black people, but rather a use of Black people’s
history

modern Americans

[white,

who deny any

otherwise noted]

Americans, saying

I

never

we

are to presume, as

Englishmen who refuse responsibility

Germans [Aryan, we

are to presume]

slaves’” (220).
for having

who

is

to

make

a

expressed by

MacIntyre’s subjects are unless

all

responsibility for the effects of slavery

owned any

my

to illustrate a point about

point about white people’s history. MacIntyre
writes, “...individualism
those

to

where MacIntyre mentions non-dominant

white people’s individualist lack of a sense
of history.
history, or social roles of

inherit this

United States today. There are

where he mentions “black Americans” only

first is

girl?”33 All of the

from the history of white Anglo Americans
or Western

this alerts us to the fact that his
attention is

history, this history

peoples.

.

He makes

wronged

upon black

a similar point about

Ireland,

and contemporary

see their relationship with Jews as morally

unaffected by the history of the Nazis. The second place where
MacIntyre mentions non-

dominant peoples
After describing

is

to illustrate the

modem

presence of contemporary, traditional communities.

society as a “conceptual

melange of moral thought and

practice,”

exhibiting only fragments of a tradition of virtues, he claims that he does
see traditions

surviving more intact in “certain communities whose historical
strong.”

He

with their past remain

ties

continues:

So

the older moral tradition

among,

for

is

discernible in the United States and elsewhere

example, some Catholic

Jews of an Orthodox persuasion,
moral tradition not only through
the peasant villages

all

Irish,

of them communities that inherit their

their religion but also

and households which

inhabited on the margins of

modem

^Lorraine Bethel, “What Chou Mean We, White Girl?”
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some Orthodox Greeks and some

in

their

from the

structure of

immediate ancestors

Europe. (252)

Conditions: Five

1

1,

no. 2 (Fall, 1979): 86-92.

These examples stand

in contrast to his

emphasis on

characterized as ongoing arguments; a
tradition

embodies

conflict

and change, and yet

is

traditions being living traditions,

healthy, he has told us, only

this sole reference to

non-dominant

portrays these traditions as stagnant,
not living traditions, not

dominant cultures only
that

that

to

emphasize

non-dominant cultures must die

members of marginalized

vital.

when

it

traditions

mentioning non-

In

their traditional nature, he contributes
to the insistence

(for lack of vitality). Furthermore,
he

cultures in the United States are often
those

complicate a sense of having a people, not those

who have

still

has not seen

who have

to

a clearly-bounded, traditional

culture and clearly given social roles.

MacIntyre never considers, “even

America,” the history of those Americans

in

inherit the narrative pasts (or presents) of
Africans, Asians, or Native

thus, never considers the narrative past(s) of
those
it

who

Americans; he

are hybrids or mestizos.

who

also,

And

thus

never seems problematic to him to speak of “our”
narrative past or pasts, for the question

of “which past?” never seems hard for him to answer,

But for many
the

it is

a source of conflict.

dilemma of the mixed

mother

listen to?”

What

(

is

never

itself the

As Gloria Anzaldua has

source of conflict.

written, “the mestizo faces

breed: which collectivity does the daughter of a dark
skinned

Borderlands 78).

traditions

‘whom should I engage

am
in

I

a part of?’ should be a key question.

meaning-making with?’ which

argument-the argument which constitutes a

is

It is

tied to the question,

the question of

living tradition-is with.

whom the

MacIntyre does see

people as having histories and traditions, which become present social contexts or

communities, but just
traditions

my

I

MacIntyre

fails to

problematize the question of which

one locates oneself in, which present communities constitute one’s

as if he asks,

should

like Sandel,

‘

given

engage

my

in the

history and tradition,

what should

argument about what the good

I

life is,

do

in,

which argument should

I

participate in? with
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it

out?’ (or

It is

‘how

argument which constitutes

the

living tradition?’) but not, ‘which living tradition (as if they

located

to live

identity.

were even

whom?’

distinct)

am

I

Furthermore, his characterization of a
living tradition as an ongotng
argument
misleading.

It

implies that

we

are

all

equally regarded as being within
the tradition,

legitimate participants in the
argument. But

it

is

not just an internal argument.

contest of borders. Questions arise
before the argument begins:

what goes on

in the

is

who

margins or the borderlands-is there an
argument

is in

It is

also a

the tradi.ton?

The

there, too?

context of cultural imperialism, of
dominance and subordination between
different
traditions, has a bearing

on the survival of some

traditions

and a bearing on who belongs

within which traditions. MacIntyre
ignores this context.

To summarize: MacIntyre

recognizes that there

is

conflict

stemming from there

being multiple practices in a society.
However, he does not recognize that the different
practices— and hence the conflicts of values-are
systemicallv different. Since he has not
characterized contemporary society as cut across
by overlapping group differences of race,

gender, ethnicity,

etc.,

he cannot recognize the systemic nature of
the different

constructions of practices. This has resulted in two
failures on MacIntyre’s part.
First

of

different values

in a society in

all,

(i.e.

which group differences construct

different people with

as having allegiance to different tables of
the virtues) and in

which

the

group differences arrange groups of people hierarchically,
the search for overall unity tends
to result in a forsaking

of the practices of subordinate groups and a consequent
increased

hegemony of dominant groups’
to systematically

practices.

MacIntyre

abandoning subordinate groups’

narrative history— our

history going

back

fails to

see that his call for unity leads

practices. Since the unity is based in

to heroic societies— there is

an erasure of

conflicting histories, histories of subordinate groups, for recognition
of such histories

would

disrupt the unified nature of the narrative.

But there

is

a second failure on MacIntyre’s part, which has to do with the fact that

group differences are overlapping, and they overlap within individuals.
racialized or just genderized, and so on;
itself

we

are constituted with a gender

No

one

which

is

is

just

in part

defined by race and ethnicity and class, and so on; for any given person, then, there
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is

never just one story

to tell.

thereby being able to
still,

tell

most people’s

in

racial story

Even

there were

if

some way of isolating,

say, race,

and

the story of one person by telling
the story of their race, there

“racial” story

(remember,

this is

supposing, contrary to

is

fact, that a

could be told separate from any other
story, a “gender” story for
example)

actually several perhaps confhcting
stories, for races are seldom
“pure.”

Thus any one
might

conflict.

individual belongs to

Identification with

many “groups” whose

one group Lather than another

attempt to live out a mixed, or mestizo identity
possible and desirable are

among

history, the past

is

also a political act.

Which

failing to problematize the act of

which has formed

and

a political act, and the

the important political questions
to ask.

MacIntyre takes these as a given by

on one’s

is

histories overlap

identities are

However,

knowing and drawing

oneself.

*

*

*

Sandel and MacIntyre’s conceptions of encumbered
selves, or selves
bearers ol particular histories provide an account of

how

who come

a certain kind of a self

as

is

constituted as having a people. This self comes by
his/her ends through a certain sort of
reflection, a reflection

which asks “who

bounded community or a
a

self,

because

identifications

to create

are

my

it

is

complex

single narrative history. But

clear that in a world

identities, there us a

I

It is

this

complex

am compelled

need

self

to ask as

I

am interested

who

histories

of

will

involves re-constituting

my own

self identity.

engage

who

is

forced to ask,

“who

is

not given in advance and in any case will

is

interesting because if

open-ended the

whom I

politically

in resistance, a resistance

For the complex

are the political companions, of the
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complex

I

understand myself

motivated question of

which

self, this

be answered by reference to a unified community or history; so one

who

in a different sort

converge within individuals

understand a self

to

the people are with

the people,

to a single,

where multiple and conflicting community

people?” precisely because the answer

as such a self,

and answers with reference

and multiple and conflicting narrative

not reveal a unity.

who

am I?”

is

in part

question cannot

led to ask,

self, the self

who

who

are

lacks the

unity that
theorists

is

the

who

aim of MacIntyre's

narrative quest? In the next
chapter

are in dialogue with communitarian
theory but

only traditional forms of community
constitute our selves.
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who do

I

will consider

not presuppose that

CHAPTER

III

BEYOND COMMUNITARIAN UNITY
The paradox of

sociability reappears within the

community of life

cohesion: insofar as sympathy in social

life

threatens to destroy the individuality

wants to protect.

it

as a paradox of group

requires an allegiance to

By

its

common

ends,

it

very nature, community

always on the verge of becoming oppression.
The existing consensus may be
mistaken for the final expression of the good,
and used as a justification for denying
the
humanity of individuals and rejecting the
is

legitimacy of dissident groups.

responds to

that

character of

all

this threat

must be one

forms of group

life

that

process through which community

as manifestations of

any one

is

.

A

politics

emphasizes the transitory and limited

human

be committed to the plurality and diversity
of groups, and

will

.

made

created and

nature.
it

Such a

politics

will prize the conflictual

universal above the preservation of

collectivity.

—Roberto Mangabeira Unger

A. Introduction

As

argued

I

in the previous chapter,

Sandel and Maclntyre-as well as other

communitarian theorists-have extremely limited conceptions
of what counts as a
constitutive

community. At

least,

allows for the recognition that

it

however, they do offer a model of community which

makes sense

unattached, unencumbered ghost-selves

who

to speak of

“having a people”~that

we

are not

appear out of nowhere and can become

(through free individual choice) anything. In response to both Sandel and
MacIntyre,

have argued

that instead of

character derives from,

community by opening

it is

presupposing

it

the

community

is

or which history our

crucial to complicate the understanding of constitutive

the question of

sacrificing the claim that

who

I

who

one’s people are, while meanwhile not

does indeed make sense to speak of having a people, a

collectivity to one’s self.

What

the traditional communitarians give

communitarian

self.

We

are constituted in

is

a descriptive account of the

community, they claim; we do “come with” our
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histories.

human

The claim

selves are.

although one can

is

As
fail,

descriptive in the sense that they
are asserting that this

social animals,

we

cannot

fail to

be constituted

way

as the liberal does, to understand
oneself in this way; one can

previously value-free subject selects
from
traditional

among

we

imply the limited normative claim

self, then,

are constituted in
that

it is

in

which a

the possibilities.

communitarian account of the

constitute a descriptive claim that
to

the

in relation to others,

mistakenly believe that one gains
one's ends through an exercise
of the will

The

is

can be understood

community;

to

can also be extended

it

best to understand ourselves as
so constituted,

for there is a poverty involved
in seeing oneself only as an

unencumbered

ghost-self.

However, stronger and more complicated
normative claims can be made when one
communitarian theory with the suggestion

that

while

we

are constituted in

revises

community and

through history, the communities and
histories which constitute us are not
unified, and are
not wholly given in advance. For
are constituted with, then

if

we

are in part agents in the determination
of

one can make normative claims about which

communities claim one’s allegiance. The basis
one understands

for these normative claims

politics in the Aristotelian sense, then

others as an undertaking which

communitarian view of the

is

constitutive of one’s identity.

self reveals that political

origin.

I

whose

identities are

A complex

say, one’s

in

advance by

community of

must be ones

that

make sense

for

understood through intersecting group differences.

This chapter will open the
is

politics with

one can make normative claims about who should comprise one’s

(constitutive) political communities, but that these claims

selves

for if

communities are neither completely

homogeneous community which was,

will argue that

and which

is political,

one understands doing

“chosen” by the unencumbered self nor are they completely
determined
reference to a single,

histories

whom we

way

for such claims

by considering whether and how

it

possible to exercise agency underneath the pull of conflicting constitutive identities.

Thus

I

am

going to turn

thinking about

now

to theorists

who

attempt to develop communitarian ways of

community without presupposing who
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the constitutive

community

is

composed

of.

I

will begin with Marilyn Fr.edman,

whose account of commun.ty comes

out of her critique of communitarians
such as Sandel and MacIntyre.

Community of Choic e/Intentional Community

B.

Marilyn Friedman’s goal

is to

retain the communitarians’ claim
that the self is

constituted in community, but to reject
their assumptions about what
counts as a

community and about
their

members”

the “legitimacy of the moral influences

She suggests

(280).

that

one begins

to think

which communities exert over
about the self as constituted

not only in communities of place but also
in what she refers to as communities
of choice;

she rejects Sandel ’s description of community
as “not a relationship they [members]
choose
(as in a voluntary association) but an
attachment they discover, not

merely an

attribute but a

constituent of their identity” (Sandel, Liberalism
150, qtd. in Friedman 283). In
contradistinction to his point, Friedman asserts that
“one need not have simply discovered

oneself to be

embedded

in

them [communities]

particulars of one’s life be defined
foster not so

much

by them” (284). She

writes,

moral

“communities of choice

the constitution of subjects but their reconstitution”
(289)— that

purposeful, chosen reconstitution.
better

in order that one’s identity or the

Her suggestion

is

that

is,

“communities of choice” can be

moral starting points— and better locations for doing continued collective
ethical

thinking— than communities of place, for one can choose to become a

community which

is

member of a

based on feminist or liberatory values, a community whose norms and

practices are informed

by feminist thinking; implicit

constitute or “reconstitute” oneself as a

member

is

the claim that one can choose to

of a community which

or liberatory values. According to Friedman, to create or join a

is

based on feminist

community of choice

allows one to exercise choice about what sort of relations and norms will inform one’s
ethical thinking;

one does not have

communitarian philosophy, the

which one

set

to take as given (or as unshakable), as

one does

in

of moral values which are held in the community

finds oneself.
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in

Friedman’s use of the distinction
between communities of place and
communities of
choice

in

thinking about

how

the self

is

constituted in

community could be

helpful

if it

allows one to mamtain a commitment
to thinking of the self as
socially constituted without
thereby being committed to seeing
oneself as necessarily constituted
by the dominant moral
values which were embodied by the
communities of place which were one’s
communities

of origin. However,

it is

not clear that Friedman’s description
of “choosing” a

within which to reconstitute one’s self
subject.

Although she describes the

is

point of entry into the
self

and

who can
start

supported by an adequate account of the
choosing

self as being socially (re)constituted

community of choice, she does not give

in fact, the

image of the

is

within a

is like at

self at this point

the

of a

and the ways her community of place have
constituted

her,

self— is quite like the liberal, unencumbered self

within the

it

is

anew. This conception of the self-which Friedman

choice— and from then on, the

once

a defensible account of what this self

community of choice;

cast off her history

community

at the

in fact refers to as the

point of choosing a

modern

community of

self is characterized as communitarian,
socially constituted

community of choice.

Thus a communitarian response

to

Friedman’s advocating

communities of choice might include the assertion
requires acknowledging the extent to

which we

that

that recognizing

we form

humans’

are necessarily constituted

sociality

by the cultures

of our communities of place; thus, one might argue, to suppose
that a person could simply

“choose” with
about

human

whom to constitute

their self-identity is to

nature. Friedman’s valorization of

examined. However,
the possibility of

I

do not think

make an

individualist assumption

communities of choice thus needs

to

be

re-

that this re-examination needs to lead to a rejection of

communities of choice;

instead,

it

means one has

be both socially constituted and capable of exercising agency

in

to

show

that a self

can

changing, leaving, or

creating a constitutive community. Friedman has not provided a description of the

choosing self as someone
not

mean

that

who

is

already encumbered or socially constituted, but this does

an encumbered self could not “choose”
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to radically

change which community

she

is

constituted within. In fact,

have argued

I

.ha,

an encumbered self can, contrary
to

Sandel's characterization, exercise
the sort of agency necessary
for making this sort of
change.

Friedman critiques “the legitimacy of
the moral influences which
communities exert
over

members"

their

Friedman

is

(280). But questioning the legitimacy
of moral influences-which

quite right to

do-does

not entail denying that these moral
influences are

present in the seifs history or identity.
Being a self

who comes

to resist or reject certain

moral values-say, the ethnocentrism
of a particular community-should be
distinguished

from being a

self

who

instance, ethnocentric.

has no history of being constituted
with that value-of being, for

By

equating a rejection of the legitimacy
of the values with a denial

that the values in part constitute the

herself

open

choosing subject’s history or

to the criticism that she relies

on a conception of the

identity,

self as

Friedman leaves

unencumbered

upon entering a community of choice.
But one can argue for both the

possibility

and the

desirability of

communities of

choice (which might better be called intentional
communities, to emphasize intention-

which the encumbered

self can

have-as opposed

to choice,

which connotes a choosing

subject with no prior or given ends) without
denying that the self

is

always constituted with

a history of values, whether these values exert a
legitimate or an illegitimate pull.
exercise of agency in rejecting the values one

encumbered, not the unencumbered

making a mistaken

community

self.

is

constituted with

The communitarian

is

the

critical

The

agency of the

claim (that

requires

it

individualist assumption to see oneself as capable of “choosing”
a

rather than finding oneself as constituted in a

which, for instance, marginal beings are constituted as
of place; recognizing

this leads

one

to see that

(partially) outsiders in

the

way

(i.e.

is

not

someone who somehow

constituted in a particular social context)-but rather an act of
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in

communities

“choosing” an intentional community

an act of an (illusory) individual— an unencumbered self

would not have been

community) ignores

someone

who was
someone

constituted in a particular social
context, but a context which constitutes
her as
partially outside (or in a problematic
relation with) the

It is

community.

important to notice that Friedman does
not characterize the “choice” to leave

one community or

set

of values and to enter into another one
as an act of a socially

constituted self, but rather as the act
of an idiosyncratic individual. She discusses
friendship, for instance, as a relationship
role, but rather is freely chosen.

chooses on one’s

by custom or

own

She

which

is

not “discovered” as part of one’s social

writes, “friends are

to share activities

and intimacies.

tradition to be a person’s friends”
(286).

choose any other individual as a
clearly false; social

friend,

-one

some

in

s

customs play a large part

in

determining

instances, there are particular others

is

based on

arising out of one s

as if any individual could

whom one can be

(286). But this

is

own

is

race, or age, or class, for instance.

whom one is expected to be

if it is

the case that

which heterosexuality

is

men

Friedman would have

community values be

friends with-

she writes that

it,

demanded”

“needs, desires, interests, values,

constituted. For instance, the fact that

is tied to their

institutionalized.

my

many

being socially constituted in a context

Resistance to such a construction of desire

out of an individual and idiosyncratic desire and

choice, but rather out of being socially constituted as resistant.
to

when

socially assigned, ascribed, expected, or

a false contrast,

desire relationships with

not, as

friends with.

needs, desires, interests, values, and attractions, in contrast
to

and attractions have themselves been socially

women

this is

voluntary choice,” where voluntary choice “refers to
motivations

motivations arising from what

comes

It is

whom one

particular people are assigned

cousin, for example. Friedman seems to deny these
forces

friendship

in

No

to be people

independent of their social positions. But

There are social sanctions against friendships across

And

supposed

socially constructed but our refusal to

Why

would our conformity

conform be somehow a

product of a ghost-self?

When Friedman
into

new attachments

writes,

“women moved

with other

women by

their

93

out of their given or found communities

own

choice, that

is,

motivated by their

own

needs, desires, attractions, and fears
rather than, and often in
opposition

expectations and ascribed roles of their
found communities” (287) she
that their

is

to, the

falsely

found communities constituted them
through a completely hegemonic

values. 34

To make

clearly bounded.

this

But

in

assumption

is

to see a given

community

assuming
set

of moral

homogeneous and

as

fact-and Friedman would agree with
this-there

is

not just one

consistent set of values which influences
or constitutes someone’s identity,
because

communities are neither homogeneous nor clearly
bounded.
that

one can be socially constituted

encumbered
her

self

who

if

thoroughgoingly hegemonic

some

would

that allows

one

to

claim that

it is

the

one sees a community as having one consistent
and

set

of values

is

idiosyncratic individual

counter-hegemonic desires,
I

ways

the recognition of the fact

has been constituted so as to animate
resistance to dominant values in

own community. Only

reference to

in multiple

It is

like to revise

one then unable

who somehow

attractions, values,

to explain resistance without

has, in a

vacuum, developed

and so on.

Friedman’s theory with the claim that intentional
communities

develop through the intention of the socially constituted
self-not the idiosyncratic
individual. Revised in this way, Friedman’s suggestion
that communities can be both
intentional

(

constitutive

chosen

)

and constitutive opens a wide range of question about what

communities are and can

be.

While Sandel and MacIntyre and other

communitarians’ accounts of constitutive communities are merely descriptive
(or may
include the fairly

weak normative claim

that

we

not only are encumbered, but that

ought to understand ourselves as encumbered), the claim
be intentional allows one
describing the

to give a

community

in

that constitutive

we

also

communities can

normative account of them. Rather than being limited

which

I

Find myself,

I

can

now

consider, given

my

to

agency

Alison Jaggar would attribute women’s attraction to each other within a society where heterosexuality
These emotions are not indications that there is
some part of us which has escaped being socially constituted, but rather they are indications that we have

is

institutionalized as an instance of “outlaw emotions.”

been socially constituted within a context where the hegemonic values do not have a complete hold on
values created and sustained within other, non-dominant collectivities affect us also, and ground the
possibility for these “outlaw emotions.”
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us;

(st,ll

as an

encumbered or collectively

communities

intentionally,

in

my capacity

to

develop or create

what should those communities
be?

Agency and t he Encumbered

C.

Garry Brodsky,

constituted self) and

“A Way

of Being a Jew;

the dialogue about the communitarian
self similar

Self

A Way of Being a Person” bnngs to

concems-although

his are

coming from a

different “place” of identity-to those
of Friedman. Like Friedman, he
recognizes that a

moral position does not gain legitimacy just
because

encumbrance of one’s “given”

it

history or experience.

carries the weight of being an

The

self he describes is a self

does not accept the moral particulars of her/his
given community as given;

aware of such general points as

that traditions

this self

is:

and communities can be

conservative and provincial and that telling someone
that her identity

bound up with family,

who

nation, religion, or tradition often can be
a

is

means not

of revealing a fact but of fashioning one, thus
persuading someone

to

bind

herself to a group, accept a belief, and, perhaps,
support an action such as a

war, for no good reason.

(

258 )

His account of the self maintains the communitarian claim
that
selves, but he

meanwhile wants

calls liberal choice.

He

to argue that

we

are

encumbered

such a self can and should exercise what he

sees the claim that the self

is

encumbered with a

history and a sense

of identity or peoplehood as consistent with the claim that the self
engages

in

an act of

choosing which manifests his/her freedom as independence from encumbrances.
That
he aims to advocate a liberalism which
self as

is

is,

not dependent upon the liberal conception of the

unencumbered.
Brodsky’s argument

particular sort of a
liberal in

one

“come with”

is

based on the example of a particular

Jew-whom Brodsky

s ability to

of a person—

believes stands as evidence that one can both be

exercise choice and

a history and sense of identity.

the sort of person he has in

sort

make independent

He

decisions, and yet

begins his argument by pointing out that

mind-and whom he himself is-does
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still

not

fit

the description of

the self offered

by communitarians such

certainly does not
positing: the self

prior to

its

fit

as Sandel

the description of the self

who

is

nonobservant, postmodern American

in

self as

.

who

to a

be

individuated in advance’ and given
“is

an assimilated, atheistic,

identity felt

by

this self

this self

and feeling of Jewish

cannot be explained

(whom Brodsky

communitarian account of the

her/his attachment to Jewish history

liberals to

nevertheless feels deep attachments to
Jewry and

unencumbered, and so

postmodern Jew”) might turn

.

mind a Jew who

Judaism” (260). The strong sense of Jewish

by an account of the

which communitarians take

“‘wholly unencumbered.

ends” (259). Brodsky has

and MacIntyre, but on the other hand

self to

refers to as the

make

sense of

However, Brodsky

identity.

argues, a communitarian vision such as
MacIntyre’s description of a self as constituted

through narrative history also does not adequately
characterize the “postmodern Jew.” For

such an account ignores the dis-unity caused by the many
different pulls on the

“postmodern Jew”;

it

ignores the “complex character of the

postmodern, assimilated American Jew” (253) and the
Jewishness and

its

member

history as a

mainstream culture are

intrinsically

life

fact that

and allegiances of the
such a self “lives her

of a group whose relations

complex”

(254).

These

to the

dominant,

relations involve connections to

Gentiles through one’s profession, through living together in the same
neighborhoods,

being tied

to

many of the same

cultural influences,

and so on; but on the other hand,

no matter how assimilated the American Jew may
feels in the

mainstream

culture, to

what extent he

be,

how

comfortable he

identifies with

and

situates

himself within the American version of Western civilization rather than with

Jewish culture.

which

.

.

he knows that there

he, as a Jew,

is

a significant part of that culture to

does not belong, despite talk of ‘our Judeo-Christian

heritage.’ (254)

Thus

the

“postmodern Jew”

is

both encumbered with a sense of Jewish identity but also

complexly constituted by the variety of perhaps conflicting allegiances which
living a life not wholly circumscribed within one single,
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result

from

bounded and homogeneous

community such
believing

Jew

These

as

in a

one

might be experienced by someone

that

who

lives or lived “as a

Jewish community” (254-255). 35

sorts of split allegiances are precisely

what MacIntyre believes disturb

the

desired attainment of a “metanarrative or
‘scheme of overall belief which extends beyond
the realm of pragmatic necessity,’”
(MacIntyre,

Whose

Justice 393, qtd. in Brodsky.
.

A self like the “postmodern Jew” would be condemned by MacIntyre,

248).

argues, as a self “which has too
convictions, too

many

many

half-convictions and too few settled coherent

partly formulated alternatives

them systematically” (MacIntyre, Whose

we

are so willing to dispense with

MacIntyre we don’t think the kind of

and too few opportunities

.

that unity is a

desideratum for the

what the polis made available

self

to evaluate

Justice 397, qtd. in Brodsky, 248). Brodsky,

however, disagrees with MacIntyre’s claim
reason

Brodsky

we have

self:

is that

“one

unlike

ascribed to the postmodern Jew has

serious short-comings” (255). For the unity which MacIntyre call
for, Brodsky believes,

precludes the very pull of conflicting allegiances which allow one to
(indeed demand that

one) exercise choice.

And “postmodern

Jews,” Brodsky posits, particularly value the

possibility of individual choice for they are particularly

aware

that “for a very long time

such options were not available to Jews” (262). Thus Brodsky believes that the

“postmodern Jew” not only continually faces choices
ability to

make such choices

friends, marriage partners,

to

and so on” [256]); and,

choices available to a person are delimited by,

in

lives,

among

making choices, such

33 And,

I

is

would argue, even

He acknowledges

a self can be

that “the

other things, the sociohistorical

her family and her native physical, psychological, and

mental capabilities” (256) but notes that “while she
agent of choice,’ she

but furthermore values the

(about, for instance, “their careers, places of residence,

“partially responsible for fashioning her identity” (256).

circumstances in which she

make

is

not, in Sandel’s

a partially sovereign agent of choice, and

the “traditional” Jewish villages or shtetl

when

communities

grandparents lived were also not as homogeneous and bounded as they have been
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words,

‘a

sovereign

she exercises this

in

made

which, say, our
out to be.

capacity and

makes

these choices she also exercises and
develops her relative independence

from the communities

that nurture her” (256).

Brodsky’s critique of the communitarian view
of the
observation that the “postmodern Jew”
that the sort

is

social circumstances,

is

and

his

not such a unified self has led him, then,
to claim

of agency exercised by the “postmodern
Jew”

by history and

self as unified

is

an agency that while affected

also an act of independence. But

what

the nature

is

of the freedom which the “postmodern Jew”
seems to cherish? Brodsky identifies

same freedom which
one’s

own

life

the liberal cherishes, the freedom to

plans. His insistence that his account of

consistent with the tenants of liberalism

understood as (even

if to

interference; otherwise,

theory.

He

people and

tells

its

of liberalism

show

would seem

to

is

not clear

how

“postmodern Jew”

the

imply that

why Brodsky would want

us that “the postmodern

as the

make independent choices about

a lesser degree than the liberals imagine

it

it

this

freedom

acts is

is

freedom from

it)

to call his theory a liberal

Jew can affirm and cherish

his ties to the

Jewish

history and, the communitarians notwithstanding,
also accept the basic tenets

(259), acknowledging that to fully argue this point he

that liberalism

foundations. But

it

can be defended without reliance on

is

unclear

communitarian account of the

why Brodsky would

its

to

go on

to

untenable deontological

insist that the

self as unable to exercise

would have

only alternative to the

agency must be the

liberal

conception of agency as an exercise of choice free from interference.

Brodsky seems

to

be pointing

to a difference of

“postmodern Jew” and the unencumbered

self of liberalism: the

encumbered, but not too encumbered; he/she

is

encumbrances. What Brodsky does not do

freedom

that the self

his recognition that the

is

“postmodern Jew”

is

affected by history and social

circumstances, but not too affected to continue to

the kind of

degree between the self he calls the

make choices independent of these

develop a distinction based on a difference

can be understood

to have.

This

is

odd precisely because

“postmodern Jew” can only explain his/her Jewish

allegiances by understanding the self as encumbered would
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seem

to

in

identity

and

imply an understanding

Of freedom to choose as a social
product, not as a form of freedom
from interference, for to

understand that the self

is

always socially constituted (even

conflicting social contexts)

Brodsky’s recognition

is to

that the

understand that

we

if in

never act free from “interference.'’

“postmodern Jew” has many difference
allegiances-ties

which cross Gentile worlds and Jewish
worlds-need not stand

as evidence that such a self

requires freedom or independence in the
liberal sense, but rather
the social worlds

ways. Freedom

which create
is

no

a variety of perhaps

the

freedom of this

Thus

I

can point to the

fact that

and

complex

self are multiple

less a social product, though, just

different or complicated social worlds.

it

want

because

it

is

to maintain the

intersect in

a product of

many

claim that the agency

exercised by the complex, communitarian self
(including the self which Brodsky calls the

postmodern Jew”)

is

a form of collective agency, an agency
which draws on the

complicated mixture of encumbrances or constitutive

ties

which are

part of this self.

not the agency of an individual asserting
independence from social ties or
interference,

but rather the agency of a self

constitution are multiple; thus

grounded

is

not obvious or simple.

or that particular
rather,

it is

who

community

that

The

is

makes up

fact that

some other

sources of

whose sources of “interference” or
the collectivity in

someone

asserts

not evidence that this person

is

evidence that there

it is

all

social

is

It is

social

which the agency

independence from

acting free

from

is

this

interference;

world whose values are sustaining the

resistance.

If the self

one

is

concerned with

Friedman’s feminist, constituted

is,

like

in a variety

Brodsky’s “postmodern Jew” or

of communities and through multiple,

intersecting histories, then one needs to recognize that

sense— means many different things, and
in

it

like

“community”— even

will be helpful to sketch out

in a constitutive

some of the ways

which one might conceive of communities. Sandel and MacIntyre’s view of

communities as being limited

to

communities of place (especially communities of origin)

derives from their failure to recognize both that

many

different socially significant

groupings of people serve as constitutive communities for any given person, and
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that there

can be
to

intent, on

involved in determining

who

one's communittes are. But before
going on

explore the senses of community
that might emerge,

I

am going to turn

briefly to

Roberto Unger's description of community,
for he does use the term
“community"
normative sense, providing a very
different notion of what a community
Sandel and MacIntyre have

in

is

in a

than what

mind.

D- The Spiral: Increased Community as Diminishing
Domination

Roberto Unger comes

to

an exploration of community because
he

is

engaged

in a

consideration of the good, and sees that the
good emerges in community. Beginning with
the claim that “the

good

is

properly viewed as an actualization of

calls the “species nature”
(239),

Unger goes on

opposed

to

(human) nature, and the second

domination— is a pre-requisite

therefore of the good.

The
the

He

first

for the

defines the

first

specifies that

under which the

good

in

community-as

emergence of this species nature and

describes the two elements of his doctrine:

element

good consists

is

the concern of the theory of the self:

in the

particular persons.

it is

development of the species nature

The second element

nature and our understanding of
increasing

nature” or what he

to describe the conditions

species nature can emerge. His doctrine thus
has two parts: the
relation to the species

human

it

is

the thesis.

.

.

in the lives

that

can progress through a

the notion that

both

spiral

of

human
of

community and diminishing domination. (239) 36

Notice that Unger’s conception of human nature is not an essentialist one,
for he sees the species nature
as evolving through the interaction of individuals; their participation
in a universal human nature is in a
dialectic relation with their own particularity, which in part
comprise the universal. His theory “does not
rely on the notion that mankind fsfc] as a whole and each of
its members has an essence or an unchanging
core that can

somehow permeate

history and biography. Instead,

distinctive experience of personality

is

it starts out from the idea that the
that of confronting a certain set of intelligible, interrelated problems

that arise in one’s dealings with nature, with others

and with oneself. Insofar as both the problems and the
may speak of a human nature and of
a universal good. But continuity does not mean permanence” (240). We might call his
understanding of
human nature a socially teleological account; that is, the bounds of human nature are developed socially
under changing conditions and so are changeable and not tied to any given essence, but at the same time, no
one individual’s “nature” is completely free from the givens of their social context. Unger writes, “The
species nature advances through the development of the capacities of individuals. But no definable set of
realized individual talents exhausts human nature, which is continuously changing in history. The universal
ideal

ways ot responding

to

them are continuous

in

space and time, one

good exists solely in particular goods, yet it is always capable of transcending them” (240). His
communitarian argument allows him to retain some conception of a human nature as not entirely up
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for

Immediately the question

whatever acts take place

would develop

in

arises for

of the good? That

attainment of the species nature, and

human

the species nature advances
through

is

whatever comes out of the

community, then what allows one

acts in

not a part of the good? Certainly
domination

development of individual capacities and
to this

that this species nature

one equates the good with the

is, if

the species nature

if

possible directions of development over
others?

Unger responds

if

community, why would one assume

in the direction

unfolding history of

Unger:

is

What

to value certain

allows one to say that domination

a part of what emerges though the

“talents.”

problem by arguing

that not just

any actions are equally

representative of the species nature, for actions
take place under different conditions;

some

conditions serve to repress the emergence of the
species nature or to wrongly represent
If

one simply takes an inventory of the ways

different social and historical circumstances

characteristics of

human

nature or

common

in

which humans

good

(242).

list

Domination may

to

.

it

.

of seemingly shared

method which

disregards the corrupting

show human

itself

it.

have acted across

ends, then one engages in a

domination on the capacity of shared purposes

therefore to measure the

act or

and come up with a

“pays no heed to the way values are determined by society.
effects of

is

nature and

produce a consensus— or the

appearance of a consensus— of values, but such shared values are not truly
representative of

humanity or of the good.

Unger argues:

Instead of asking what people want,

we

should ask

first

under what

conditions their choices might inform us more fully about what
to

each of them and

be

to

to

mankind

a whole.

[sic] as

determine the circumstances

in

which we

Our

first

is

distinctive

concern should

are entitled to give greater or

lesser weight to consensus, taking agreed-upon values as better or

indications of our

moral agreement

grabs, while

meanwhile not

conception of a unitary

common

is

often

humanity.

little

.

.

Because of the

more than a testimonial

fact

worse

of domination,

to the allocation

falling into an essentialism; he writes that his effort “is to retain the

human

nature while acknowledging that

different forms of social life he establishes” (246).

101

man

[sic]

makes himself through

the

of

power

in the

nature,

it

group. For moral union to be
representative of the species

must

weight only

arise

in the

from conditions of autonomy.

measure

to

which they

.

.

Shared values carry

are not simply products of

dominance. (242-243)

Unger

s

claim, then,

from people through
moral agreement

to

that the

is

good consists of those shared values which

history, but only

be arrived

at in

under certain conditions: the conditions

to stand for

And

emerging.

the opposite arrangement
is

from

that

led to conclude, “the species nature

Unger has thus justified

is

is it

even just any way

with one another in the formation of values.

It is

in

is

(260).

community

only those ways of engaging which do

b gtter than domination. To

only to refer to a collective development of values, but
the

community”

which people may engage

not manifest relations of domination and
subordination; community,

domination and

that

is

revealed and developed in

a definition of community in a normative
sense:

not just any gathering of people, nor

to

become hegemonic,

of domination, Unger stipulates,

history through the spiral of diminishing
domination and increasing

opposed

that allow

agreed upon” values. Thus domination
inhibits the good from

of community. Thus he

is

emerge

an egalitarian way, to be uninfluenced
by domination,

since domination creates a situation
where only the dominators’ views

come

will

call

it is

to

Unger can claim,

something community

make

is

is

not

the normative claim that

development of values can only tend towards the good when there

is

freedom from

domination.
It

become

clear, then,

how Unger’s

understanding of community differs from that

of Sandel or MacIntyre; for both Sandel and MacIntyre refer primarily

which

are characterized

by entrenched

relations of

domination).

that

By

we should

strive for

communities

domination and subordination. Their

accounts of community are merely descriptive; their claim

community, not

to

is

that

we

are constituted in

community (where community

is

opposed

to

understanding communities as intentional Friedman opened the way

make sense of the normative claim

that

we

should develop community; by defining
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to

community

in oppos.tion to domination,

Unger provide

a motivatton for

maktng

this

normative claim.

Unger must now consider what
absence of domtnatton.
group.

To

The organic group

principles

this

a

is

the conditions are for

community regulated by
to

depend upon

three institutional principles,

certatn empirical assumptions

inferences; these pnnciples are the

community of life,

division of labor.

on the community of

will focus here

community a location of “sympathetic
“political equivalent of love”

Two

for the

end, he develops an account of
what he calls the organ,

whtch Unger acknowledges

I

community, or

the

social relations”;

can take place (261)

”

as a

is

a

whose aim
community

Unger argues

factors coalesce in sympathy: the

which each views the other

democracy of ends, and the

life,

it

and

to

is

in

make

which

the

that:

communion of purposes by

complementary

a

virtue of

rather than as an

antagonistic will, and the willingness to see and
treat others as concrete

individuals rather than as role occupants.

Sympathy means

that people
encounter each other in such a way that their sense
of separateness from one
another varies in direct rather than inverse proportion to
their sense of social

union.
are

When

individuality and sociability

viewed and

.

.

complement each

treated as unique persons and as partners to

other, others

whom one

is

bound by common purposes. (261-262)
The

face-to-face coexistence and the fact that

variety of activities prevents

members from

members

participate with

one another

in a

seeing one another as role-occupants; instead,

they are able to see one another as concrete, particular people, with whole
personalities.

Thus an association characterized by
organization

is

a

community of life”

face-to-face coexistence and by multipurpose

(262).

Unger’s primary concern with the organic group as a locus for community-for

non-domination— is with the tension between the group cohesion necessary
and the preservation of what he

refers to as individuality.

for

community

The elements of the community

•^The democracy of ends indicates the “circumstances under which choice would become increasingly
expressive of humanity,” and the division of labor describes the kind of organization of labor that can “serve
as a basis for the development of individuality as well as for the advancement of the species nature” ( 261 ).
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of

life are

members

meant

to both foster cohesion or a
sharing of values

to exist as

and to provide

a basis for

and be known as concrete individuals.
The community of

remain a small group

in order to

must

life

allow members to recognize
each other as individuals

rather than role-occupants, for “others
cannot be

known and

unless they can be seen and touched in
the flesh” (263). But

dealt with as real individuals
at the

same

time, the shared

values which ground members’ sympathetic
relations with one another can serve
to destroy
this

very individuality.

When Unger makes the

arresting

on the verge of becoming oppression"
(266) he

is

been suppressed. But the nature of this dissension

differences, not

tendency

to

it.

from group differences

that

“community

is

always

expressing his wariness of achieving a

consensus of values, a consensus which so often
only

does not give an adequate account of

remark

reflects the fact that dissension
has

itself

needs to be examined, for Unger

Dissension, for him, arises from individual
tied to categories

of social

identity.

Unger has a

equate diversity with individuality: differences for
him tend to be descnbed as

individual differences, not group differences, and so

it is

these individual differences which

he strives to protect within community.

Recognizing differences as socially significant group differences
rather than

just

individual differences requires adding to Unger’s description
of the tension present in the

community of life. He
would

like to

add

sees a paradox between group cohesion and individuality;
but

that there is not only the question

I

of individuals’ idiosyncrasies being

subordinated to group cohesion, but also a question raised by the interlocking of
race,
class, gender,

and so on

in the

formation of identity:

if

group cohesion

is

based on one of

these categories of identity-a shared racial identity, for instance-then does the

group become based on only those who are dominant

group cohesion requires shared

identity, then

in other categories

members who belong

marginalized group will always be the dissenters

in

to

norm of the

of identity?

If

more than one

every group they are

in.

Unger

powerfully represents the problem of the possibility of group cohesion becoming coercive
or tyrannical. But the problem

is

more than

the
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problem of the subordination of

individuality;

the

is

it

problem which

arises

when

the group cohesion

achieved by

is

defining the group in terms of an essential
characteristic of identity, and thus

when

the complexity of identity as
constituted through interlocking social
categories

When Unger

how

asks

to preserve the possibility of
individuality, he

saying (despite his insistence that he
for individuality— that

is,

might say instead, what

is

not saying this) that

is

does seem

we need something

all

ignored.

be

to

“room”

like

non-interference from others in the community;
however, one

is

needed for group cohesion not

to

be tyrannical

is

also the

possibility of having significant ties to (and
of being able to act out the expressions

meaning

is

imbedded

of

in) other

communities, tied to one’s multiple membership

whose

in social

groups. 38
This leads to a complication

in

Unger’s concern for not seeing others as merely

role-occupants. Although others should be seen as concrete,
particular persons rather than

occupants of social

because they are

roles, in fact

in part

what

what make up

their social roles or identities are

cannot be ignored

the concrete particulars of people’s “personalities”

and experiences. Unger’s emphasis on seeing others as individuals
rather than
occupants leaves no room for seeing others as individuals
their social roles or identities.

It is

who

role-

are constituted in part

by

important to retain an awareness of other members’

belonging to a variety of social categories

(e.g.

of race, gender,

etc.);

while

it

will not

do

to

see others merely as role-occupants (as instantiations of categories defined by essential
characteristics),

it

is

nevertheless crucial to recognize

categories affects or forms someone’s experience.

person

who wants

to

know how

to

be

my

friend/

how membership

As

The

Pat Parker puts

first

thing

in a variety

it,

you do

of social

“For the white

is

to forget that

Black./ Second, you must never forget that i’m Black.” (297); the sense here

is

that

it

i’m

is

necessary to both see someone as a unique, particular person (and not to see someone as an
38 Unger does raise the fact that people
should be able to have multiple memberships in different
communities of life, but he never answers the question of how these people are to avoid being pulled in
different directions, and partially erased as whole personalities in each separate community of life. He
writes, “the individual

ought

to

be entitled to be a

then be to reconcile the requirements of a
possibility of plural

membership”

(280).

member

community
Indeed

,

that

of various groups. The prudential problem will

embraces many aspects of

this is the
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problem.

life

with the

instantiation of a category

recognize

how

experience.

way

which

is

defined by an essential characteristic) and
also to

the fact of important socially
constructed categories of identity do affect

Unger’s focus on seeing someone as a
particular individual does not provide
a

to also see

them

social categories.

It

Thus Unger

as affected

by

their experience of

being in particular interlocking

misses the “never forget that i’m Black” half
of Parker’s imperative.
is

concerned with not erasing individuality for the
sake of group

cohesion. However, answering that concern

is

not enough; one also needs to be concerned

with the problem of erasing multiple, interlocked
group identities which
the individual. This

is

more complicated because

or expressed by sets of shared practices or
as

Unger

s

community of life)

is

different

group

come

identities are

together in

connected to

ways of being; but because a community (such

the locus for shared practice, one

must consider what

the

shared practices of the community should be. Shared
practices might leave room for a
variety of individual expressions, thus answering
Unger’s concern, but

complicated to consider

how

to leave

room

more

it is

for different expressions based

on mixed,

interlocked social identities. Unlike communitarians such as Sandel
and MacIntyre, Unger

seems

to see society not as

homogeneous; however, heterogeneity

for

him

is

due

to

individual idiosyncrasies, not group differences. Thus his concern with
allowing for the

expression of individuality within the organic group

is

not a concern with allowing for the

expression of complicated, interlocked group differences.

Unger, unlike Sandel and MacIntyre, argues

community must be
organic group

much

membership

as

Friedman sees people leaving

their

any particular

it

violates the conditions

there are

many

member of an

communities of origin and

Unger argues:

forced membership in the community of

from

in

voluntary. In this way, he imagines “choosing” to be a

entering communities of choice.

A

that

on which

its

life

or a prohibition of departing

being

is

based. Suppose that

organic groups already established, each united by an

initially distinct set

of common experiences and shared purposes. The
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individual should be able to choose which of

of his

However,

it

is

own

them

to join or to leave in

view

experiences or purposes. (279)

important to notice that Unger, unlike Brodsky, does
not have a liberal

conception of “choice”; for Unger,
leaving or entering a community.

it

He

is

the

encumbered

self

who

exercises agency in

explicitly rejects the liberal definition of

the nonexistence of external interference with
one’s ability to

freedom “as

do what one wants” (277) by

noting that “the self cannot be imagined apart from
social relations” (278). Defining

freedom, for Unger, depends upon distinguishing “legitimate
and illegitimate power, for
only the

latter represents

domination

or illegitimate power, but

it

To be

(278).

free entails

freedom from domination

does not require freedom from the necessary and legitimate

powers of socially constituted values. This

is

a very useful distinction

which could be

applied to explain, for instance, the actions of Brodsky’s “postmodern Jew.”
The

independence
illegitimate

which the “postmodern Jew”

asserts is an

powers of one particular community, but

socially constituted (or “interfered with”) altogether.

it

is

It is

independence from the

not independence from being
really not accurately

characterized, then, as an exercise of free choice in the liberal sense.

Freedom, for Unger, as “the measure of an individual’s capacity

good”
is

is

necessarily a social product as the

neither complete

“objective or

good

is

freedom from interference nor

communal

The good

to achieve the

only achieved in community. Freedom

is it

a complete internalization of

values.” Rather,

for

each individual has a universal as well as a particular aspect so

that neither the affirmation of individuality nor the

obedience to principles or

practices suffices to characterize freedom. Instead, freedom lies in the
relationship between the universal and the particular good, and between

choice and value, portrayed by the theories of human nature and

community. Individual choice

is

important both as a manifestation of

individuality and as a sign of the species nature.
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.
.

(278)

Thus Unger
self

is

is still

s definition

of freedom successfully describes

capable of choice or the exercise of agency,
and he

is

how

the

encumbered

able to account for

why

it

important for the encumbered self to be able
to exercise such agency. But,
despite his

insistence

on an understanding of freedom as a

social product, he

describes the

still

motivation for such a self to choose one community
or another in terms of the manifestation
or the preservation of individuality, not in
terms of the conflicts generated by being socially

constituted by a mixture of perhaps clashing values
or

ways of being. The

individual picks

and chooses between established organic groups or
creates a new one, not because he/she
is

constituted with an identity that

is tied to

one group or another, but because he/she has an

individual personality suited better for a particular
group.

Thus Unger does overlook some

of the ways in which an individual cannot be free to leave
a community, even with a social

understanding of what freedom
racialized or genderized as a

is.

For instance, one cannot leave a group

member

of (except

if

one can and wants

assimilate), for others will continue to identify one as a
identity will continue to be in part constituted

organic group. Unger argues that

one

is

to “pass” or

member of the group and

by these perceptions

The same tension between group cohesion and

that

one’s

39
.

individuality

is

members of a community must be

present within the

able to transcend the

shared values of the community and to access values of other communities or cultures,
but
again he does not see the tension as a conflict of values created by the interlocking of
different categories of social identities.

Community
strongly

He

writes:

requires cohesion;

felt,

though

relative

it

and

can survive only
shifting,

in

an atmosphere of

moral agreement. At the same

time, however, individuals must have access to a culture that transcends

what any one group can perceive or accomplish on
traditions of thought or
history.

For

work

its

own. The

constitute the deposits of the species nature in

that reason, they represent, despite their distortion

of dominance, parts of the good and indispensable aids to

39 Thanks to

Ann Ferguson

different

for pointing this out here.
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its

by the vices

further

realization.

Moreover, without a basis for the criticism of
shared values,
there will be the tendency to sacrifice
autonomy to moral union, and
transcendence to immanence. ( 287
)

Here

it

is

clear that while

what he does not see

is

Unger sees

that particular

the species nature as “deposited” in different
cultures,

people belong to particular cultures-belong

sense that MacIntyre does recognize, that
tradition.

To

we

are “bearers” of a particular history or

see us as truly constituted by our communities

is to

see that

bearers of a history, particular manifestations of the
“species nature”;

and choose from among the available

to

have constitute

us,

we embody,

we do

possibility for

agency

Unger perhaps sees too much room

in

as

not just pick

cultural construals of the species nature.

MacIntyre (and Sandel) might not see enough

choose

in the

So while

which values we

for this agency; he fails to

see the “choice” of which communities constitute us as in part
informed by the histories

defined by our cultures, race, and so on.

What Unger does

provide

is

an expanded understanding of

communities can aim purposefully towards the good where
but where the good

is

how

good

that

is

constitutive
socially developed,

also understood to have the possibility of emerging only in the

absence of domination. His conception of freedom as a social product allows one

to

understand choice as something which a socially constituted-or encumbered-self can

engage

in.

constitutive

Thus both Unger and Friedman point

to the

community. Recognition of both pluralism

and intention

(in

(in

to

expand what counts as a

what

is

constitutive of identity)

development/formation of community) requires a broadened

will be included in the

term “constitutive community.”

It

will also allow

communities which have the intention of political resistance

that list

subordination, and to ask about these communities:

being

need

in

who

are

my

to

one

list

of what

to include in

dominance and

people in the sense of

such a community of resistance with me?

Unger opens

the question of

how

a

community can achieve

the desired absence of

domination and subordination, and he answers by describing the features of the organic
group.

What

I

have pointed out

is

that he has not
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given enough attention to

how

relations

ot domination and subordination
are maintained by a failure to
recognize

can suppress the values and expressions
of members of a community

how communities

who

are also

constituted through a multiplicity of interlocking
collectivities-collectivities based on

categories of social difference such as those
of race, class, gender, ethnicity and
so on.

now, of various

thinking,

collectivities or

can continue Unger's attempt

to describe

communities which constitute

how

a

community

we

self identities,

(or set of communities) can

create and maintain conditions of non-domination;
however,

members of communities

By

I

intend to think of the

as in part constituted by racial, class, gender

(etc.) identities,

and

evaluate constitutive communities in terms of their
possibilities for resistance to forms of

domination which are based on these categories of

E. Senses of
I

want

to suggest here

order to focus on the idea that

many

may

identities are

always constituted

also be true) but

“community”

ways of using

the term

“community,” not

in

the term are incompatible with each

more importantly

in a multiplicity

communities which constitute the
sorts of

Community ^

some ways of using

other (which

what other

different

identity.

in order to

foreground the idea that our

of collectivities.

To

self as a resistant political being,

communities also constitute the seifs

identity.

it

talk about the sort of

is

helpful to notice

Included in the term

are, for instance:

—community of origin
—community of place

—“home” community
—community of support
-community of choice

^Many

of the ideas and the terms (and some whole sentences!)

in this section are taken from a workshop
Comunidad: herramientas para pensar sobre redes comunitarias y sobre pohtica de base
Senses of Community: tools for thinking about networks and community based politics”

called “Sentidos de

comunitaria

/

developed by the Escuela Popular Nortena, a folk school in Valdez, New Mexico, for our summer encuentro
in 1993. The workshop was created collectively by the staff of the school, including myself. The text of
the

workshop

is

included

in

an appendix.
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—community

ot social/political

—community of social/political
—political

movement
identity

community

-community of resistance
-community of destination

The

list

could, of course, continue or be revised in

often overlapping or contained within each
other.
setting definitions of them, but rather because

of communitarian sources
of the terms will help

in

which our

illustrate the

I

many ways;
I list

want

in

many ways: one

for instance-but

etc.),

one can also be

am

I

and

interested in

to generate thinking about the
plurality

Some

explanation of each

broadness of the term “community.”
is

bom

into, but this

can be

born into a particular place-a town or a neighborhood,

bom

into a family (extended or not, biological or not,

a religion (consciously observed or not) or lack thereof, a culture
or a mixture of

cultures, etc.

What

is

them not because

identities are constituted.

A co mmunity of origin is the community one
understood

the terms are flexible

One does

not choose one’s

the features of one’s

identity are salient.

which there

is

community of origin

community of origin.

communities of origin are depend upon which

For instance, one

is

to be or not to

characteristics of

born as one sex or another and so

a gender system (and only in such a society) one

one does not choose

as a

be born

into.

is

However, were

in a society in

born into a gender that
there not consciousness

of gender as a socially significant characteristic, one would not think of a “community” of

people of one’s gender
is

41
.

One’s community of origin includes

born as a historically constituted

self.

One can be bom with

all that

one

4

one

a history of being a

colonizer, for instance, or a history of being colonized, or one can be born
conflict, inheriting the history of both colonizer

inherits as

embodying

and colonized. Whether one

this

later identifies

Ann Ferguson points out here that there are other circumstances as well in which one would not see
gender as a basis for calling a set of people a community. She notes, for instance, that “a group of people
who had minimal contact with other people might take gender to be socially significant” (for instance, they
might employ a sexual division of labor) and “yet not think of ‘communities’ of the women and men, since
there is no reason to think in such distinguishing terms unless and until women of one community want
and need to relate to women of another community.” (Notes on an earlier draft).
Ill

with features of one’s communities of
origin
birth into them, but
is

it is

not determined simply by virtue
of one’s

is

not unrelated, either (For instance,
the fact that

not a necessary implication of the fact that

was born with

I

part a result of a conscious act of identification
and a

But

it

is

certainly dependent

upon

A co mmunity of place

is

my being bom

identify as Jewish

this heritage; rather,

form of resistance

it

is in

to assimilation.

as a “bearer” of Jewish history).

based on the place where one

block or neighborhood-or huge-the nation.

I

lives.

It

could be small-my

A community of place could remain relatively

constant or could be continually shifting. For instance,
a community of place based in a

small rural town might be quite constant; there

On

the other hand, the

one moves around a

community of place

lot,

in

one

movement

located in a college

into or out of the town.

dorm

is

very temporary.

one will have many communities of place, and

community of place very
constitutive of

is little

temporarily, that

s identity (unless,

community

will probably not

perhaps, one’s experience there

one way or another). One may belong

to a

if

is

one

is in

If

a

become very
particularly intense

community of place out of a

variety of

reasons, for instance, out of choice, out of tradition, out of economic
necessity or
privilege, out of force (the inmates in a prison cell block, for
instance,

of place), and so on.

Members of a community

reason for being there, and members

one another.
it

may be

of place

may

or

may

form a community

not have a

common

extremely similar or extremely different from

A given community of place could include many other communities within

42
.

A “home” community may or may not be one’s actual home in the sense of where
one

lives.

It is

quite possible to not have any

feel this as a lack).

It is

the

community

at

“home” community (and one may

which one

might describe such a community by saying things
or “it’s where I’m accepted for
family, or

it

who I am,”

could refer more widely

etc.

It

is

most

like, “it’s

“at

home” or

where

I

at ease.

may

not

One

can really be myself,”

could be as small as a circle of friends or

to a social group; for instance,

some

42 Ann Ferguson suggests workplaces as possible examples of communities of place.
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or

lesbians express

the feeling of being at

where one

“home” only

in lesbian

not constantly alienated,
misunderstood, unappreciated;

is

loved, where one

is

understood on

all

levels of

guard without being attacked. Perhaps

Of course,

change.
it is

a

community. One's "home" community

it

is

meaning, where one can

where one

also

is

it

there can be various degrees to

is

which a

where one

let

down

is

is

one’s

not constantly challenged to

particular

community

feels like

“home” community.
It is

an interesting question whether “home”
community

radical political point of view.

On

the

one hand,

it

sustaining,

is

is

good or bad from a

and can offer the base of

appreciation, encouragement and love
necessary to keep up hope, to not “burn out”
or
despair, to risk creativity, to support the
growth of identities

undervalued
In

in the

mainstream.

It

which

are forbidden or

can also provide material support or
physical protection.

extremely hostile conditions, a “home” community
can be essential; for instance, gangs

can be “home” communities absolutely necessary
for
sustenance on

all levels.

imagined (out of

On

the other hand,

if

racist fear, etc.) than real, the

their

For instance,

someone with
-one

may

who

is

in a

community

in

feel not appreciated, not at

community

calling

one

in.

If

having a “home” community

“home.” And

may

such identification

may work

at risk,

seen as an oppressor— where one

is

is

be unappealing

and not home,

is

where

if

there

is

politically necessary for

a

someone

“home”

change, then

against change.

political

change

does not deny the necessity of having a home
like

is

the “official” language-

identification with oneself as

Bernice Johnson Reagon contrasts the concepts of
coalition,

it

or where meanings are not

someone who speaks

not always to be loved and appreciated

more

comfort of “home” can be too seductive;

which one

class privilege, for instance, or

survival, for their

the “risks” of the outside world are

can keep us from entering communities where we are
shared.

members’

to

atmosphere which she experiences coalition
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is

to

coalition, arguing that

be made. But

go back
to be.

home and

to, to retreat

She

writes:

at the

from

same

time, she

the battlefield-

Coalition

done

work

is

not

in the streets.

work done

And

it is

in

your home. Coalition work has

to

be

some of the most dangerous work you can

And you

shouldn’t look for comfort.

and they

rate the success

Some

people will

come

do.

to a coalition

of the coalition on whether or not they
feel good

when

they get there. They’re not looking for a
coalition; they’re looking for
a home! They’re looking for a bottle with
some milk in it

and a nipple,

which does not happen

You

in a coalition.

don’t get a

lot

of food

in a

coalition. (359)

Reagon

sees coalition

precisely because

it

is

work

as necessary for political change, and also
necessarily difficult,

not a “safe space” like

home

with each other. However, Reagon does not think
the time;

all

and then you go back

It

it is

But change and safety are

to take

all

the time.

your bottle wherever

You go
it is,

become

will not

Reagon

s

different

few hours

It

never gets enough.
for

you

and home be separate can be problematic.

home which

is

that

to

if

have a “home”

if

in a

communities are based on seemingly “separable”

is

part of

what makes a “home” a “home.”

all

young

it

political

lesbians,

it

possible for a person

“home,”

that

is,

a political

community
if

lesbian

that serves as a

community

is

to

still

lack a

home and

yet

be a “home”

cannot be based on the shared meanings which only white middle-class

lesbians share.

lesbian of color

It is

features of identity

very personal sense-a family or a circle of friends-but

not banished to the private sphere. For instance,

for

It

’

shared identity

more public or
is

go

everyone has a “home community. However, not everyone can have a

“home” community
and

to

separate from coalition can serve as a hiding

place from coalition rather than as a recharging place. But even more importantly,

assumes

work

a martyr to the coalition” (361).

insistence that coalition

dismisses the possibility that a

odds

and then you go back and coalesce

(359). Coalition, according to Reagon, “is a monster.

you

it is

to the coalition for a

always wants more. So you better be sure you got your home someplace

to so that

at

possible to engage in coalition

too hard, too draining: “In a coalition you have to
give, and

it is

from your home. You can’t stay there

some more

is.

When

there are

community, an older

many

different lesbian

lesbians’

community,
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communities

etc.),

it

is still

(for instance, a

often the case

that the lesbian

members
Reagon

community

that

occup.es the most vtsible or public
space

If

the

is at

go back

same time arguing

But

to.

one wants

that "the barred

to

make

to

be marginal

in

rooms

the claim, as

every community

Reagon does,

surviving coalition, then one needs to
consider

that

[filled

how

community

is

we need

is

it

is

we

to not

to

make
If

whose

all

members of a

had

single

better have

homes

have a “home” community.
to

go back

to after

this possible for those

what

is

necessary about

who

are

“home”

sustenance and love and appreciation and
material support and protection,
to learn

how

to create this without pre-supposing
shared meanings.

coalition can only be maintained as long as
everyone has a
fact that

with

one needs a home

marginalized everywhere that might be called
“home.”

then

the one

are mainstream or dominant in
other ways: they are white, young,
and so on.

feature of identity] will not be allowed
to exist” (362) and that
to

is

not the case that everyone has a

coalition itself a

more

sustaining place.

entail a constant battlefield, a lack

“home”

“home” community

If

to recuperate in, then the

points to the need to

make

The lack of a priori shared meanings must not

of appreciation or love or other personally and
politically

sustaining necessities.

A co mmunity of support can be narrower in
sense that

ways

members of one

rather than for one’s

club or a group of friends

may

support
setting

who

s

community of support may

“whole”

who

s

and voluntarily for a

group.

life.

It

It

might be a

work and

it

could be a group of colleagues

in

an academic

offer help, critique, and appreciation but

It

who do

could be a network of

out for each other’s kids or serve as each other’s confidantes.

Community of choice

of one’s

It

support one another in their projects. The limits of the

not necessarily develop their thinking or their projects collectively.

women who watch

in the

offer support in specific, limited

self (or for all of one’s multiple selves).

be well defined; for instance,
read each other

scope than a “home” community,

common

could be a

refers to a

end.

The

group of people that comes together purposefully
entry into the group

liberal political group, a

is

intentional;

it is

musical band, a coalition, or a study

could be a group based on a feature of social identity— for instance, a
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not a given

women

of

color caucus or a Latino student
organization-but the group
is

intentionally

for instance, to

formed

for a particular purpose.

It is

itself

possible for a

Identity in these times

is

dependent,

at least in part,

definition (“re-articulation” as Michael

Identity in times of

as

movement

movement and

is

upon

the

times of movement.

movement

Omi and Howard Winant would

through the movement that the community

Movement,

community of support,

be one kind of community of choice.

A gQ-mmunity of social/political movement exists only in

truly

(though not the identity)

is

not stagnant

for definition or re-

put

it*3).

it [ s

affirmed as constituting a community.
if

the

movement

itself is vital— that is, if

it is

not stagnation. For instance, Chicano identity
grew from Chicano

constituting identity as Chicanos or as

Raza

for people formerly self-identified

Mexican- American.” The Women’s Liberation Movement
created a sense of women

forming a socially significant

political category,

as

and of there being reason for the formation

of women’s communities such as consciousness raising
groups. The meaning of being a

woman

is

changed through the women’s

as a political category

Civil Rights

was created

Movement, and so on

in this

all

liberation

identity for

its

a

the concept of “lesbian”

movement. The Black Nationalist Movement,

the

create and re-create (in compatible and incompatible

ways) the meaning of Black or African-American

Vietnam war created

movement, and

identity.

The movement

community-and a counter-culture- which was

against the

constitutive of

members.

A community of social/political movement can evolve into a community of
social/political identity if the

remains. This
alive.

is

movement ends

not a clear line because

The “women’s community” or

it

is

or stagnates but the identity created in
often unclear whether or not a

the “lesbian

(and thus regulates membership) a priori - that
redefining the meaning of
“lesbian

community” may

4^See Racial Formation

in the

“woman” and

is,

movement

is

community”

often tends to define identity

instead of the

movement’s defining and

“lesbian,” a given

take a stagnant definition of

United States: From the 1960’s
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it

“women’s community”

who

or

counts as members of these

to the 1980's.

categones and then one must meet

When
to

this

this

poor

definition to gain admittance
to the

community.

happens the social meaning of the term
“woman” or “lesbian” does not continue

develop out of movement. Social/political

oppositional

identities are also created not
out

movements but out of oppressive systems of
classification;

of

for instance,

categories of racial identity are created by
the racial state (as represented,
for instance, by
the census), categories of ethnic identity

emerge out of anthropological or sociological

research and colonial practices, and so on.

A social identity can embody the tension between resistance to
the status quo. For instance, to the extent to

oppression, basing a

community on or embracing an

to maintain the oppressive nature of the dual

identity is defined in a
if

having a gender

is

which the gender system

way which does

identity such as

is itself

a tool of

“woman” might

gender system; furthermore,

if

etc.)

race, class, etc. to be erased.

can re-define or re-articulate the meaning of

identities,

On

serve

a gender

not recognize interlocking features of identity

seen as separable from having a race,

on the basis of gender enables

and maintenance of

(e.g.

then defining a

community

the other hand,

movement

and a movement which resisted

oppressions as interlocked could create identities which did not depend
upon the illusion of
the separability of, for instance, race, gender, class and so on.
social/political identity refers to a
least

community where

problematic in some of the above ways-that

identity to be seen as separable
fact tools

is,

So a community of

the identity

upon which

it is

and not interlocked, and given

identity are the

is at

given the tendency for features of
that

many

identities are in

of oppressive systems: for instance, the dual gender system and the

Communities of social/political

based

racial state.

communities which ground “identity

politics.”

By

political

community

I

mean

to include

Aristotle’s conception of the polis as not a

happen

to

be grazing together

in the

same

communities which correspond

mere aggregate of persons, not just
field,

but rather people

who

to

cattle

who

self-consciously

participate in the formation of each other’s— of the public’s-values or conception(s) of the
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good.

am not

I

agreeing with Aristotle that such
a community requires unity or
harmony or

a consensus about

what the good

is;

but

it

does require engagement and struggle
about

values rather than disengagement or the
infamous “freedom from interference "

community

in this

sense could be conservative (for
instance, the “moral majority”) or

could be radical (for instance, a
communo-anarchist group) but
(nor could

it

could never be

it

it

liberal

be libertarian).

A c ommunity of resistance

,

then, denotes a political

resistance to the oppressive status quos and thus

commitment

A political

to

such resistance.

am

I

individual rights to choose their

own

community which engages

whose values

in

include, at base, a

not including liberal groups

who

advocate members’

conceptions of the good, for such groups purport
to

not be constitutive of identity; they are not political
communities.

A community of

resistance might be both inwardly and outwardly
directed: personal transformation in

accordance with collectively changed values combines with
action or education or the
creation of

movement aimed

at

changing oppressive practices or

community of resistance could be

at the

same time

of social/political movement, and so on.
a

community of resistance could be

this

a

I

a

will leave

community of place,
open

for

A

institutions or systems.

now

community of social/political

or a

community

the question of whether
identity, for to

answer

question means going on to consider whether maintenance of distinct lines of
identity

consistent with resistance to the oppressive status quos, a question which

I

will take

up

is

in

subsequent chapters.

A community of destination denotes one’s political destination or aim.
(political)

claiming

community of resistance but

it

as one’s

community of destination

movements

may have

a hope for such a community.

constitutes the self as resistant, but at the

is itself

a

not yet been forged as a community; in

community of destination one expresses

The community of destination

resistance aims.

it

It is

a product of resistance;

it is

same time

the destination at

the

which one’s

A destination can change as social/political conditions change and as

redefine identities.

To

say that political destinations are both the products of
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resistance and the pre-conditions or
the ground for further resistance

anarchist idea of perpetual revolution:
the goal of political resistance

to invoke the

is

is

not to reach

some

stagnant, ideal state in which no further
changes will be necessary, but rather political
resistance

must be understood

to be ongoing, offering continual
resistance to re-emerging

dominance or oppression within changing conditions.

A community of destination could be a found community

or

it

could be a

purposefully formed community or both (as
lesbian communities were purposefully
formed

and can now often be found-already-formed).
Since one engages
political

with

it

community, whether

in part

forms

it; it

it is

already formed as a

remains continually

community or

in the process

not, one’s

is

requires radical imagination;

political clarity,

Knowing what one’s community of destination

means being visionary with

it

respect to the goal or

destination of one’s resistance. But such vision must
take into account what

may

problematic about affirming any one community or another. For
instance, one
able to unproblematically affirm any one

community of destination, given

To

affirm a

community

as one’s

community of social/political

may

not be

identity as one’s

community of destination without ignoring
itself

interlocking

recognizes identities as

Without such recognition, the affirmation of any one community of destination

can mean condemning one’s

Rican

be

that oppressions (and features of identity) are interlocked.

oppressions requires creating a community of destination that

complex.

engagement

of formation.

Lacking a community of destination could be described
as lacking
or lacking the conditions for such clarity.

with any

critically

own

self to marginalization; for instance, for a

to affirm U.S. Latinos as her

to ostracism for her

own

dark skin.

community of destination may mean

To be

destination in the sense of affirming that

subjecting herself

able to say, then, that one has a

community

as one’s

own-and

Black Puerto

community of

for that affirmation

not to require ignoring the interlocking of oppressions-is itself a political achievement, a

product of resistance.
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To name
“who

question,

with

are

whom one

where

one’s community of destination

my

people?”

in fact, to

in a particular sense;

wants to throw one’s

this resistance includes

is,

with

lot,

it is

whom one

to

be able to answer the

be able to point to the people

engages

in political resistance

both the transformation of members’ self-identities

in

accordance with liberatory values, and the transformation of systems
of oppression through
the creation of or participation in

Having surveyed many
that the

who

my

are

movement.

different possible senses of

people?” question can be answered

community

in

many

it

becomes

clearer

different senses; that

can be answered by reference to any (or many) of one’s constitutive communities.
To

someone one of “my own people,”
community which

is

then,

may just

indicate that

we belong

truly constitutive of our identities. Calling

be merely descriptive or

it

may be

normative; that

is,

is, it

call

some

together in

someone “my own” may

the affirmation of

some

but not others

of our communities serve to promote political resistance and change of oppressive status
quos.

I

might

call

someone “my own”

in a descriptive

from the same community of origin. But

may

be reluctant to affirm them as

admitting someone to be one’s

if I

am

“my own.”

own and

I

sense just because

fundamentally

would

at

we came,

odds with

like to distinguish

of the particular town)

affirming them as one’s own. For instance,

admission both acknowledges
these values and

it

that

indicates that

I

I

have

I

one’s own,
there

them;

is

no

we

I

want

less

if I

draw a

in part

distinction

to maintain that

“my own”

I

I

(in this case,

I

in a descriptive sense; this

for

engaging with
the

this

community

in

an

community unproblematically

as

could stand behind.

between affirming and admitting someone

even when “just” admitting someone

of a strong sense of moral connection: they implicate

are, in a sense,

I

been constituted within a community with

would not affirm

own, as a community whose values
However,

in are

am responsible

attempt to change their values. But

my

grew up

I

this person,

between

should admit that the classist and racist members of the community of place

am thinking

say,

I

be

be one’s own,

me and

morally responsible for each other, whether
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to

to

want

I

implicate

to affirm their

actions and values or whether
are

this

still

in

some sense mine,

I

want

to try to get

my

despite

them

to change.

Their actions and values

being opposed to them. Bat- Ami Bar

sense of being implicated in the actions of one’s

own

people even

On

illustrates

when one would

oppose, rather than affirm, their actions. She argues that when
one counts someone as
one’s own,

from

it

appropriate to feel not only anger (which one can feel towards
someone

is

whom one

is

morally separate) but also shame, for feeling shame reflects one’s

own

connection to the actions of one’s people. One’s opposition to the
action does not make

one thereby not responsible for or implicated by

Uncomfortable as shame
anger that

I

feel at the

need

is, I

Bar

it.

governments

it,

On

and

that

I

writes:

need

it

more than

I

need the

have formulated and dictated the

Jewish-Israeli policy in relation to the Palestinians. Although anger too

presupposes horror

at

motivates action,

allows

it

what happens, and

me

to separate

it

too

is

a moral feeling and thus

myself from what becomes

posited as the origin of the repression, for example, the Israeli government.
In this respect anger

is

a self assuring and purifying feeling. Shame, on the

other hand, does not separate but includes.

It is

a feeling entailing the

taking of personal responsibility of seeing oneself implicated in the

wrongdoing. (“Meditations on National Identity” 56-57)
Feeling shame, then,

is

a

way of claiming someone

expressing opposition to or horror

as one’s

“my own” means making

both that the community should exist as a community, and

community

of the community).
affirmed as

would not necessarily mean

My different communities may

“my own”; some communities

ambivalence.

would

(this

And

given that there

is

be easy

own. For instance,

if I

to say

I

that

I

can stand behind the

that

I

agree with

all

of the values

could affirm as

“my own”

only with

never a morally “pure” community, whatever

“my

have such a “home,” but

a political claim

stand in complicated relations to being

some ambivalence

be, there should probably be

as one’s

simultaneously

at their actions or values.

Affirming a community or a people as

values of the

own and

it

in the affirmation

people” are those

may

in

of any community

my “home” community may

be politically problematic;

121

this

if

my “home”

community

is

could

be expressive of a

itself

different.

based on shared

And,

interlocking

it

identity, for instance, then the affirmation
of this
failure to

count as

“my own”

would leave people who recognize

the people

their identities as

The unambivelent

own

affirmation of a people or a

in the

is

and

a result of the creation and sustenance of a
fights oppressions as interlocked.

or nothing affair: short of realizing a

communities of resistance which
affirm as

complex and

my

I

“home”

community

achievement of a community of destination. Having a people
it

whom I am

from

mixtures-who have no “home” community based on seemingly

features of identity-without any people to call their

as

in this

distinct

sense.

my

own,

sense

is

then,

is

the

never a given;

community of resistance which recognizes

But affirmation of people as “my own”

community of destination,

can— with

community

may belong

I

is

not an

all

to other

greater or lesser degrees of ambivalence—

own.

The next

several chapters explore different reasons

why

problematic to affirm a particular community as “one’s own.”

which describing

the boundaries of

I

will

go on

I

may

why

to consider

be politically

will focus

communities have depended upon

understandings of identity, and consider
oppression. Then,

it

on the ways

essentialist

such essentialism promotes continued

communities

that are defined through the

concept of “culture” (these communities could be, for instance, communities of place or

“home” communities).
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in

CHAPTER IV
THE COMMUNITARIAN SELF IN IDENTITY POLITICS

A. Introduction
In the previous chapters

having a people— that

is,

I

have

that the self

tried to

argue that

conception of the polis provides a model for seeing

who

have

built

on

conception up against
I

am

Aristotle's

modem,

have been interested

liberal notions

in the

development of a non-individualist

politics

of identity

how

have argued
the self

is,

politics

I

is (or

have also shown

politics,

grounded
it

is

in

it

self-

that Aristotle's

how

to attain

in a

it)

to be a

how some contemporary
self

and have held

this

of the abstract individual.

communitarian account of the

lies in the fact that

to think in terms of

formed morally

is

communitarian conception of the

interested in thinking about the place that

identity politics, that

I

consider the question of what the good

public matter, not a matter of private decision.
theorists

makes sense

can be thought of as encompassing more than a

contained individual, tied to no history or community.

context of others

it

self precisely

because

I

has or potentially could have in the

and so

I

group

identity.

will turn

now

My

to

one such

possibility:

appreciation for the

a politics which takes identity to be socially

constituted within a context characterized by group difference and thus provides a model

contrary to liberal politics which denies the significance of group difference and posits the
subject as a

human being

capable, ideally, of free choice. Just as traditional

communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre argue

that there

choosing subject free from social constitution with particular values but rather
identity is social identity, so the basis for identity politics

is

a belief that

never

is

a

that all

members of

different social groups are deeply constituted with a collective identity and that such an
identity has a bearing

on the moral and

communitarianism also consistently

political choices that subjects

make. But

traditional

posits the subject as unitary, not multiplicitous or
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complex, and portrays communities as
group difference. Identity

and separable, not themselves cut across by

politics has inherited these

into accounts of collective identity

While an abandonment of the
collective thinking

distinct

assumptions too, translating them

which depend upon the conceptual unity of groups.

politics of

group identity undermines the conditions for

and acting and leaves us instead with a conception of the

unencumbered with

particular moral values, a

dependence upon unity

self as

group identity

for

ignores the complexity of the communitarian sources of
identity.
In a time

when

collective moral and political thinking and acting

is

inhibited

pervasive ideological image of the subject as an unencumbered
individual,

be able

to

make conceptual

meaning cannot be made
collective thinking

Lugones,

who

comes

my

to

alone,

I

am committed to

.

voices that have accompanied

knowledge

to

style alone

making or remaking anything.

But

The voices

sweetly.

all

of color

speak

this

one

.”

.

(“On

the Logic” 35).

not meant to have

Lugones’ sense; one

company with whom one makes meaning and

is

oneself

is

in the

moment

my

freedom

to

do

as

I

made by

is

this

before collective responsibility might be taken,

thwarted by the persistent ideology:

expect and act on

we

me

women

in

meaning. In such a society,

I

agree with Maria

company

in liberal society,

is

I

me: one just does not go around alone (lonely maybe), but not individual-

not meant to have

the process

essential to

the creation of the possibility for

speaks of knowing her company: “a layering of voices of
.

is

sense of a communitarian account of the subject. Believing that

and acting, collective meaning-making. Here

mind.

it

by a

“it’s

my own

private decision; above

choose.” In contemporary, liberal U.

all,

S. society

see daily messages that our moral values are freely chosen, that our cultural identities

can be changed
history

is

at will as cultural artifacts are

bought and sold,

that nothing is lost

when

forgotten, transcended or assimilated beyond, that beneath our colorful or not-so-

colorful skins,

we

are all simply, abstractly,

“multi-cultural” education has

come

to

human

beings.

This

is

have the flavor of an import

displayed like fascinating bits to browse through, selecting what
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is

a society in

which

store: ethnicities are

appealing. But the

array of choices
affect

how

is

not meant to challenge anyone’s identity
nor

the cultural selections are to be made,

what way. Even the
instead able to

identities

who

which one would think

become a matter of choice-for

those

is

to take

identity understood to

is

on which cultures and

are inscribed

who

in

on the body are now

can afford such things as plastic

surgery and colored contact lenses-rather than
something that must be accepted as given or

even respected as a marker of history and heritage.
Moral problems

that raise issues

of

public policy are responded to with solutions that rely
upon the illusion that moral thinking
is

done as an individual whose values

are

formed independently of the

social context.

Think, for instance, of the currently popular bumper sticker
which reads, “if you’re against
abortion,

don

have one

t

(read:

you make your decision and

our values need not affect each other
the notion of the

unencumbered

at all as

long as there

is

I’ll

make mine,

since after

free choice). Politics

all,

based on

self prohibits a consciously collective thinking about

moral

problems, and dismisses the possibility that collectively shaped identities— be they
simple or

complex-form

who

one’s

or inform our moral and political thinking.

company

identity-based
self.

Towards Alternatives

will be helpful to look at a

unencumbered

bars one from asking, then,

is.

B.
It

It

Unencumbered Self

more sustained example of how

self translates into concrete

ways of thinking

to the

moral or

the belief in the

political actions, before

that stand in opposition to the notion of the

The following example should

examining

unencumbered

serve to contrast the ideology of the unencumbered

self with identity-based thinking, thinking that sees the identity of the self as given or

socially constructed, but not “chosen” prior to or apart

history

and social context. Recently, a

“converted” to Judaism and
as an

example because

I

now

think

it

gentile

woman

from the given values of a
with

whom I am acquainted

considers herself to be Jewish.

I

want

to use this action

raises interesting questions about identity,

which recognition of historically and

socially

formed
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particular

and the ways

identities intersects with the

in

possibility of choice.

For the concept of conversion

must be thought of as something

identity

required for this

is

want

Jewishness as belief
the case

I

am

,

can be “chosen”;

my

claim

is that

what

is

who

is

to contrast here

Jewish because she

is

describing, the

woman

that is

is

part of a history

Jewish

to

deny

and a

45
.

Jewishness as a given social identity with

and knowledge about a

in

set of beliefs

choose to adopt. This conflation serves

community (perhaps an imagined community)
I

sense in this case 44 Jewish

and an understanding of a religion as a

potentially, could freely

recognition of the Jewish self

What

make

a conflation of Jewishness as a historically and
socially constructed

identity with Judaism, the religion,

which anyone,

that

to

in

set

of claims constitutive of a religion. In

question thinks she became Jewish just by virtue of

choosing certain beliefs and undergoing the recognized process of committing

to them.

Reconstruction of identity, in any deeper sense than the changing of one’s beliefs, was
not
seen as necessary for becoming a Jew. The claim that

choosing to learn about and believe

in

unencumbered;

“the subject

if,

as Sandel puts

it,

Judaism

is

given subject (my gentile acquaintance) chooses
a subject, “the relevant moral question
is

given

in

44 I say “in

is

not

case” because

I

I

there

is

to

becoming Jewish

is

consistent only with a view of the self as

is

regarded as prior to

new

its

ends” then the

ends, the ends of Judaism. For such

‘Who am

advance) but rather ‘what ends shall

this

all

I?’ (for

choose?’ and

the answer to this question
this is a

question addressed

can imagine other cases of “conversion,” or better put, reconstructions of
self who could be thought of as standing somewhere

which were not thought of as “chosen” by a
outside of the chosen values themselves.
identity,

45 Naomi

Scheman has a similar reaction to the idea of conversion to Judaism, and compares it to her
“uneasiness about male to female transsexuals.” She writes, “I have no problem with the wish any more
than I have a problem with wishing one were born in Paris; I just don’t believe one can realize it.” That is,
,

someone raised to be a man cannot completely undo and remake gender construction to be a woman,
Scheman argues, so being Jewish is not the sort of thing one “chooses.” If being a Jew is a matter of
religious belief and knowledge, then, Scheman points out, an atheist like herself would not count

just as

(similarly,
to

if

being a

woman is at least in part a matter of animating femininity, as seems to be for male
women who are not feminine or who reject femininity would not quite count as
it

female transsexuals, then

women.) And, Scheman argues, the convert’s “kind of Jewishness [i.e. religion] is more intelligible in
contemporary America than mine; more intelligible even to me. My own feels ineffable; but one thing I
know about it with certainty is that it is my birthright, that it is not something I chose, nor is it
something I could cease to be.
it doesn’t seem to me that one can really choose it, imbued as it is with
history: one would have to change the past.” (“Jewish Lesbian Writing” 189). I would add that the
convert’s kind of Jewishness is more intelligible precisely because it is grounded in the unencumbered self,
whereas Scheman’s (or my) kind of Jewishness requires a conception of the self as encumbered with or tied
.

to a history

.

of a people and a community of a people.
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to the will

(Sandel, Liberalism... 58)

The unencumbered

self

becomes Jewish by

choosing new ends. 46
It is

important to notice that

understanding of what

it

is

to

in the

be a Jew

is

mainstream of
that

it is

this liberal society the

predominant

a matter of religion. 47 Being Jewish

is

understood here through the lens of the ideology of free individual
choice available to the

unencumbered

self.

What

is

interesting about this

example of liberal thinking

is

that

it

stands in stark contrast to the seemingly obvious fact that being Jewish
can also be thought

of as a given social identity. In
exists,

fact, the

view

that being a

even under liberalism, with the contradictory view

than a Jew.

A non-religious Jew

of Judaism)

is

seen as a Jew

body, and so on;

in fact,

I

is

that a

a matter of choice co-

Jew can never be other

(someone who does not “choose”

when Jewishness

would argue

specifically to atheist Jews, a fact

Jew

is

present in her speech, her manners, her

that there is a

which

is

to believe in the claims

whole “culture” belonging

irreconcilable with the view that being Jewish

no more than a matter of religion. Furthermore, anti-Semitism operates

in

a Jew cannot be seen as other than a Jew, no matter what “choices” she/he

What, then,

is

is

such a way that

may make

48

the alternative to seeing Jewishness as a matter of religion and as

such something which can be chosen by the unencumbered

self? Is

it

that Jewishness,

46 I think that within some
Jewish communities, conversion is looked at with ambivalence precisely
because for Jews whose sense of identity is so clearly tied to history and community, it is not quite

become a Jew through an act of the will: thus the convert is never quite believable
The following story “about the Italian barber who fell in love with a Jewish girl on Broome
by Abe Cahan from the Jewish Daily Forward (from the early 1900’s) illustrates this: “He wanted to

believable that one can
as a Jew.

Street”

mother wouldn’t bless the match. Finally the mother agreed to the marriage provided the
The mother made the new husband learn Hebrew and he had to pray every
morning wearing his yarmulka. The Italian and his Jewish wife lived with the mother, and the barber did
not get his breakfast until he had prayed. But that wasn’t all. The wife had a brother named Joe and Joe
never prayed before breakfast. So the barber asked his mother-in-law what was the difference between him
and the brother? The answer was, ‘Joe’s a Jew. / know he’s a Jew but you’ve got to prove you’re one.’”
(Harry Golden, in Metzker, Isaac, ed. A Bintel Brief 20).
marry

her, but her

barber converted to Judaism.

47 This was

made vivid to me once several years ago when I was in a feminist consciousness-raising group
which about half the members were Jewish. One week we decided our topic would be “Jewish identity.”
One of the gentile women asked, “What should I talk about? Christianity?” For her, her difference from us
in

Jews was

to be found in her different religion, not in her different history or culture or race or ethnicity.
48 Even Jews who “convert” to a Christian religion remain Jews in the eyes of anti-Semites (and, as it
happens, in the eyes of Jews— the wisdom is, “once a Jew always a Jew”). My mother and members of her
family were baptized Christians in Germany, but come 1933 they were, because of their Jewish background,

“non-Aryans” according to Nazi logic, and were treated accordingly. This is an anti-Semitic application
of the recognition that the identity of the self goes deeper than what one chooses as one’s individual ends.
still
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understood as something more than a

set

of religious beliefs and a body of religious

knowledge, cannot be chosen by someone whose
heritage does not already include
think that the answer must be both yes and
no, and the key here

agency through which one could become or be Jewish.
As
traditional

argued

I

morally binding. Against

encumbered or

this

view,

I

is

in a

previous chapter,
in

changing,

given or inherited and such an identity

have argued

socially constituted, the subject can

even when understood

that

I

the sense of “choice” or

communitarians cannot account for the exercise of agency
involved

or re-constituting one’s identity; an identity

to

is

it?

to

is

be

and must exercise agency and continues

be constituted and reconstituted through intersecting, continually
changing social

contexts or communities. Thus the agency exercised

woman

my example

in

understood herself

to

a collective agency.

is

be exercising “choice”

While

the

in the liberal sense,

one

could imagine a case of someone reconstituting her identity as Jewish
through a process

understood to involve deep cultural change-change of social identity-where
took place through the remaking of identity

in

community

essentialism to uphold the claim that only people meeting

It

.

would

this

change

require an extreme

X condition (e.g.

mother, having three or more Jewish grandparents, being raised Jewish,

having a Jewish

etc.)

were

truly

Jews. Borderline cases challenge the plausibility (not to mention the desirability) of such a
claim. For instance, the

agency

in

Jew who

is

raised assimilated can be understood to later exercise

remaking herself to have a strong sense of Jewish

her identity in Jewish

community

49
.

While

be simply understood as an act of the
that this case is different than the case

undergoes a similar process (since

this

is

and

who

is

it

involves the exercise of agency,

of someone

who

has no Jewish heritage

think of the assimilated

with a Jewish history, however deprived of
gentile in this way),

it

she was, while

seems impossible, without invoking an

not a Jew, to say that there

can reconstitute
it

cannot

an exercise of choice. While one could argue

will,

we can

identity; she

is

a clear line

Jew

as

we would

still

who

encumbered

not think of a

essentialist definition of

who

between those people who could

49 See, for instance, Adrienne Rich’s account of her lifelong process of reconstituting her identity as a Jew,
in “Split

At The Root.”
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and those

who

never could reconstitute their identities as Jews.

example of conversion was not

to assert that

identities; rather, the point

to say that

to

was

be a social reconstruction of

identity.

no one can change

what took place

It

My point

their socially constructed

in this case

was understood

to

in describing the

was

not understood

be an act of individual

choice, an exercise of the will.
Traditional communitarianism can serve as the basis
for accounts of identity which

view the

self as socially constituted

such that they are essentially unchangeable. As

I

have

argued with respect to the communitarians, the maintenance of such
accounts of identity

depends upon seeing communities

and homogeneous.

An

in

which selves are constructed

never

in

bounded, separate,

apparently homogeneous, traditional, self-contained Jewish

community, under such an account, would

someone who was not

as

constitute

its

members simply

some such community (and one would be

part of

as Jews,

and

either in or our,

between) and had no Jewish heritage could never become Jewish simply by

choosing to commit to a

makes no

set

of religious beliefs; “conversion,” under such an account,

sense.

Thus

I

am

identifying

of conversion: there

is

two

different existing strains of thought about the possibility

the predominant

can be chosen, and there

is

view

that

being Jewish

a matter of religion and

is

an identity-based view, for which communitarianism provides a

grounding, which sees Jewish identity as an inheritance, a result of belonging and being
constituted through a particular history and community.
alternatives to the liberal
self

making a choice,

identity

I

view

want

that

that reconstruction of identity

view of social

as completely given

is

possible in

agency suggests the beginning of another

is

is

am claiming

that there are

identities (of

which Jewish

only one such alternative.

community through

My claim

the exercise of collective

alternative account that takes the self to be neither

unencumbered nor completely constituted within a given,
to question

I

becoming a Jew can be a matter of the unencumbered

to suggest that a

would be an example)

While

single collectivity.

the politics of an identity-based alternative to the
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What I want

unencumbered

self,

and the

possibility of seeing identity

represents.

To do

more complexly without

now

this, I turn

losing the sense of collectivity that

to an exploration of the link

between

politics (that

it

is,

the purposeful exercise of thinking and acting with
a political aim) and group identity.

C. Identity and Politics

politics

The term

identity politics”

and group

identity.

I

makes reference

have been led

to

to a potential or existing link

an exploration of the variety of conceptions

of the self and of politics (and the connections between them) that
are
politics”

because

I

between

all

termed “identity

understand these conceptions to provide alternatives to the

understanding of the self as unencumbered and to politics as a matter of interest-group
liberalism 50 “Identity politics” have included politics based on identities
such as: “African.

American

identity,” “lesbian identity,” “Latino identity,” “working-class identity,”

and so

on. In these terms “identity” implies socially constructed identities based on categories
of
race, culture, ethnicity, class, gender, “sexuality”

groupings which emerge and dissolve
identity categories has

its

own

history

and perhaps other categories or

in different historical periods 51
.

and

characteristics; with

some

Each of these

the creation of the

category more clearly serves the purpose of oppressive systems while some emerge from

movements of resistance (and some may have
groupings of people into these categories

is

in

I

am

I

take

it

that the

not a “natural” given; the categories

themselves, as well as the identities they refer

while

a dual nature in this sense).

to,

referring to “categories” of identity,

are socially constructed. In each case,

it is

also the case that although they are not

any sense “natural,” the categories are also not just formal; they both produce and

produced by the lived

realities

of social

life,

so that

members of the

are

categories have the

lived experience of shaping their identities in relation to (or within histories and

communities

of) other

members of that category

50 See, for instance,
for a discussion of
51 “Sexuality,” for

or group, and in contradistinction from

Ann Ferguson’s “Ethico-Political Strategies and Feminist Oppositional Communities”
how identity politics differs from interest group politics.
instance, is a relatively recent mode of categorizing people or referring to personal

identities.
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members of other

With some of the categories

groups.52

plausible that the lived experience that
identities in relation to

each other

is,

But even

(e.g.

is

more

their

through shared values, ways of being, language,

from the

classification of the

members

into a

such cases, the drawing of borders between the categories

in

the notion that different cultures are separable and
distinct

from

it

members of the category have of shaping

daily practices, customs, etc.) exists apart
distinct group.

(culture, for instance)

from one another) can

the articulation of the categories as categories, not simply

(that

result

from the lived experience of

the social construction of identity.

To

the extent that

there

is

say,

As a Black man,

one does think of people

terms of such categories of identity,

a challenge to the view of the self as unencumbered. For instance, for

identity.

I

think...” implies that values are

For the unencumbered

man,” Blackness

is

more than

recognizes that a self s identity

and

is

the claim that there

While

identity politics shares with

identities

from

self s identity

constituted

is

informed by socially constructed

underneath. For the person

set

it

who

speaks “as a Black

represents an identity with a particular

of values. Furthermore, identity politics not only

a connection between self identity and engagement in politics.

go deeper than what

identity politics

to

constituted as tied to these categories of identity but also

makes

is

is

this covering;

history, experience, perspective

someone

color differences are only “skin deep”; they cover the

self,

human being who

generic, rational

is

in

is

traditional

is

communitarian theory the understanding

open

to be

changed by individual choice,

communitarian theory

is

that

our

the departure of

that the collectivity in

which

the

not assumed to be a traditional community of place but rather

thought to be based on categories of identity such as those of race, gender, class,

ethnicity,

and so on.

complex and

My contention

is

that if

one sees these categories of

inseparable, and yet adheres to the communitarian recognition that our

identities are constituted in

community, then one must ask complicated questions about

^Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s account of racial formation informs my
identity here.

identity as

description of categories of

Racial formation, for them, refers to “the process by which social, economic and political

forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by
racial

meanings” ( 61 ).
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who

comprises one’s constitutive communities. Recognition
of the profound depth with

which members of a community may engage with
one another-in
other

s

moral constitutions-makes questions about

who

that they

our “company”

is

form each
particularly

weighty.

While the existence of
plausibility of the

the ideas of culture, race, gender

unencumbered

self,

and so on can challenge the

even these categories of identity can be deflated

the liberal mind; they can be seen as indicators of
differences that

create different moral identities. Thus, for instance,

in

do not go deep enough

women and men

to

are seen as not

constructed with different “moral voices ,” 53 but rather each can,
despite their superficial or

cosmetic (or “sex”) differences, think simply as a human being.

must deny

It is

not that the liberal

that differences exist along lines of categories of identity,
but they

must see

these differences as only skin deep and thus not really differences of
socially constructed
identity at

all.

Categories of ethnicity and culture would seem to present the defender of the

unencumbered

self with a difficult challenge, for cultural differences are recognized to be

tied to differences of values.

interpreted in a

framework

But through

that

ethical relativism,

emphasizes free choice as an exercise of the

interference in the practices of other cultures

would be

to

impede

even cultural differences are

free choice.

is

will.

Non-

thus required because to do otherwise

Thus recognition of cultural

differences leads the liberal to

a principle of non-interference, rather than to the practice of “interference”-which might
better be called participation in the public realm or polis—at least within one’s

or community.

The recognition

that culture

forms

its

own

members morally might

culture

lead to a

recognition that one should understand oneself to be engaged morally with others. This

engagement should

at least

be seen

to

make

but furthermore, to the extent to which

all

sense within one’s

own

culture or

community,

cultures are, especially in this postcolonial

53 As Carol Gilligan’s challenge to Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that they are.

Voice.
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See Gilligan, In a Different

world, inextricably mixed up with one another, such
engagement can

between and amongst

different cultures as well 54

this

However, even when

.

acknowledges the extent

to

which culture plays a

acknowledgment leads not

to

its

members,

rather to disengagement; since cultures

must not judge others unlike oneself.

If this cultural

relativism dissolves into an individual subjectivism, even the recognition
that one
culturally constituted self

community. Thus

unencumbered

and one

a

is

urged to not see oneself as morally bound to any

is

for the idea of social identity to present a challenge to the idea of the

self,

must be seen not

is lost

across,

the liberal

part in morally constituting

engagement but

are different, the thinking goes, one

make sense

it

must be seen as going more than skin-deep. The

fact of difference

as a call for tolerance or non-interference, but rather as an indication of the

social construction of identity

and thus as a

call for

engagement

in the public

realm

which

in

identities are constituted.

The

possibility of collectivity

is

both suggested by and made problematic by the

recognition of the degree to which our identities are socially constituted. If social identities
are constituted by collectivities based

on distinctions of race, gender, and so on, then one

can recognize these categories as a basis for feeling oneself
collectivity that is denied to the
identity are not distinct

collectivity

is

becomes

unencumbered

self.

to

have a “people,” a depth of

However,

if in fact

the categories of

and separable but rather are interlocked and mixed, then who
unclear. There

is

a political motivation for looking

social identity as a possible yet suspicious basis

from which

to

at

this

categories of

answer the “who are

my

people?” question.
It is

is

important to ask the

“who

are

my

also important to be clear that the question

people?” question

is

it

should hear the

“who

were synonymous with

54This
for

is,

some

are

my

is, I

people?” question, as

the question

“what

it

a political question and not simply a

question about identity for the sake of identity. That

we

in relation to identity, but

is

my

am

it is

not going to pre-suppose that

probably most often heard, as

identity (be

it

cultural, racial, gender,

however, made problematic by the fact of imperialism, which makes
engage in others’ cultural formation.

to
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if

it

an exercise of domination

etc. identity)?

Rather,

provide answers to the

what

ask what,

if

one

any,

“who

my

are

s politics.

“who

my

are

s political

that accounts

of identity have provided or tried to

people?” question, and

in

There

sense of

the relation

is

assumption (implicit

one

am recognizing

the politics are of these identity-based answers. That

effects of basing

To

I

who

between

of course,

is,

interested in considering

what

are the motivations

and

one’s people are on one’s sense of identity?

identity

some versions of “identity

are,

am

I

many ways

and

politics is to question the automatic

politics”) that one’s identity determines

of referring to “identity”

in

answering the

people?” question, and these different conceptions of what identity

different political implications;

one can redefine what

avoid describing our identities

in

is

meant by

is

have

social identity in order to

terms of apparently separable categories of identity, and

thus one can create a politics that

is still in

different political implications. This

is,

some sense a

then, not an

politics of identity, but with very

abandonment of the concept of socially

constructed identity, but rather a revision of what this means. So the question

is

about whether group identity makes sense as a basis for answering the “who are

open

my

people?” question as a political question, and about what account of identity best grounds a
politics of resistance.

In the previous chapter

I

pointed out

that,

recognizing the

community (community of origin, community of social/political
resistance, etc.),

many

one can see

different senses.

that the

When

“who

are

my people?”

identity politics links

many

identity,

it

community of

question can be answered in

group identity-as

through the available categories-to political commitment,

different senses of

assumes

it

is

constructed

that one’s

community

of social/political identity should also form one’s community of resistance (which
political

community);

that

is, it

assumes

that to

answer the “who are

with reference to one’s community of social/political identity
the

“who

are

my

is

my

is

a

people?” question

to simultaneously

answer

people?” question as a political question, a question that inquires about

one’s community of resistance. For instance, under
the binary gender system as a

woman— that

is,

this thinking,

someone who has
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someone constructed by

a social identity as a

woman-should be committed

specifically to the politics of

women’s

liberation.

the

It is

assumption of the link between identity-as constructed through
categories of social
identity— and politics that
possibilities for a

I

am going

to question so

community of destination

a sense of peoplehood and yet does not

I

can ask, instead, what are the

that is characterized

by a depth of collectivity or

depend upon categories of identity

as they are

currently and problematically constructed?

D. Keeping Identity Political

While

identity politics links

group identity and

politics,

it

is

also possible for the

assertion of subordinate identities to be seen as itself the political goal; that

is,

one can go

further than seeing identity as just motivating or directing one’s politics, and instead
see the

assertion or preservation of a subordinate identity as itself exhaustively comprising one’s

and thus

political action,

understanding,

it

is

fail to

common

see there being anything

“who

to hear the

are

more

to politics.

my people?”

Under

this

question as exclusively a

question of identity (as opposed to a question about one’s political commitments), and
indeed, even as a question exclusively about social identity,
interesting question,

is

a complicated and

people?” question as a

difficult question

An example

that

One can

hear the

of identity without addressing

comes

complicated identities of mixed race people.
difficulties

the

can be a problematic or complicated question without

necessarily being a self-consciously political question.

on the psychological

is

one which for many people cannot be easily answered. But

question of what one’s identity

politically motivated.

it

to

mind

Many

is

it

“who

are

my

as necessarily

the recent attention given to the

treatments of this topic focus primarily

involved in negotiating identity, rather than on the political

implications of and motivations behind various possible identities or identifications

55
.

Similarly, recent literature on the children of Holocaust survivors tends to focus on the

55 See, for instance,

People

in

America

.

many of

the essays in the collection edited by

Other essays

in this

same

collection
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Maria

do focus on the

P. P.

Root, Racially Mixed

political questions.

psychological aspects of

this status rather

than asking: what are the moral/political

implications or imperatives for survivors of a genocide? 56
I

am

who one

givens of

one

is

are

my

or

suggesting that one not investigate identity solely

order to sort out the

but rather in order to also ask, politically speaking,
what about

is,

whom one

in

could change one’s identity to be? In

people?” question as a question about politics that

this

may

who

way, one can hear the “who
or

may

not be answerable in

terms of what one considers to be the givens of one’s identity.
Insisting that one ask the
question as a political question guards against getting stuck in
identity as an end in
In

emphasizing

that

is

it

not enough to stop

June Jordan asks, “What

is

at the

recognition and affirmation of identity,

the purpose of your identity?” (qtd. in Parmar,

1 1

emphasis). She illustrates the difference between on the one hand hearing the

people?

question as a question about identity and on the other hand hearing

about politics,
the purpose

second case, identity can be shown

in this

(i.e.

political purpose)

itself.

of one’s identity

is.

to

it

my

1,

“who

are

my

as a question

be relevant only by saying what

Jordan says

in

an interview with

Pratibha Parmar:

Almost every year black students
to say to
it

me

that they

They say

about.

want

to hold a

unity and

I

When we

to

do?

that

I

I

takes

it

it

is

to

I

we

teach,

sit in

say yes, and

am already

a

ask what’s

I

black and

room with

other people

who

you want

are black to

some purpose

to

know

it

are not talking politics, (qtd. in Parmar, 111)

important to note that identity

is

not always as

much of a

given as June Jordan

be here— for instance, for many mixed race people or for people

up assimilated, claims

come around

don’t need to meet with you about

black—that’ s not unity. Unity has to have

otherwise

While

I

I

I

get together, what’s the purpose of that, what do

don’t need to

am

meeting and

say unity for what?

you are black so we unify okay but
that.

Stonybrook where

at

like the

one

that “I

am

problematic to be given as obvious-her point

who have grown

already black and you are black.
is

.”
.

are too

well taken that questions about identity do

56 See, for instance, Helen Epstein, Children of the Holocaust or Dina Wardi, Memorial Candles: Children

of the Holocaust.
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not in themselves

amount

to questions

about

One can

politics.

ask identity questions

without any political intention (although one might also say
that any question about identity
is

a political question, even

if

question: what are the politics of answering the
particular

way

My

not intended as such).

“who

aim here

are

my

to ask the political

is

people?” question in

this

rather than that particular way, with reference to this
particular identity rather

than that particular identity?

my

answering the “who are

The claim

that there are political decisions to

be made in

people?” question suggests that identities are not only not

givens, but that their reconstruction can be motivated and guided by political

considerations.

A similar objection to political questions’

dissolving into questions of identity

is

expressed by Jenny Bourne. She begins her essay “Homelands of the Mind: Jewish

Feminism and

Identity Politics” with the assertion: “Identity Politics

Exploitation

out

personal).

is

What

is

(it is

to

extrinsically determinist). Oppression

be done has been replaced by

to cultural politics” (1).

and

remaking of our

as the political problem)

identities; identity is not

needs to be asked

that identity

(

not that she thinks there

politics, but rather that political considerations

economic exploitation

that

It is

is

who I am.
is

is

in

(it is

is

the rage.

intrinsically

Political culture has

or can be no

(and she

is all

tie

between

ceded

identity

primarily concerned with

must guide the conscious making and

an end

Bourne argues: “The question

in itself.

not what constitutes our identity, but what

must have “a purpose over and above

its

own

is

identity for?” noting

definition and preservation”

21 ).
I

am sympathetic

to

Bourne’s proposed

suggest a complication which arises for

me

line

because

of questioning here, but
I

is itself

Iris

I

like to

all

will argue later,

a form that oppression takes, and the resistance to this

oppression through the assertion of a threatened identity

57 See, for instance.

would

do not share her belief that

oppression should be analyzed through the concept of exploitation. 57 As

enforced assimilation

I

Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression”
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is

a political act.

in Justice

What Bourne

and the Politics of Difference.

objects to-and here

I

agree with her-is the stopping with this act as a final
end, as

were the only form of political resistance
however,
itself,

it

to

engage

With her focus on

in.

if it

exploitation,

not even clear that she recognizes resistance to
assimilation as a political act

is

but in any case, her point remains that political action
does not end here; identity

not just an end. Furthermore, given what a problematic
task
in asserting

any

it

to

is

identity, there are political questions to ask about

know what

how

is

involved

identity is to be lived

even for the seemingly clear purpose of resisting assimilation. For
instance. Bourne

wary of Jews
on the

fetishizing Yiddish

who we no

side of recreating

makes sense

in

our

own

and notes

historical

and

that assertion of identity has

the purpose

no

means

any embracing of identity

its

itself

(22).

who

at

emphasis

in the original).

aim

at

I

am

.

.

is

not necessary to

.

that “Identity

the mistake

.

question, then,

is

to

is

how can

ending oppression, and
in different

view

how

can

ways elements of

are marginalized, fractionalized, 58 or fragmented? 59

not merely a precursor to action,

only learn and confirm our identity.
(22,

goal.

An open

it

Bourne writes

avoid recreating or creating

Bourne ends with a suggested direction
is

of identity,

supreme

to political struggles that

oppression which produce beings

“Identity

is

political purpose.

end rather than as a means”

identity serve as a

such searches for identity will end up

political context.

politics regards the discovery of identity as

identity as an

is

longer are’”(21) rather than creating an identity which

Thus even when asking what
answer

that “all

is

She

to take this questioning.

it is

also created through action.

through our actions. What we do

going to hold

this

reminder

in

mind

is

as

writes:

.

.

We can

who we are"
I

go on

to look

descriptions and justifications of identity politics that have been offered, to read these

accounts through the recognition that identity can be a starting point (“a precursor to

58 This term was used in this context in the

Combahee River

1977.
59 Maria Lugones uses this term: “Fragmented:
parts taken for wholes, composite,

composed of parts produced by

in

Collective’s

“A Black

Feminist Statement”

fragments, pieces, parts that do not

composed of the

parts of other beings,

a splitting imagination,

fit

well together,

composed of imagined

parts,

composed of parts produced by subordinates

enacting their dominators’ fantasies” (“Purity” 463).
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in

action

and can be remade through collective action where the remaking

)

is

understood with

political purpose.

The

E.

Social Constructio n of Identity and the Question of Fssentialism

Claims about the connection between

identity

and

politics

could begin either with

the assumption that identities are naturally given or with the
assumption that they are
socially constructed.

upon claims about
identity

While some

strains of identity politics have, purposely or not, relied

the naturalness of certain features of identity, any consideration of

might be reconstructed through

social construction.

constructed,

political practice

Before turning to see

how

it

is

must take

be open

to

argued that identities are socially

will look briefly at versions of identity politics that

I

identity to

how

make

the contrary

assumption.

Linda Alcoff,

in “Cultural

Feminism Versus

In Feminist Theory,” describes cultural
politics) as “the ideology

themselves

in

Post-Structuralism:

feminism (which

I

count as one version of identity

of a female nature or female essence reappropriated by feminists

the early

work of Adrienne Rich

as

needs to be freed from

its

male

love, creativity,

and the

and

all

this free

ability to nurture

women— that

is,

as a natural essence,

parasites, released for creative expression

through bonding with other women. In

sites the

examples of such theory. 60

She summarizes Daly by writing, “Female energy, conceived by Daly

attributes,

Identity Crisis

an effort to revalidate undervalued female attributes” (408). She

work of Mary Daly and

attributes of

The

and recharged

space women’s ‘natural’ attributes of

can thrive” (408-409). For Daly, the natural

those constitutive of their femaleness— are their essential

other attributes such as their race, ethnicity, and so on, are “male defined

differences” (Daly, 365, qtd. in Alcoff, 409), and are, as Alcoff notes, “apparent rather

than real, inessential rather than essential” (409). Daly, Alcoff argues, bases her claims

60 Alcoff draws on

Woman

Born

.

Mary Daly’s Gvn/Ecology and Adrienne Rich’s On Lies.
that in “Notes Toward a Politics of Location”

She also notes

Rich departs from her

earlier position.
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Secrets, and Silence and
in

Of

Blood, Bread and Poetry

.

about what women's politics should
be on their g.ven female nature:
"Our essence
defined, here, in our sex, from
which flow
allies,

who

is

the facts about us:

all

our enemy, what are our objective

interests,

what

who

is

is

are our potential

our true nature" (409).

Alcoff also notes that Adrienne Rich
bases her arguments on the claim that
women’s
biological characteristics can be the
basis for their liberation; Rich writes
that

“come

to

view our physicality as a resource, rather
than a destiny.

unity and resonance of our physicality,
our

- man
°

" 21 1 ,d in AIcoff
’

'

-

bond with

409 >- Thus Rich also

.

.

We

the natural order.

women

must

must touch the
.

.”

(Rich,

Of

“identifies a female essence, defines

patriarchy as the subjugation and colonization
of this essence out of male envy and need,

and then promotes a solution
with other
I

women”

want

that revolves

(Alcoff, 410).

few things about such theories which take

to note a

naturally given essence. First of

all,

not recognize the

different

their social

and

around rediscovering our essence and bonding

ways

in

which

historical contexts;

such theories are ahistorical

even

women

identity to be based

on a

in the sense that they

do

are constructed differently depending

in the face

of evidence that

women

often

experience their differences from each other as more salient
than their commonalities,
biologically based shared characteristic

because

it

is

timeless; this

is

maintained to be what

is

on

still

a

essential precisely

seen as timeless. However, such shared biological characteristics
are not

becomes

clear once

we

recognize that the interpretation of female biology

is

different during different historical periods, as well as
across cultures and across other

defining group differences. Whether a

woman

s

biology places her as a mother, a virgin, a

deviant, a whore, and so on, for instance, has everything to do with
her other features of
identity such as her race

common

and her

class.

To name women’s

essence, then, ignores the fact that biology itself

shared “physicality” as a

is

always socially interpreted and

constructed.

Secondly, to give an account of women’s identity as based on an essential and
naturally given characteristic and to argue that

women
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should privilege

this identity is

harmful to those whose experience

women of color who are
what

their political

it

discounts; for tnstance,

commitments should

women’s

whom one
is

they are and to

is,

to severely limit the questions

is

one can

one’s political possibilities are limited
to

should redefine or revalue what has already
been given (for instance,

innate abilities to nurture, to be peaceful,
etc.); one cannot ask

remake one

who

who

be.

ask about what one’s politics should be.
That

how one

discounts the experience of

told that their racial identities are
inessential to

Thirdly, to see identities as naturally
given

asking

it

s identity

through practice. Furthermore,

should engage

in politics, since, as

it

how one

does not make sense

to

should

ask with

Alcoff noted, “who are our potential

our enemy, what are our objective interests”
(409) and so on are

all

allies,

given by our

natures.

It

may

appear that the recognition that identities are socially
constructed rather than

naturally given will provide a

way

for identity politics to avoid the

and the corresponding problem of privileging only some
people’s
is

not necessarily so.

Even

if identities

constructed with essences: a theorist

might argue

that

who

essence,

to insist

upon

all

this

However,

this

argues that identities are socially constructed

as simply a

woman,

and so on. Constructionist language reveals essentialism

who have

identities.

are constructed, they can be described as

one can be constructed

to describe beings

problem of essentialism

or as simply a Black person,

in its use

of terms like

“woman”

been socially constructed with a shared characteristic

(or

extended use of the word) which legitimizes the use of the

categorical term.

That constructionism

is

or can be really just another form of essentialism

focus of Diana Fuss’ argument in Essentially Speaking

most commonly understood
lixed properties

.

She argues

is

the

that essentialism “is

as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and

which define

the ‘whatness’ of a given entity” (j«); essentialism

“classically defined as a belief in true essence— that

which

and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing”
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(2).

is

most

is

irreducible, unchanging,

As an example of such

essentialism in feminist theory, Fuss
notes that “essentialism can be
located in appeals to a

pure or original femininity, a female
essence, outside the boundaries of
the social and
thereby untainted (though perhaps
repressed) by a patriarchal order”

(2).

This “classical”

understanding of essentialism, then, captures
the sense in which theories such
as those of

Daly and Rich, as described above, count
as
Fuss, however, argues that there
philosophically, and politically)

we can

is

essentialist.

“no essence

to essentialism, that (historically,

only speak of essentialisms ”

( xii )

and

that, in fact,

constructionism (which she defines as “the
position that differences are constructed,
not
innate”

[xii])

employs another form of essentialism. She

is

thus challenging and expanding

what she has called the “classical” understanding
of what essentialism
the

ways

in

which constructionists employ a

is.

She points out

different sort of essentialism.

While a constructionist might recognize

that ‘man’

For instance:

and ‘woman’ are

produced across a spectrum of discourses, the categories
‘man’ and

woman

still

remain constant.

Some minimal

point of commonality and

continuity necessitates at least the linguistic retention
of these particular

terms. (4)

The

constructionist might use categorical terms in the plural
(e.g.

“woman”)

to indicate that there is

no single or unitary way

in

“women”

rather than

which members of the

category are constructed transhistorically, but even the use of the
plural term, “though
conceptually signaling heterogeneity nonetheless semantically marks
a collectivity;

constructed or not, ‘women’
sub-categories of

“woman”-for

differently in terms of race

essentialism either, for

each with

its

own

To do

this

still

“it

occupies the space of linguistic unity”
instance, using separate categories for

and class and

succeeds only

historical period,

in

(4).

Specifying

women

described

and so on— does not avoid

fragmenting the subject into multiple

identities,

self-contained, self-referential essence” (20).

fragmenting into separate essential identities employs what Elizabeth

Spelman

calls the “additive analysis”

that gets

added on has

its

own

of identity and of oppression; each separate identity

essence. Recognition that identities are socially constructed,
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then,

even when the process of

social construction

is

understood

in

terms of multiple

systems such as racial systems and
gender systems, can coexist with an
understanding of
identity as

based upon an essence or a conjunction
of essences. And, simply the

recognition that identities are socially
constructed rather than naturally given
does not
necessarily avoid the harms of essentialism
such as the marginalization of the
experience of
certain people. For instance, an identity
as a “Black

woman,” might be understood, under

the additive analysis, to consist of an
identity as “Black” (defined by an
essence of

Blackness, likely to be based on a male norm)
added onto an identity as

by an essence of womanness,

likely to

understanding of what

be Black and the understanding of what

are based

it

is to

on the assumption

assumption

category

(i.e.

is

(defined

be based on a white norm). Whether the
it is

that these identities are given naturally
or are

that they are socially constructed, the
identities are

essences, and the essence

“woman”

extracted from the experience of

still

to

be a

woman

based on the

understood to contain

whoever

is

the

“norm” of the

Black men, or white women), thus excluding or marginalizing,
for instance.

Black women, or fractionalizing them into having two
separate

identities neither of

which

describe them properly. Thus as Fuss argues, recognizing
that identities are socially

constructed has not solved this particular problem of essentialism.
Indeed, Fuss argument that there

is

an essentialism employed

in constructionist

accounts of identity seems to be confirmed by the fact that feminist
critiques of essentialism
in feminist theory often focus

identity.

One

clear

on feminist

example of this

critiques feminist theorists such as
essentialist uses of the

is

theorists

who assume

Elizabeth Spelman’s Inessential

term “woman.”

De Beauvoir

(249), she clearly recognizes that

creatures, that

is,

women

constructed or conditioned as

Reproduction of Mothering

is

Woman

Simone de Beauvoir and Nancy Chodorow
obviously rejects

natural essences; with her important claim that “[o]ne

woman”

a social construction of

is

all

which
for their

claims about

not born, but rather becomes, a

are socially constructed or conditioned

women. Nancy Chodorow’ s The

an investigation into the psychological aspects of
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how

females are socially constituted
or gender, zed (within a context

in wh.ch women do the
mothering) to be women. Ne.ther
of these constructionist accounts
of identity rue able to

avoid describing women's
construction to be a construction
as women, as people
share a particular essence, though
de Beauvoir would clearly deny
that there
to the condition

If

it

is

is

who

any essence

of women.

true that the

move from

seeing identities as naturally given
to seeing identities

as socially constructed does not
avoid essentialism and

its

attendant harms, then there must

be further questions to ask about
identity even for those proponents
of identity politics
see identities as socially constructed.
Fuss suggests that “the question
is

not

'is

this text essentialist

What moliva,es

i,s

(and therefore ‘bad')?’ but rather,

deployment ?”'

(*,').

essentialist discourse is strategically

differently,

would

I

Her point

smart-whether

like to suggest that in

we

is that

it

is

‘if this

we should be
text

is

who

asking

essentialist,

should focus on whether an

worth the “risk ." 61 To put

examining versions of identity

politics

this

which

take identities to be socially constituted,
one should focus on considering whether or
not
the particular link

between

identity

oppression of the very people

be helpful

in this respect

and

which

politics

whom it purports

because they point

to

is

posited

is

one

to liberate. Critiques

some of the ways

in

that furthers the

of essentialism

which oppression

may
is

perpetuated (for instance, through fragmentation) by
some versions of identity politics;

however, the focus should be not on determining
“essentialism”

oppression

is

is,

identity politics

may

assumes the social construction of

share with other ‘nature’ or biologically based identity politics
the dangers of

that identity is a matter

61

but rather on determining whether

identity politics that

seeing identities as separable, and so on, there

to

under some account of what

being resisted or perpetuated.

Meanwhile, although an
identity

is essentialist,

if,

is

an important difference: the recognition

of social constitution can (although does not necessarily) allow one

claim that identity can be re-constituted through changed practice.

Of course,

the

immediate question

is:

worth the

risk to
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whom?

If this is so,

then there

IS

the possibility of

harms imbedded

Even

so, as

remaking our

and our

in essentialist constructions

political practices so as to

avoid the

of identity and their corresponding

have suggested, recognizing identity as
something which

I

community does not
lor

identities

is

politics.

constituted in

necessitate seeing the possibility for change,
including the possibility

embracing hybrid

identities.

way of understanding

Traditional communitarianism stands as an
example of a

identities as socially constructed without
thereby being able to

understand identities as formed in complex or
hybrid ways, and without raising questions

about the possible reconstruction of identity.

Even

if,

as Fuss argued, the recognition that identities
are socially constructed

rather than naturally given does not automatically
solve the
resultant imperative to base one’s political sense
of
identity,

to

do

what

this in a

politics that is

it

does allow

way

that

To

it

is

does not duplicate the problems

based on the belief

by nature can be made

if

to

change

the

The hope and

is

is

to

not simple or easy.

it is

out.

Any

identity

to

make

is

it

I

“nothing that
1

is

103a 18-20).

they are changeable through

As Marilyn Frye

argues:

women on

this planet lies

only historically determined.

a contingent fact that

could be otherwise,

needed

know

profound change for

not given in nature. For then

the logical space

have pointed

behave differently by habituation” (NE

possibility of

it

I

this possibility, for as Aristotle asserts,

precisely in the fact that our being

am, and thus

“one’s people” are on one’s

that identities are given naturally through, for
instance, a

recognize that identities are socially constructed

re-habituation, even

its

the possibility of reconstructing identities, and of
attempting

is

female essence, does not even offer

what

who

problem of essentialism and

I

am who

could be otherwise. That

is

.

.

and

and how

I

precisely

thinkable to assume responsibility for

changing history (and our selves). (“History” 302-303)
Identity

is

formed through

about identity

(e.g.

“what

all

is

social practice. If

one pays attention

to the political questions

the purpose of your identity?”), then one’s political

understandings can inform the practices through which one’s identities continually are
developing.

That

is, it is

not simply that one’s identities, as given, are what dictate what
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one

s politics

should be (as some identity politics imply);
rather, one’s identities are

themselves also formed through

politics, since

our political practice

is itself

an arena of

(re)habituation, or re-constitution of identity.
*

I

have argued

sake or for
to

its

in this

*

*

chapter that group identity can be valorized either
for

potential tie to politics.

The communitarian account of the

self

its

own

can be taken

simply be a descriptive account: the self is socially
constituted. Political motivations lead

me

to

want more than

furthermore

it

is

good

this descriptive account: not

to

embrace the

only

is

the self socially constituted, but

social constitution of the self for this allows

take (collective) responsibility for this moral constitution.
Thus

beyond a valorization of group
political thinking

about

how

identity just for

its

own

sake;

I

I

am

am

one

to

urging that one go

suggesting that there be a

the self can and should be constituted through the creation and

sustenance of different social contexts or communities. Identity politics can
politicize

group identity

in this

way.

Because of this potential

in identity politics,

I

will turn in the

next chapter to an examination of the trajectory that identity politics has taken,
and suggest
a direction for

its

movement.
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CHAPTER V
THE PATH OF IDENTITY POLITICS: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION

Humanity

in the

form of

fraternity invariably appears historically

peoples and enslaved groups
if

it

persecuted

were organically evolved humanity

under the pressure of persecution the persecuted
have moved so closely together

interspace which

we have

the persecution, keeping

The humanity of
so

In this as

among

much

insult

called world (and which of course existed
between

them

the insulted

as a minute.

at a

This does not mean that
it

as

that the

them before

distance from one another) has simply
disappeared.

and injured has never yet survived the hour of

and injury endurable; but

it is

it is

does mean that

liberation

insignificant, for in fact

in political

terms

it

is

it

by

makes

absolutely

irrelevant.

--Hannah Arendt

[Pjartnership in misery does not necessarily provide for
partnership for change:

get the monsters off our backs all of us

may want

When we

to run in very different directions.

-June Jordan

A. Introduction

This chapter will be an examination of the ways in which identity politics
have
inherited both the virtues and the problems of traditional communitarian
theory, and an

exploration of a possible politics of identity that rejects those tenants of communitarianism
that are problematic. In
in

mind

moving

the questions that

I

to sketch the path

of identity politics,

I

will

keep centrally

raised in the previous chapter of whether different versions of

such politics allow one to ask questions about the parameters of group
think that communitarian theory must be revised to enable

it

to

some of its various guises— is

I

While

I

countenance the

heterogeneity within constitutive communities, along similar lines
revision must take place within identity politics.

identity.

I

believe that such a

will argue that identity politics— at least in

characterized by a problem similar to a problem present in
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communitarian theory:

it

conceptualized in such a
as a

mode of conceivtng

requires that the collectivities that form
one’s self identity be

way

that hybridity

itself

be countenanced as an identity or

of identity; rather, the identity exists
as a unity.

of questioning suggested

work of Maria Lugones,

in the

critique of identity politics in both

abandoning the possibility of a

branches” of identity

its

I

will follow a line

a questioning that leads to a

and some of its coalitionist guises, without

separatist

politics

The connection between
different

cannot

of group identity. 62

identity

politics,

and

been described differently by

politics has

and so

I

turn

now

accounts of identity politics that have been formulated.
The
originally formulated an account of “identity
politics” in

look

to

at

some of the

Combahee River

“A Black Feminist

different

Collective

Statement” from

1977 where they write:

Above

all else,

women

our politics

initially

sprang from the shared belief that Black

are inherently valuable, that our liberation

adjunct to

somebody

else s but because of our

autonomy. This may seem so obvious as

to

is

need as human persons for

sound

apparent that no other ostensibly progressive

a necessity not as an

simplistic, but

movement

it is

has ever considered

our specific oppression as a priority or worked seriously for the
ending of
that oppression.

us to

work

.

.

.We

realize that the only people

consistently for our liberation

to continue

most

politics.

to

come

end somebody

Their references to recognizing their
that they “often find

it

politics

evolve from a

community which allows us

own

oppression

is

embodied

in the

concept

We believe that the most profound and potentially the

radical politics

working

care enough about

our struggle and work.

This focusing upon our
of identity

Our

is us.

healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our

who

own

directly out of our

own

identity, as

opposed

to

else’s oppression. (212)
specific oppression

difficult to separate race

from

class

comes out of their

assertion

from sex oppression because

in

our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously” (213). They are also working

62 It

is not just the critiques of specific theorists-for instance, Sarah Hoagland and Iris Young-which are
informed in this chapter by Lugones’ work, but more generally the direction of my thinking in this chapter
has been inspired by her work, particularly “Purity, Impurity and Separation.”
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from

the recognition that

the major systems of oppression
are interlocking” (210). Thus,

the specific oppression to

which they

refer

constituted by the interlocking of these

is

inseparable and simultaneous forces.

While they focus on

men and do

progressive Black
separatists

demand”

focus on their

this specific oppression, they also
“feel solidarity

own

(213).

not advocate the fractionalization that
white

They go on

that

make more

all

all

to

are

sense of their claim that they should

others’ oppression: “If

everyone else would have

the destruction of

women who

oppression rather than that of others by asserting
that ending their

oppression would entail ending

would mean

to

with

Black

women were

free,

own

it

be free since our freedom would necessitate

the systems of oppression” (215). That

is,

they take

it

that

because

they experience (simultaneously, and as
interlocked) sexism, racism, economic oppression

and heterosexism, fighting against

their

own

oppression involves destroying

all

of these

major systems of oppression and thus involves ending the
oppression of all others who
experience any of these forms of oppression. 63

The Combahee River

Collective

s

emphasis on identity

recognition of the interlocking of oppressions

is

important to remember since, in popular

usage, “identity politics” often refers to a politics that utterly

than one supposedly distinct form of oppression

The concept of identity

at

politics has

non-mainstream
sexuality;

when

when

when

fails to

take into account

As Barbara Smith

a time.

been extremely useful

development of Third World feminism.
clarifying and catalytic

politics as requiring the

individuals

It

more

reflects:

in the

has undoubtedly been most

do

in fact

have a combination of

identities as a result of their race, class, ethnicity, sex,

these identities

make them

direct targets of oppression;

and

and

they use their experiences of oppression as a spur for activist political

work. ( Yours In Struggle 84)
63

The reasoning here is problematic to me, as I am skeptical that focusing exclusively on the intersection
of oppressions which Black women experience amounts to fighting everyone’s oppression. The claim that
Black women are affected by every major system of oppression-sexism, racism, economic oppression, etc.-may be true but because these systems of oppression operate in a variety of ways on, say, people who are
racialized in different ways, fighting the particular oppressions

which

affect

Black

necessarily address the particular forms of oppression which affect, say, Latinas.
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women

will not

She contrasts

this

version of identity politics (of which
the

Combahee River

Collective

stands as an example) with lesbian
separatism and cultural feminism, which
she refers to as

more

limited versions of identity politics,
noting that “these approaches to dealing
with

being social-cultural outsiders only work
when the more stringent
are either not operative (because
everyone involved

realities

of class and race

white and middle-class) or

is

when

these material realities are ignored or
even forcibly denied” (84).

Thus another possible formulation of identity
of identity as most essential or

at least

most

salient,

politics is

one

that posits

one feature

and advocates organization around

this

one

identity, with other identities

this

formulation of identity politics, for there are a wide
variety of ways in which one might

argue that one feature of identity

being subordinated. There can be vast differences
within

is

more primary than

Alcoff pointed out, Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich
identities as

women

to

be prior to

posit

economic bases

for other

is

is

For instance,

her early work) take

their racial identities,

understanding of a “female essence” that
particular system of oppression

(in

others.

and

naturally given.

their

is built

upon

women’s culture-and

Or, one might argue that a

forms of oppression such as racism and sexism; some

women’s

women

essential

many

a

sameness

way

to

“other” cultural

cultural

each other and

to unify a

movement

“The Fourth World Manifesto”

women’s

‘

as

that

common-a

ties are less central in the

Commenting on

feminism with

their

Cultural

share something essential in

determination of their identity or position in society.

feminism, Alice Echols writes,

women’s

the cause of other forms of oppression: Marxist theories

the notion that
that

Linda

arguments are based on an

feminist theories such as Daly’s posit patriarchy as the model
for racism.

feminism

as

its

insistence

the rise of cultural

upon women’s

fundamental difference from

men seemed

by 1973 was highly schismatic” (244). She

to

sites

one example of cultural feminism’s subordination of

differences from each other to their commonality; this “Manifesto” states:

A woman’s class is almost always
.

.

.

class

is

determined by the

man

she

is

living with.

therefore basically a distinction between males, while the female
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defined by her sexual caste status.
...

is

Movement must
any

cut across

false identitication of

As

the

(male-imposed)

all

women

Female Liberation

class, race

and national

lines,

with privileges that are really male
(such

as whiteness or class, etc.) will be
fatal to our

Movement. (“Manifesto”

331, qtd. in Echols, 246)

Whether
from

the rationale behind

the claim that

and so on do not

form of identity

really constitute a

politics that

is

the

woman’s

and

derived from assumptions about biology,

identity in the

way

Furthermore,

Bourne warns

her sex or gender does, the

calls for

women

when

identity politics takes the

identity itself that

against, as

I

is

to see

their racial,

form of cultural

seen as the political goal; this

noted in the previous chapter.

prevented from asking the question of what the political
purpose of identity
valorization of the identity

that race, class

deny or downplay the importance of

to

embracing of female

the route that Jenny

is

emerges from these assumptions

women

ethnic or class identities.
it

unity

one form of oppression causes others, or from
the belief

themselves as e ssentially

feminism,

women’s

is,

One

is

is

beyond a

itself.

B. Separatist Identity Politics
If different

forms of oppression are seen as isolated and

an identity politics that

calls for

one

is left

with

an erasure of the non-primary elements of identity. While a

“crude” version of such identity politics might explicitly

more primary than

stratified,

another, other

more

state that

one feature of identity

careful theories recognize that any one person

is

may

experience several oppressions and yet by advocating that separation take place along one
line

of identity

the separatist

(e.g.

gender identity) and

that other

community, one form of oppression

are therefore being seen as conceptually separable.

of identity politics to see
the

how

it

is

forms of oppression be fought within

is still

It is

being privileged, and oppressions

worth looking closely

at this sort

a departure from the sort of identity politics described by

Combahee River Collective. As an example,

version of lesbian separatism.
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I

will look here at Sarah

Hoagland’s

Hoagland stands as an
explicitly

interest, ng

example of someone whose

identity politics

communttartan and could thus potentially
recogntze and respond

is

to the fact that

people have mult, pie communitarian
sources of identity. Hoagland's
descrtptton of the
self,

much

Roberto Unger's, emphasizes both
collectivity and individuation;
she

like

the tdea that individuals are

autonomous, but maintains

with others, the self emerges as
unique. She calls

mean

I

word

invoke a self who

to

what

for

the greek

mean

I

auto

choices;

this self

while

engagmg

community

in

“autokoenonous”:

both separate and connected. So

'autokoenony' (o' to ken o

:

'

ne)

which

I

create a

I

take from

self) and 'koenonia’ (“community,
or any group whose

(

members have something
the self in

is

that

rejects

in

common”). What

community.” The

self in

I

mean by 'autokoenony'

is

community involves each of us making

involves each of us having a self-conscious
sense of ourselves as
moral agents in a community of other
self-conscious moral agents. (145)

Hoagland
l

esbian

is

it

focused on the question of

community a community
possibilities are.

lesbians can re-constitute themselves
in

that exists within a context

,

what our moral

how

of oppression

She recognizes how we have been

within what she calls heterosexualist contexts,
but she

which these contexts have constituted us as valuing

is

that affects

socially constituted

interested in resisting the

relations of

ways

in

dominance and

subordination.

For Hoagland, then, separation
values, values not based
apart

motivated by the possibility of creating

on dominance and subordination,

from heterosexualism, where heterosexualism

dominance of one person and

in a situation or a

system

argument turns on the claim
by refusing

to

be a

is

“a

way of living

it

that

that

normalizes the

She argues

that lesbian

“a legitimate moral and political choice,” for “to engage

in order to try to

particularly in order to render

is

new

in a lesbian context that exists

the subordination of another” (7).

separation from heterosexualism

is,

is

change

meaningless,

by refusing

member of the

is

it

is

one choice. To withdraw from

another choice” (55). Hoagland’s

to be a part of the heterosexualist

system— that

category ‘woman’-and by defining oneself as
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it,

‘lesbian’,

one can open up the

which one

is

possibility of being morally
re-habituated in a context in

not subordinate. Not only does the
heterosexualist system from which

lesbians separate thereby
possibility of creating

become meaningless,

new

new meaning,

value,

unhke the category ‘woman’-is not
as

norms of behavior”

but within lesbian

s

construction) of the self

is

community

irretrievably tied

the

up with dominance and subordination

recognition of the social construction (and
potential recentral to her thesis that

we can change our moral
it is

only

among

Hoagland does not apply her vision of how

to think about

what

identities are constituted within.

of communities lesbians’

sort

That

is,

while

it is

identities

other lesbians that a

the self

is

constituted only

racial, ethnic, or class

clear to her that as a lesbian, a lesbian

can only re-constitute herself with liberatory values as an
autokoenonous being

community, she does not problematize

meanwhile speaking of

is

for “the conceptual category
‘lesbian’-

within lesbian community, and while she
argues that

in

there

(68).

While Hoagland

lesbian can do this,

community

that

the act of speaking of

someone

in lesbian

as a lesbian without

person as someone with a particular, say, racial identity; to
do

so would raise the complicated question of where this self
could be autokoenonous as

someone with a complex
Thus a

identity.

separatist version of identity politics can

affecting one person, and yet

still

imply

that

view multiple oppressions as

one feature of identity should be privileged by

arguing that separation take place along one line of identity. Spelman’s critique of
essentialism imbeds itself in such feminist theory

is

useful for seeing

how

privileging of gender takes place.

Spelman

arguing that

that different oppressions-for instance,

this analysis

assumes

racism— are separable, and

that

when two

one person, these oppressions add on
additive analysis, then, those

who

to

or

how

this isolating

and

critiques the “additive analysis” of oppression,

more forms of oppression

sexism and

are experienced by

each other without mixing. According

to the

experience “both sexism and racism” experience just
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sexism and racism, not a specific form of
oppression

that:

that is the result of

particular mixing, or interaction, of
sexist and racist forces.

It is

Black

women

thing Black

men

“sexism and racism.” For

women

have

by implication, should unite

in

merely

that suggests

experience) and that they experience another form
of

in

same thing white women experience). (122)

(the

additive analysis claims that although

oppression, what

to say

experience one form of oppression, as Blacks (the
same

women

oppression, as

The

As Spelman comments:

highly misleading to say, without further
explanation, that Black

women experience
that

some

we may each

common

women

as

is

experience other forms of
that

we

all

experience sexism, and,

order to resist this shared oppression.

A lesbian

separatist

theory such as Hoagland’s can recognize that

some women experience

notice that the heterosexualism that a

of color experiences differs from the

heterosexualism that a white/anglo
“a matter of
says

it is,

on the

men

woman

woman may

(or the masculine) dominating

but rather

it is

racial relation,

racism, but not

experience. Heterosexualism

women

is

never just

(or the feminine)” (8) as

Hoagland

always a matter of racialized men dominating (and/or, depending

being subordinate

to) racialized

women.

Rejecting the additive analysis of oppression, Spelman argues that
gender, race, and class identities as mixing in such a

each other. So for any individual woman,

that

what her race and

then

genders
identity.

in the

class are. If this

world and

it

woman’s gender
it is

identity.

Spelman looks

Chodorow

needs to go further than
all

to just

accurate to describe what
‘girl.’

I

was learning

my

girls

partly determined

at

all

women

as sharing a gender

Nancy Chodorow’s work on

women. Spelman argues

in

me, and what

to be a white, middle-class, Christian
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I

“.

that

.

.

it

the

humans

Chodorow

and women;

girls

and women. She notes,

mother nurtured

by

not the case that there are only two

claim that females are turned into

females are turned into particular

is

describes the process by which female

are turned into gendered beings-girls, and then

think of

that they are partly constitutive of

does not make sense to speak of

In considering this point,

development of gender

is true,

way

we must

in fact,

does not seem

learned, as being simply a

and ‘American’

girl” (85).

we might

Similarly,

ask of Hoagland:

is

a female turned into a

heterosexualism, or into a particular sort of
a

woman

exists only in relation to ‘man’

identity holds,

male domination of women

to the claim that all

“But do we have gender

women

are

women. But

in

females become not simply
sense in which
but

women do

many genders-then

common,
light

of

from

all

woman? When Hoagland

claims that
as long as this

will appear socially desirable and, even,
natural”

‘women,’ but not

that heterosexualism creates

w omen-for instance, women who are racialized in a particular
way.

Responding
writes:

under

(someone who dominates), and

(7) she is seeing that heterosexualism creates

B a rticular

woman

for there

is

identity in

have gender identity

common?

another sense, no: not

women

if

common, Spelman

gender

but particular kinds of

is

a social construction and

women”
is, if

(113). If there

women do

not even have gender in

such as separatism cannot argue that

all

a

is

‘woman’ describes not one

does not make sense to base feminist politics on what

which

all

women

we have

common. 64

in

In

should separate

without making the false assumption that a woman’s gender identity

distinguishes her from

men and

all

only from men, for there are

and many genders of men. Separatist

strategies thus fail to

significant for strategies of resistance) divisions that

Separatist politics

power

which simply suggest
relations

fail to

do not run along

the separation of

between what Spelman

many genders of women

acknowledge these complicated

gender divisions. Furthermore, lesbian separatist strategies also

altering the

in

one sense, of course, yes:

In

not share a gender identity-that

a sense in

this, strategies

men

it

women

all

acknowledge

lines of

gender

(as

at all.

women from all men aim at

calls the “generic

woman” and

the

“generic man,” beings who, like the unencumbered self of liberalism, in fact do not exist.

While there

many

are certainly

different versions of lesbian separatism, 65

generally been understood to involve
64 Even retaining the term ‘gender’

American

.

.

.

(e.g. in

some such

statements

separation of

like,

“she

is

be problematic;

it

65 See, for instance. For Lesbians Only

:

A

“separation of various sorts or

,

“Some

modes from men and from
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women from men. 66

constituted by race and class factors

Separatist Anthology eds.

66 For instance, Marilyn Frye defines separatism in

has, in fact,

genderized as a middle class Asian-

woman”) to refer to an identity which is partly
may seem to privilege gender over race or class.

[etc.]

it

Hoagland and Penelope.

Reflections on Separatism and Power” as
institutions, relationships, roles

and

activities

may

Ann Ferguson

proposes the term “racial gender” as a

way of indicating

that

gender

formations and racial formations interact
and change one another. She does not
argue that

women do
gender

in

not have “gender” in

common. Such

question. She writes:

common,

a claim

“The

still

disparity

but rather that

calls

women do

not

all

have

racial

an identity politics based on gender into

between the gender norms

for the

dominant and

subordinate races and ethnic groups of a
particular social formation account for
differences
in personal identities that

difficult

make

(“Racial Formation”

1

identity politics based
14).

on a

common

She meanwhile maintains

transhistoncal features of gender, and that

women

sense of gender

that there are

some

might come together across other

differences based on these features. For Ferguson,
the concept of racial gender explains

motivations both for antagonisms and for coalitions
between groups of

[T]o say personal identities involve racial genders

economic,
gender

political,

and

their race,

women

women

set

up a

political

are defined similarly as
1

some of these

of color are defined differently as

which may

Formation”

women

‘woman’ -is not

“irretrievably tied

undermined by her
subject. 67

It is

in spite

mind

is

and so on, her attempts

if

of

of their race. (“Racial

that the

term ‘lesbian’—

indeed the generic lesbian. While Floagland
is,

as racialized, constituted with class

to recognize the

failure to see the necessity of multiple

only

women because

up with dominance and subordination” (68)

attempts to see lesbian subjects as non-generic-that
identities,

practices white

16)

indicates that the lesbian she has in

and ethnic

and

identities

antagonism. In other practices,

Without the concept of racial gender, Hoagland’s claim
unlike

to say that there are

and cultural practices through which race

identities get defined. Further, in

women

is

women:

complexity of identity are

communities

for the

complex

the category ‘lesbian’ describes generic lesbians that the category

escapes systemic links to dominance and subordination;

if all

members of the category

which are male-defined, male-dominated and operating for the benefit of males and the maintenance of male
privilege-this separation being initiated or maintained, at will, by women ” ( The Politics of Reality 97).
67 In fact she
is careful to consistently note the race and class, etc., identities of any lesbian she is
discussing whenever these identities are relevant, and in this way is always aware of non-generic subjects.
.
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‘lesbian’ are racialized

members,

for instance, then

once again the category

must

‘lesbian’

be seen as tied to relations of dominance
and subordination, for just as the system
of
heterosexualism creates of males and females
dominant
racial state racializes subjects as

from

it

is

it

is

system of dominance and subordination.

racialized lesbians, then the category ‘lesbian’

The generic woman and
one aspect

to the

the generic

to

is

man

unencumbered

gender identity but not encumbered with

communities

the

reject as illusory

separation from the system of heterosexualism
that

important to also see, for instance, that to be racialized

identities constituted as tied to a

as similar in

women,

systemically created and enforced relations of
dominance and

all

subordination;

subordinate

dominant and/or subordinate. Those who

the generic lesbian cannot say that
frees us

men and

tied to

is,

as the

system

that

to

have

If all lesbians are

dominance and subordination.

(or the generic lesbian) could

self; that is,

be described

they are encumbered with a

identities tied to the race, ethnic

which they belong. Thus the recognition of gender

construction--that

is

as a

and class

form of

social

makes women of females and men of males-can

take place without the recognition of other systems of social
construction of identity, or

without recognition that
socially constitute

many systems of group

any one person’s

identity.

difference act together and inseparably to

In this

way, even a communitarian-based

theory such as Hoagland’s offers a limited recognition of

Hoagland’s separatism certainly
oppression, but her insistence that
separatist

all

tries to

whom an

individual

the self

is

“encumbered.”

recognize and address multiple systems of

forms of oppression be addressed within a lesbian

community mistakenly assumes

determining

how

woman

that heterosexualism is

has her most significant

most
ties

of politics— with. For instance, she does not advocate separation for
racial lines or suggest that within racially separatist

communities,

salient in

of identity— and thus

women

women

of color along

could address

heterosexualism. Her positing of heterosexualism as the form that dominance and

subordination takes and her argument that heterosexualism can be fought by

evacuating

all

heterosexualist contexts (contexts that construct
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them

as

women’s

women,

that

is,

as

subordinates to men, rather than as lesbians)
misses the simultaneous primacy of
racism,
for instance, in

some women’s

and the

lives

racial state as constituting us
as

dominant

and/or subordinate beings. Hoagland
attempts to avoid calling for fractionalization
by

arguing that in fact racism can be fought

woman

has to choose to ignore her racial identity
or to feel the

fractionalization.

And

yet this argument ignores

out: that resistance to racial oppression
racial solidarity exists.

necessitates that

we have

split loyalties that result in

women

in

which

around the

that “our situation as
fact

Black people

of race” (213). Along similar

lines, bell

writes:

There

is

a special

liberation.

tie

binding people together

women

Black

shared resistance struggle that led black

of some feminist

Maria Lugones
to leave the

critiques

who

struggle collectively for

and men have been united by such

have known the experience of political

activists.

(

solidarity.

women

From Margin

It is

in

69)

which she can engage as a

participation that keeps subordinated cultures

come

Borderlands 21] but

to lesbian

this is not

life” (“ Hispaneando ” 142).

Nuevomejicana lesbians)

to

I

culture on

that

it is

critical cultural participant, a

be able to engage in

She

men and women,

it

is

such

critical

my

back’ [Anzaldua,

necessary for herself (and for
this struggle, for the culture

needs

critical

writes:

Nuevomejicana lesbians cannot just leave
other

requires her

can struggle for the survival of hispana culture and

She argues

participants in order to remain alive.

it

from becoming ossified under colonization.

community with ‘my
where

They

the experience of

Hoagland’ s version of separatism precisely because

communities of color

writes, “I

ties.

to reject the anti-male stance

necessary act of resistance to racial and cultural oppression because

She

of color have pointed

Collective, for instance, asserts that they “feel

Black men,” noting

solidarity

what many

thus that no

comes out of the communities of color

The Combahee River

solidarity with progressive

hooks

w ithin the lesbian community and

because

la cultura

Chicana and Latina cultures) needs
158

to

the preservation of la cultura to

Nuevomejicana

(as all other

be both fortified and transformed or

else

we

will carry

(“ Hispaneando ”

As someone who

is

dead cultures on our backs, we

will be obsolete beings

143).

socially constituted in several communities,

cannot be autokoenonous as a hispana lesbian

Lugones notes

in either heterosexualist

that she

hispana communities

or in lesbian separatist communities. Separation
along one line of difference ignores that
the self

is

constituted in

more than one community.

Recognizing identity as complex and as deriving from
membership
intersecting

communities points

and

in multiple

to the dangers of an identity politics that
privileges

one

feature of identity by advocating forming communities
based on one feature of identity and

then engaging in

all

of one

politics recognizes the

there

is

within this community.

s politics

need

to address, say,

Even when such

racism within a lesbian separatist community,

a failure to recognize that communities constitute their

constitute their

communities and

socially constituted; thus

the separation of

women

it is

identity

that to separate

members and members

from a community

is

to

change how one

not enough to address racism within a lesbian community, for

of color from their communities of color represents a choice not

continue to be constituted within these communities, and not to

Lugones notes

that

it

is

lesbians of color

who

to

critically participate in the

continued shaping of these communities, the communities on which their identities are
part dependent.

is

are

in

most aware of the harms

of having to leave their communities of origin. She writes,

[W]e have

left

communities
not

know

if

frequently.

our kin and, in a significant sense, our people

that will not recognize us as fully their

anglo lesbians have

this sense, but they

own

in

as lesbians.

do not express

I

do

it

Hispana lesbians express constantly an ambivalent attachment

to lo nuestro.(“ Hispaneando" 141)

In fact,

Jewish

women
As

also frequently express a similar sentiment.

Rima Shore

the politics of identity play an increasing role in our

myself baffled

at conflicting

claims on

my

loyalty.

writes:

community,

I

find

We are being urged,

and

urging each other, to acknowledge and to reclaim the cultures from which
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we have emerged.

...

Am

I

to value the culture

came, while dismissing the family

Do

itself?

the abstract, but not with the brothers

I

from which

my

family

seek to identify with Jews

I

have loved

all

my

in

98-

life? (Shore,

99, qtd. in Bulkin, 125).
If lesbian

communities

reflect a culture that derives

then white/anglo (gentile)

women who form

from

the

dominant white/anglo

lesbian separatist communities

culture,

do not

quite

leave the communities in which their cultural
identities have been constituted in the

way

members of non-dominant
Thus recognizing
any one person,

in a

cultures do.

that identities are socially constituted

number of communities

group differences makes

it

and

socially constituted

that this takes place, for

or along lines of multiple and intersecting

evident that separation from communities in which one’s
self

partly constituted results in a lack of sustenance for the
self that

one certainly may want

that

to refuse to sustain

some of the ways

in

is

so constituted;

which one’s

and may purposefully separate from a community

at

is

times

been

self has

for this reason.

But

a mistake to think that one could maintain a desired identity (as a living,
changing

it is

identity) apart

from the community(ies)

that sustain

cannot carry one’s culture on one’s back

make new meanings. Thus,

all

it.

If

meaning

is

made

socially then one

by oneself and expect the culture

to continue to

there are problems with any identity politics that, inadvertently

or not, calls for the social sustenance of only one feature of identity (separable from the
rest)

by requiring one

of, for instance,

to leave the

communities

that

make

the continued social constitution

one’s racially or culturally defined self impossible.

C. Multiple Communities
In response to the

problem

that I outlined

above with

separatist politics,

it

might be

suggested that one could have multiple and yet separate communities, each of which

on the commonality of one feature of identity. However,
will not do. If

self

is

it is

I

built

believe that such a suggestion

unacceptable to have to leave some of the communities

in

which one’s

socially constituted, the suggested line of thinking goes, then let us maintain
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is

all

of

our communities and yet keep the
integrity of each community
as defined along different
lines

of difference. This model of identity
recognizes that the self is constituted
as

multiplicitous, and thus calls for multiple

Such a model

is

proposed by

community or group

Young

Iris

identifications.

in her description

of group difference

within what she calls the “heterogeneous
public.” Rejecting the idea that the
public

arena in which differences are to be

behind

left

in the

is

the

formation of a unity, she suggests a

public differentiated by social groups each
of which has a distinct sense of identity;
social

groups that are oppressed are entitled
in

to special

order to counter the fact that the public,

forms of representation within the public,

when conceived of as

a locus of impartiality,

excludes such oppressed groups or requires
members of these groups to assimilate as a
condition ot participation.

To

give

some examples of social groups who

represented in the heterogeneous public,

Young

writes that “clear candidates for group

representation in policy-making in the United States
are

old people, poor people, disabled people, gay

are to be specially

men and

women,

Blacks, American Indians,

lesbians, Spanish-speaking

Americans, young people, and non-professional workers” Throwing
(
127-128).
Participation in public decision-making, then,

is

a matter of group representation, carried

out through caucuses based on social groups whose interests
and perspectives would

otherwise be ignored.

Though

Young

its

writes that:

realization

is

far

from assured,

the ideal of a

“Rainbow

Coalition” expresses such a heterogeneous public with forms of group
representation. ... In a

Rainbow

Coalition.

.

.

each of the constituent

groups affirms the presence of the others and affirms the specificity of
experience and perspective on social issues.

.

.

Ideally, a

its

rainbow coalition

affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the oppressed

groups or

political

movements

constituting

it,

and

it

program not by voicing some “principles of unity”
rather by allowing each constituency to analyze

from the perspective of

its

arrives at a political

that hide differences but

economic and

experience. ( Throwing 126-127)

161

social issues

Young’s proposal serves

to recognize both the fact of

group difference (including

its

role in

shaping the collectivities within which
. dent, ties are
constituted) and the necessity of
taking
concrete measures towards ending the
dominance of

ending group differentiation

some groups over

others while not

itself.

But what goes on within each of the social
groups or caucuses? Such a concern
informs Maria Lugones’ reading of Young’s
proposal. Lugones uses the concepts of
thickness" and “transparency" to describe
the positions of

w ithin

their groups.

She

writes:

Thickness and transparency are group
with respect to their group
those of the group and
in the

members of social groups

Individuals are transparent

they perceive their needs, interests, ways,
as

if

if this

relative.

perception becomes dominant or hegemonical

group. Individuals are thick

if they are aware of their otherness
in the
group, of their needs, interests, ways, being relegated
to the margins in the

politics

of intragroup contestation. (“Purity” 474)

So, for instance, within a group of

women, women of color

within a group of Latinas, Latina lesbians

may be

thick

tend to be thick members;

members, and so

on.

Lugones then

considers what happens during Young’s process of group
representation to those people

who

are thick

we need

members of each of the

a solution to the

social groups to

which they belong. She argues

problem of walking from one of one’s groups

to another,

that

being

mistreated, misunderstood, engaging in self-abuse and self-betrayal
for the sake of the

group

that only distorts our

Having multiple and yet
fragmentation, as long as

needs because they erase our complexity” (“Purity” 473).

distinct

group memberships

results,

some members of each group

Lugones argues,

in

are transparent while others are

thick:

Fragmentation occurs because one’s

interests, needs,

ways of seeing and

valuing things, persons, and relations are understood not as tied simply to

group membership, but as the needs,

members of the

group. Thick

interests,

members
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and ways of transparent

are erased. Thick

members of

several oppressed groups

those groups.

As

become composites of the

transparent

members of

thick, they are marginalized through
erasure, their voices

nonsensical. (“Purity” 474)

While Young does not
separatists such as

call for separation

along only one line of identity, as
lesbian

Hoagland do, what she does

temporary separations into

distinct caucuses.

these caucuses are fragmented as they

group. The very problem that

call for

can be characterized as a series of

Those who are thick members

move from group

Young aims

to solve

to group, erased in

in

each of

each separate

by ensuring representation of

oppressed social groups seems to be replicated within
the social group: participation

group requires assimilation

Young
group

to the

hegemonic ways of transparent members;

in the

the unity that

rejected as a desideratum for the polity resurfaces
within the social group as the

articulates

mechanisms

its

concerns and positions. As a form of identity

for identity-based group representation

still

politics,

Young’s

require the conceptual separability

of “features” of one’s identity; while the subject can be
multiplicitous for Young-that

one can belong

to

are fragmented.

and be constituted within several different

As Lugones

notes,

Young

is,

social groups-thick subjects

“lacks a conception of a multiple subject

who

not fragmented” (“Purity” 473).
*

In this context, a return to the

*

*

Combahee River

identity politics looks very appealing, for they are

fractionalization while not
their identities as

Black

Collective’s conceptualization of

aiming

to

avoid

abandoning the concept of collective

women

this

very problem of

identity.

They

insist

upon

(they also alternately describe themselves as “Black

feminists and lesbians”), and state that they cannot separate the features of their identity.

They

explicitly refuse to

caucus

to a

women’s

walk from one of

caucus), as thick

misunderstood, engaging

in self-abuse

(Lugones, “Purity” 473); instead, they
as not being thick

members,

their

members

groups to another (such as from a Black
in

each group, “being mistreated,

and self-betrayal
insist

upon

the group of Black
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for the sake of the group.

the group in

women.

.”
.

which they see themselves

is

While
problem of

think that

The Combahee River
which they name,

fractionalization

complicated

members

I

of the ways

group of Black women.

which complex

in

identity

aiming

is

to address the very

believe that their approach can be further

I

one presses the question of whether there are

if

in a

Collective

still

The Combahee River

thick and transparent

Collective has addressed one

can be distorted. That

is,

identities

can be seen

through the additive analysis; their identities could be seen
as the identity of a (generic, but
really male)

on.

Black person plus the

They have

identity of a (generic, but really white)

rejected this fractionalizing

against being marginalized (as thick

way

members)

woman, and

so

of characterizing identity. They guard
in the various

wider groups

in

which they

might be placed, among Black people, among women, among lesbians,
and so on.

However, they

are

still

positing a unity within the identity they have named: the identity of

Black women. This insistence upon unity can serve

do not

squarely within any such identity; to posit a unity of “Black

fit

up another norm
group

to systemically marginalize others

who do

to

women” may just

contend with that marginalizes those within or on the borders of

not quite

women, Blacks who

fall into

who
set

this

place: for instance. Black Latinas or other mixed-race

are gender-ambiguous, Black

women who

some other way

in

fall

outside the defining or hegemonic features of the unity, whether by being urban, elderly,

Caribbean, a gang-banger,
despite the narrowing
as Black

women,

by

there

rural,

the

non-English-speaking, Southern, and so on. That

Combahee River

is,

Collective of their group to those identified

may be more and more forms

that thickness

and transparency can

take within such a group.

There

are, then, at least

two

distinct

ways

identity are problematic for or harmful to those

(and one can experience both of these ways
the

norm of the

identity

is

at

in

who

which

are marginalized

once).

The

first is

separate, distinct lines of group difference

derived. Recognition of this problem leads the

focus on their

own

oppression as Black

essentialist constructions of
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problem of not

fitting

from which one’s “composite”

Combahee River

women However,
.

the

by these constructions

there

is

Collective to

a second

problem

that

persists

even when identity

is

characterized as free from this sort of
fractionalization: the

assumption of commonality of identity within
a group such as Black

women

misses the

indeterminacy, “impurity,” hybridity, or
mestizaje present within even such a precisely
specified identity.

It is

not just that there are gender differences
within a group defined

along lines of race, for instance; there are
also racial ambiguities or mixtures
within
Blackness, gender indeterminacy amongst those
generally called
of group identity

when

is

not reached by specifying

the illusion of such unity

is

in the

by Leslie Feinberg;

Naomi Zack (among many

Adrienne Rich writes about being

in “Split

who

will never be the

the marginalization faced

wrong body”~and do not

offered, as described for instance

race person, as

is

it

is

so on. Unity

categories of identity, especially

created by marginalizing those

ones defining the norm of the category. This

gender ambiguous~“bom

more narrow

women, and

fit

the

by those who

are

two gender categories

the marginalization of the

mixed

others) describes, or the Mischling that

At The Root”;

it is

the marginalization of the

mestizo and the mestizo, terms used by Chicana/Latina/raeshza
theorists such as Gloria

Anzaldua, Maria Lugones and Linda Alcoff as they draw on the Latin
American tradition of

acknowledging the mixing of peoples

Cosmica ”;
work;

it

is

it is

into

what Jose Vasconcelos named “La Raza

the marginalization of the hybrid, to use a term

the marginalization of the assimilated

the survivors or descendants of imperialism,

the colonizer

who

whose

from Trinh T. Minh-ha’s

are not considered “authentic,” and of

subjectivity reflects the cultures both of

and the colonized, as described, for instance, by Edward Said

The Combahee River

Collective’s solid identity as Black

68
.

women-or any

clearly defined category of identity— is not always available to those

who

are

other

on the borders

68 See Leslie Feinberg,
Stone Butch Blues (Ithica, N.Y.: Firebrand Books, 1993); Naomi Zack, Race and
(Philadelphia: Temple U.P., 1993); Adrienne Rich, “Split at the Root: An Essay on Jewish

Mixed Race

Identity” in Blood,

Bread and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,

New Mestizo Maria Lugones, “Purity, Impurity and
Separation”; Linda Alcoff, “Mestizo Identity” (unpublished paper, presented at the Eastern Division of the
Society for Women In Philosophy at Binghamton University, April 1994); Jose Vasconcelos, “La Raza
1986); Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera: The

Cosmica: Mision de

la

Raza Iberoamericana”

1957-1961); Trinh T. Minh-ha, “From
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism

A

in

;

Obras Completas (Mexico: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos,
in Framer Framed (New York: Routledge, 1992);

Hybrid Place”

(New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).
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of or
is

who

straddle the defining lines of difference
of categories of identity.

clearly a value to

naming

underneath

it

one another; thus

all, all

I

want

the

same

to hold

as

on

how

to

clearly, nevertheless

one another or only idiosyncratically

to

Young’s commitment not

or promote an undifferentiated, supposedly
impartial public.

question of

yet, there

the collectivity of identity. Just
because the lines of difference

which would delineate categories of identity cannot
be drawn
not,

And

I

to ignore

we

different

are

from

group difference

will return, then, to the

have collectivity which does not define by a systemically
exclusionary

norm and marginalize

the rest,

how

to

name an

identity

which recognizes

the sociality of

experience and subjectivity without reducing that sociality
to a circumscribed category.

ask the question using Lugones’ terms,
is

no one who

is

a thick

how

To

can there be a collectivity within which there

member, no one who

is

“relegated to the margins in the politics of

intragroup contestation” (“Purity” 474)?

D.

From

Identity to Politics:

Where Does

Trinh T. Minh-ha comments that “‘[identity’ has

the Hybrid

GrC

now become more

a point of

departure than an end point in the struggle” ( Framer 140) and Linda Alcoff
suggests that

we

understand the identity politics that the

indicating that “one’s identity

is

Combahee River Collective developed

as

taken (and defined) as a political point of departure, as a

motivation for action, and as a delineation of one’s politics” (“Cultural Feminism...” 431432).

I

think this

is

a positive interpretation of the political implications of the

River Collective’s formulation of identity

marking off of categories which define

on the work

to

be done

itself,

and

it

politics, for

it

is

the identity out of

one which focuses not on the

which work

takes the direction of this

work

decided a priori by the givens of one’s identity; the work of politics
constitution of identity, a process through
a point of departure

is

which

identity changes.

echoed by June Jordan, who comments

Parmar about “issue-oriented unity among

in

to

is

done, but rather

be open-ended, not

is itself

a source of the

The sense of

identity as

an interview with Pratibha

different kinds of people,
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women, black

people.

or black

whether

women"
it

that "it

enough

s

Even

so,

to get

is

it

may be enough

not

to get started

anything finished" (qtd.

enough

in

say that identity

to

is

remains: where, given a certain conception
of identity,

what conception of identity leads one
hybridity? While

how
one

1

to depart to

will return to this question

particular assumptions about identity
s identity

quite depart

The

“who

are

political question about

people?” question)

“coalition-building.”

a point of departure, for the question
is

engage

is

one compelled
in

to depart to,

and

a politics that does not erase
I

first

want

to discuss briefly

lead to a politics that enables one to
maintain

is

However,

identity.

whom to

“do politics” with

(that

is,

one version of the

often framed as a debate between “separatism”
and

believe that both of these forms of oppositional
politics

I

can presuppose the distinctness and separability of social
it

doubt very much

Parmar, 109-110).

momentarily,

may

I

based on clearly delineated categories-a
politics that enables one to never

from an essentially defined

my

on something but

identities.

With

separatist politics

perhaps most clear that one must be able to isolate one feature
of identity as definitive

of the line along which separation

is

to take place.

But coalitions can also invoke a

conception of social identity as fractionalized or composite,

if

the coalition

is

understood to

be a coming together of previously distinct and separate groups or
“caucuses”

that

remain

throughout the coalition process. Bernice Johnson Reagon’s proposal
for

distinct

“coalition politics” presupposes a

“home”

Reagon

and home be separate can be problematic, precisely

s

insistence that coalition

because one must ask
contestation

who

to

which

parties to the coalition can return.

gets “relegated to the margins in the politics of intragroup

(Lugones, “Purity

’

474) within the “home.” While Reagon thinks of the

coalition she proposes as an alternative to separatism (imagined as “barred rooms”), in fact
the separate

“homes”

that sustain or revitalize participants in the coalition also

can be places

of marginalization of “thick members.”
Coalition politics

is

consistent with the conception of identity put forth by the

Combahee River Collective. Such

a coalition

is
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envisioned by the authors of Yours In

Struggle, a collection of three essays, by
Minnie Bruce Pratt, a white Christian-raised

Southerner, Barbara Smith, an African-American,
and Elly Bulkin, an Ashkenazi Jew.

The authors preface

the

book by saying “we believe our cooperation on

concrete possibilities for coalition work”
coalitions

between

distinct

whose

And

backgrounds

all

Jews

in the

norm of either

comments on

The

illusion of

is

not, as

group. Barbara Smith

United States are white people of European

(80), dismissing as a “minority” those

Bulkin asserts that “Jewishness

indicates

created by dismissing or downplaying the
existence of

is

identities are mixtures, or are not the

writes in her essay: “Almost

book

yet the coalitions are conceived of as

groups-for instance, people of color and Jews.

the distinctness of these groups

those

(9).

this

who do

many assume,

not

fit

this description.

Elly

equivalent to whiteness” and

the inadequacy of the language available to describe
the racialization of Jews

(especially Sephardim); however, her

commitment

to coalition

and perhaps the persistence

of an image of coalition as taking place between distinct groups
leads her to announce that
her focus

is

primarily on relations between white-skinned Jews and non-Jewish
people of

color in this country” (97). Jews

Bulkin
“thick

s analysis, fitting into

who

are not white are left outside of the focus of

neither of the groups that comprise the coalition.

members” of each of the caucuses have

separability of the various groups to

groups come together

their identities

Thus

the

fragmented by the conceptual

which they might claim membership, even

as these

in coalition.

Coalition politics, then— such as the

Rainbow

Coalition that informs

Iris

Young’s

description of the heterogeneous public or the coalition that grounds the idea of Yours In

S tru ggle-can require clean categorization of group difference just as
can. This indicates to
to envision a

me

that

genuine coalition

one needs
in

which

to

much

as separatism

conceive of coalition differently, that one needs

the distinctness of seemingly separate identities

dissolves without the group differences themselves disappearing.

Here the suggestion
If identity is

that

we

conceive of identity as a point of departure

is

pertinent.

a point of departure, could coalition be a destination (albeit an ever-changing
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one) instead of a temporary engagement
from which one then returns

imagine a coalition

in

where

work

the coalition

which one’s
itself

identity

would be

would be changed

Reagon

s

fitting into the

coalition.

in the process; if this is so,

sense, a

home

to

go back

to, for

same home community— as

When

in the coalition process,

a practice constitutive of identity. In fact,
Bernice

Johnson Reagon’s description of coalition suggests
might take place

home? One can

that extraordinary

change

in identity

however, one would end up without,

in

one would not end up as the same personthe person

whom one was when one entered the

identity is understood as including hybridity

and including the possibility

(and perhaps desirability) of consciously (re)-constituting
oneself as hybrid, there can be

no homes

Reagon’s sense.

in

E. Partnership in

Who might be
of identity?
in

What

partners in a coalition that

would be understood

to

be transformative

of partnerships could acknowledge that identities have been made

sorts

complex ways by

Misery or Partnership for Change?

intersecting group differences but also see identities as points of

departure, not limiting facts?

June Jordan writes that “partnership
partnership for change” (“Report” 82).

in

misery does not necessarily provide for

Hannah Arendt expresses a

similar idea

when

she

distinguishes between on the one hand a sort of humanity present in “dark times” 69 -that

is,

a fraternity based on the intimacy and unity of the persecuted and characterized by what she
calls

worldlessness-and on the other hand a friendship whose discourse “belongs

area in which there are
truth'

many

both links and separates men, establishing in fact those distances between

Dark Times

“If

it

is

space of appearances

in

:

an

voices and where the announcement of what each ‘deems

6 9 “Dark times,”
for Arendt, are times
In

to

when

the public realm disappears.

She writes

in the

men which

preface to

Men

men by providing a
who they are and what

the function of the public realm to throw light on the affairs of

which they can show

deed and word, for better and worse,
extinguished by ‘credibility gaps’ and 'invisible
government,’ by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet, by exhortations,
they can do, then darkness has

moral and otherwise,

that,

come when

in

this light is

under the pretext of upholding old

triviality” (viii).
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truths,

degrade

all

truth to

meaningless

together comprise the world” (“On Humanity”
30-31).™ Jose Vasconcelos also speaks of
the unity or patriotism within his raza a
patriotism that
,

effects of imperialism, but that

is

necessary in resistance to the

is

not the ultimate end, since in his teleological
fashion,

Vasconcelos sees history leading towards the ultimate emergence
of “la Raza Cosmica
futura” (904), una raza mestiza. Here the racial
nationalism

conditions of domination by stronger nations, but

is itself

Para no tener que renegar alguna vez de

vivamos conforme
el

mas

alto interes

al alto interes

de

la

de

consumar

mundo,

el triunfo

civilization nos

de

necessary under present

las

el

Vasconcelos writes:

limited.

la patria

la raza,

misma

es menester que

aun cuando este no sea todavia

humanidad. Es claro que

conforma con un intemacionalismo
circunstancias del

is

el

corazon solo se

cabal; pero, en las actuales

intemacionalismo solo servirfa para acabar de

naciones mas fuertes. ... El estado actual de

impone todavia

el

patriotismo

como una necesidad

la

de

defensa de intereses materiales y morales, pero es indespensable que ese
71
patriotismo persiga finalidades vastas
y trascendentales. (912)

All of these three theorists, then, have a double-edged recognition of the place of the
collective identity of oppressed peoples. Categories of social identity are created

systems and conditions of oppression that give
fraternity or collective identity.

reality

Such an

rise to a certain solidarity, partnership,

identity cannot

be denied without denying the

of the conditions of oppression or of the “dark times” that form the context for

As Arendt

it.

writes:

I

cannot gloss over the fact that for

adequate reply to the question,

many

years

I

which Nathan the Wise

70Thanks to Bat- Ami Bar

On

(in effect,

though not

As

That answer

for the statement with

in actual

wording) countered

for suggesting the relevance of this essay to me.

some time have to renounce the very fatherland it is necessary that we
of the race even when that is not yet the highest interest of humanity. It

'in order to not at

the high interest

considered the only

Who are you? to be: A Jew.

alone took into account the reality of persecution.

7

from

according to

live
is

clear that the

heart only conforms to complete internationalism; but, in the present circumstances of the world,

internationalism would only serve to finish perfecting the triumph of the strongest nations.

interests, but

it is

.

.

.

The

imposes patriotism on us as a necessity of defense of material and moral
indispensable for that patriotism to pursue vast and transcendental ends.

present state of civilization

still
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the

command: “Step

considered

it

closer,

Jew”~the statement:

as nothing but a grotesque

I

am a man-I would

and dangerous evasion of

have

reality.

(“On Humanity” 17-18)
While

to ignore or miss the

importance of the solidarity and collective identity
of the

oppressed would indicate a denial of the

reality

of persecution, the politics of such a

collective identity are limited, for they forestall
the possibility of fully embracing and

developing

human

hybridity or mestizaje 1
.

The

identity politics

considering in this chapter have in various ways manifested
tried to build “partnership for

change” out of oppressed

which

for a people to

times.

The

where

true discourse-the contestation of

have

men

identities.

realm can

cast.

But

only with people with
true

upon a

retreat

move

means

that they avoid disputes

whom they cannot come

humanity of discourse

part of

what

it

in the public

of persecution and acting as

if

from

the public realm

closer to one another, to seek in

the substitute for that light and illumination

this

is

meaning-takes place. She speaks of the

have, in such [dark] times, to

warmth of intimacy

the

have

their collective identity forged through persecution
in dark

“fraternity” of the persecuted is dependent

powerful need

have been

this limitation, as they

For Arendt, the refusal or inability to cross lines of difference

means

I

and

which only the public

try as far as possible to deal

into conflict”

(“On Humanity”

30).

But the

realm also cannot be gained by ignoring the context

group difference did not

exist, that

is,

by crossing over

lines

of difference without acknowledging that the lines were ever there. In the context of
persecution, to deny the relevant lines of difference along which group identity are formed

would be both dangerous and

a denial of reality; while Arendt wants the true humanity of

friendship rather than the forged intimacy of fraternity, the friendship cannot be one that
fails to

acknowledge the context

in

which

it

takes place, a context in which

important to distinguish between mestizaje which

we

are not all

from domination and U.S.A.-style meltingis thoroughly discussed by
Linda Alcoff in “Mestizo Identity.” It is also addressed by Carlos A. Fernandez in “La Raza and the Melting
Pot: A Comparative Look At Multiethnicity” and by Jose Vasconcelos in his development of the idea of
“La Raza Cosmica.”
is

pot, assimilationist ideology,

which

is

is

tied to domination.
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free

This distinction

just

human

beings. Rather, any friendship in the
context of persecution must be one that

fully recognizes the context.

[I]n the

She

writes:

case of a friendship between a

conditions of the Third Reich

humanness

for the friends to

it

German and

Jew under

a

the

would scarcely have been a sign of

have

said:

Are we not both human beings?

It

would have been mere evasion of reality and of the world
common to both
at that time; they would not have been
resisting the world as it was. A law
that prohibited the intercourse of

could not be defied by people

Jews and Germans could be evaded but

who

denied the reality of the distinction. In

keeping with a humanness that had not

humanness

in the

say to each other:

lost the solid

midst of the reality of persecution, they would have had to

A German

and a Jew, and

Without endorsing the

retreat into the collective identity

people, Arendt finds a

way

Her account

is

seems

to

resistant identity

than accepts

it

friends.

(“On Humanity” 23)

of the persecuted as a persecuted

maintain in view the relevance of group difference.

suggestive of an alternative to an identity politics that depends upon

partnership in misery
identity

to

ground of reality, a

to

ground the shared

be something that

is

identity.

Even under

imposed or given by

the oppressive system, a

can be claimed or created within a coalition

as given

persecution, where

that transforms identity rather

by the oppressive system. The transformation must be

introduction of the contestation of meaning within the collectivity, that

of what Arendt shows

is

is,

tied to a re-

a re-introduction

missing from the “fraternity” of the persecuted. The

transformation takes place both in the assertion of the identity as a collective and contested
political

commitment-a commitment

through oppression-and

that recognizes

in the treatment

identities as created

of identity as a starting point -in part shaped by a

context of oppression— but not as an immutable
identity,

and defies the

fact.

To be somewhat

metaphorical about

one can contrast Bernice Johnson Reagon’s characterization of “home” as a

stable

place of return to recuperate from coalition work, with June Jordan’s characterization of

“home” encapsulated
some place

to leave

in her

which

remark

is

that

“everybody needs a home so

where most folks

will say
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at least

you can have

you must be coming from”

(

Notes” 123). Jordan’s “home”

were transformed through

some sense

a point of departure; in a coalition in
which identity

political practice,

Linda Alcoff notes
in

is

that “people

their identity” (“Cultural

one would not return

to the

of mixed races and cultures.

.

.

same home.

have had

to

choose

Feminism” 432) precisely because what was given

as an identity could not easily be defined
within the parameters of the available categories;

being

in this position

of choosing compels one to

treat identity as a point

of departure. In

contrast to the communitarian account of the
social construction of identity that tends to be

deterministic because

takes the subject to simply inherit a set of values
as given within

it

one unified history or community,

I

would

like to

socially constituted as hybrid exists within

these communities
there

is

may

always the need

someone who does not
such as the racial

I

hybrid.

complex and

agency

“fit” in

must be a

political act

is

and perhaps conflicting ways,

in navigating one’s

it is

who

intersecting communities, and

self identity in various

quite “fit” the category as

insisting that she does

“ain’t

on her

to exercise

state, there

she does not quite

by

pull

claim that since the person

own

self identity.

Thus

for

defined by a system of oppression

of identification, either with the category

(and thus she transforms the category by inserting herself into
fit,

as Sojourner Truth did with the category

it,

‘woman’ by asking,

a woman?”), or with an identity which resists the categories, an identity as impure,

Thus a

racially

mixed person might

identify with

one race: Black, or Latino, for

instance-or might identify as hybrid; the assimilated Jew might choose politically
identify as Jewish,

and so on.

When

to

infused with agency in this way, an act of identifying

holds the possibility of being resistant; the collectivity can be conceived of through terms

used to denote those

who

are “partners for

change” rather than “partners

in misery.”

Think, for instance, of the difference between the term ‘Chicano’--a politically claimed
identity— and the term ‘Mexican- American ’—a category of identity given by the racial state;

along similar

lines, think

sexual,’ the difference

of the difference between ‘queer’ (or ‘gender resistant’) and
‘

between mestizo

’

(or ‘hybrid’)

and ‘mixed-race’ (or

‘bi-

‘bi-racial’),

and the difference between ‘dyke’ and ‘gay/homosexual woman.’ The terms “Chicano,”
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“queer,” dyke” and so on keep alive the
contestation of meaning

term applies (which

is itself

among

those to

whom

indeterminate) as long as the meanings of the
terms are

themselves contested. As Cherrie Moraga comments
on some of the other terms,

have always hated the terms
political bite.

(126). That

.

is,

They

.

the

‘biracial’

and

‘bisexual.’

They

I

are passive terms, without

are a declaration not of identity, but of biology,
of sexual practice”

these terms refer to something that

is

taken to be a given or a neutral

fact;

they do not declare identity as political commitment,
as identification.

The

solidarity

named by

commitment, but a commitment

these terms of identity
that, as

community

to the

resists together, but

it

is

is

formed.

not as

It is

not necessarily as a group

same given category of identity. The

would require an

the solidarity of a political

Arendt urges us to do, takes into account the

context of persecution in which the relationship
a

is

“human beings”

whose members

all

that

belong

creation of identities within such communities

act of identifying to be cognizant of

how

the starting-point identities of

those involved have been formed under oppression, but not to take these
identities to ever

be finished. Under

engages

this

in political acts

conception, rather than having or being a certain identity, one

of identity, acts that take identity, as Linda Alcoff suggests, as a

point of departure but also as a continually evolving possibility; “identifying” with

someone, then,

is

one way of affirming them as one’s own, where

always understood as a purposeful

political act,

this affirmation is

and one which does not need

to reinforce

or line up in accordance with given categories of identity, but cannot ignore them, either.

That

is, it is

not simply that our identities, as given, are what dictate what our politics

should be (as some identity politics imply), but that our identities are themselves also

formed through our

politics, since

our political practice

or re-constitution of identity. While
identities as they are

some

an arena of (re)habituation,

identity politics such as cultural

formed through persecution

determine one’s politics and one’s

is itself

political

(or, in fact, as naturally

community,
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feminism take

given) to

the politics of identity

I

am

suggesting here takes identity to be created
through ah social practice, including
through the
continuing work that

Given

this

we do

in political

communities or

coalitions.

understanding of identity as created through
political

fixed or unchanging; communities

who

acts,

no unity

is

politically forge their sense of unity
maintain this

unity only through the continued struggle
of collectively developing and maintaining their
political

commitments. Basing one’s

solidarity

consciousness of the real possibilities for

on shared

this resistance

resistance,

however, requires

being actualized together; that

full

is,

one must not underestimate the importance of how deeply
our social constitution has

shaped our experiences and values
with each other even as

differently, perhaps in

we commit to engage

ways which make us

in resistance together.

at

odds

We are not all equal

candidates for being each other’s “people,” and yet the
affirmation of someone as “one’s

own can

still

go against the

grain,

and must go against the grain

essentialist constructions of identity while maintaining a

if

one

is

to disrupt

communitarian sense about one’s

political life.

If

one takes as a

starting point the sort of multiple social groups that Iris

proposed for the heterogeneous public, one must focus on the departure from
multiple group identities that result in fragmentation.

I

am

Young

this place

has

of

not denying the significance that

the existence of such social groups has for guarding against forced assimilation into
an

undifferentiated public.

I

am

suggesting a rethinking of Young’s heterogeneous public

with attention given to what happens within each group and

parameters and characteristics of the group.
assimilation that
the

still

norm defined by

Lugones

is

very defining of the

correct, there

is

a forced

takes place within each group, an assimilation of the thick
the transparent

members.

social groups such that their coherence

rather

If

in the

I

am

members

to

suggesting that one reconceive of the

depends not on the categories of oppression but

on the contested terms of political commitment.

When

it is

the categories of

oppression that define social groups, these categories lend authority to transparent members
as they

make

their

own ways and

concerns seem to represent those of the whole group;
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without these categories of identity there
identity as a point of departure
all

and never as

back

itself a

this

hegemony.

given, defining

by taking

understand one

collectivities or coalitions to

s identity as in part

social group,

identities

even within a

direction ol hybridity, for
collectivity in

which

identities are

draw on the group differences

Young

members aim

a hybrid self that will develop

is

it

political practice allows

new forms of thickness and

envision a process where within any collectivity

to

identity.

one

transparency.

to

I

remake themselves

when

in the

meanings of the

the

forming are contested meanings. In

that

one takes

be places of re-constitution of

formed through

purposefully resist the re-emergence of

If

norm of a

emerging norms can be contested and one can depart
from given

collectivity

To

less to

is

this

have been sustained through groups

process one

like those that

suggests, but treat these social groups and the identities that
were sustained in

as contestable without being dispensable, that

is,

This departure includes an enactment of a

one can

new

treat

them

sense of what

the possibility of recognizing

whom one

is

them

as points of departure.

it

with a group. The idea of solidarity must be constructed so that there
noticing one’s differences from those with

may

be solidary

to

is

is still

room

for

solidary, but also so that there

two other intertwined phenomena:

first

of

all,

is

being solidary

with a group must be understood to allow for having the status of both being and not being
the

other

with

whom one

is

solidary;

and secondly, being solidary with a group must be

consistent with identities being remade or reconstituted through the experience of solidarity -that

is,

through the actual work done in the coalition community. This remaking of

ourselves in the coalition

community does

the degree of hybridity within

I

is

all

not decrease our differences; rather,

not merely a precursor to action,
(22).

And

political actions create

as

increases

of us.

will close this chapter with a reminder

who we are ”

it

it is

from Jenny Bourne, who

also created through action.

.

.

.

writes: “Identity

What we do

is

one asks the question “what do we do?” one must ask which

room

for identifying with the hybrid, in oneself
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and

in others.

In the next chapter

grounded

in the

I

will consider the question of collective
identity as

concept of ‘culture’ and

I

will focus in

on

it

could be

the question of whether

understanding of ‘culture’ can allow one to
develop and animate hybridity. That

some

is,

I

will

be asking whether the concept of ‘culture’
provides a basis for a socially constituted
identity that could avoid

some of the problems

that

I

have outlined

in this chapter within

identity politics; could ‘culture’ inform
a politics of identity in such a

depend upon
argue that as
political

essentialist categories of identity that
marginalize those
it

is

commonly understood and

as

it

framework

in

which

it

‘culture’ has

the borders?

I

will

tended to be a reifying

can include the idea of mestizaje and be a

identities are socially constituted

This conception of ‘culture’ aims to

on

that did not

has been drawn upon to ground some

communities and oppositional movements,

notion; however, understood differently,

way

resist assimilation
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and lived as creative

possibilities.

without reifying the claimed identity.

CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL

COMMUNITY AND THE CONCEPT OF ‘CULTURE’

A. Introduction
In the previous chapter

and group

politics

identity

I

when

argued

the group in question

and enforced social differences. In

by suggesting

that there is often a problematic link

this

that there is frequently a

chapter

That

communities

is,

ethnicity of their

members

defined by systemically created

will take the questioning

problem with the concept of

often culture that either defines a priori or later
identity.

I

is

that distinguish

comes

to

between

one step further
and

‘culture’ itself,

it

is

be associated with a group’s

themselves from other groups by the

take shared culture to be, a priori, a basis for

community

membership. And, other constitutive communities (whose members do not share an ethnic
heritage)— such as

“women's community”

or “lesbian

community”— often

are thought of as

becoming, through the development of shared practices and values, the locations of shared
‘culture’; for instance,

one often hears the terms “women’s culture” or “lesbian culture .” 73

Such communities “borrow”

the concept of ‘culture’ to attach to

understood simply as a shared identity.
degree to which a community

is

what could otherwise be

as if the concept ‘culture’ adds depth to the

It is

thought of as constitutive of

its

member’s

identities;

credence to the community as constitutive precisely because to share a culture

something

that

is

adds

share

goes deeper than what can be chosen by an unencumbered subject.

However,
the term

is to

it

I

believe

it

is

a mistake to

fall

commonly understood— to ground

back on the concept of

political

‘culture’ -at least as

communities whose goal

is

liberatory

73 Ann Ferguson’s “Is There
a Lesbian Culture?” critiques the concept of “lesbian culture” on grounds other

than (though compatible with) the ones that will be the focus of

my

critique.

there are lesbian subcultures, not a universal lesbian culture, and secondly that

our goal as international

movements)
political

(

movement

are

more able

to tolerate

“we

need.

first
.

.

to

of

all

that

conceive of

building (of interconnected lesbian, gay and feminist

rather than culture building” precisely because “those

movement

a culture”

political

She argues

who

see themselves as building a

value disagreement than those

82 ).
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who

see themselves as building

change, and so

be asking what role the concept of

will

I

of unity within such communities.

committed

that are

to

working

to

I

will focus

end

now

‘culture’ plays in creating a sense

specifically

on

relations of oppression, that

political

is,

communities

of systemically

maintained dominance and subordination of people
along lines of group difference, such as
those of gender, race, class, sexuality, and ethnicity.
recognition that

it

among members

I

am

motivated here by

frequently the concept of ‘culture’ that provides
the conceptual unity

is

of such communities, and by

my

concern that

typically understood-is at odds with the project
of liberation.

giving up of culture through assimilation
political

my

communities

that

I

have

in

may

itself

in fact ‘culture’— as

it

is

Meanwhile, however, the

perpetuate oppression. Thus for the

mind, both the option of eradicating a non-dominant

culture (through assimilation) and the option of preserving
a culture in any simple

way

are

problematic options. Furthermore, both of these options are typically
suggested or pursued
in the context

the

My contention

of movements for social change.

one hand) and the attempt

is

that both assimilation (on

to maintain traditional cultures (on the other hand) are

inconsistent with liberatory political change.

I

will point out that

when

stagnant and commodified set of practices and characteristics, that

down unchanged,

it

whose

is

a

a “thing” to be passed

serves to limit the possibilities available to people and as such

conservatizing force.
those

is,

a culture

However,

cultures are

I

will argue that a critique of culture should not

non-hegemonic towards a rejection of their

culture.

I

is

a

push

will

end the

chapter by suggesting an account of ‘culture’ that could ground political communities

without serving, as

I

will argue that ‘culture’ often does, as a reifying notion.
*

I

will begin

by defining the term

*

*

‘culture’ here in

accordance with

contemporary anthropologists, as including such things as the

its

art, literature,

use by
food, and

language of a group of people, and also their everyday ways of being-everything from
their

ways of moving through

space, holding their bodies, and gesturing to their
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ways of

arranging relationships, feeling emotions,
and so

obviously shared by groups
their locations; that

is,

who

on™

not only have the

Cultures, in this sense, are most

same

heritage or ethnicity but also share

cultures are enacted in particular communities
of place,

where

everyday practices are shared. These practices
may develop out of features of the place; for
instance,

all

members of one community of place may

things as living in a certain climate, engaging
in the

share practices that are tied to such

same

sort

of industry or work,

speaking the same regional dialect, attending the
same synagogue, or using the same
reservoir.

However,

at least in the

contemporary U.S., such communities of place are

largely obsolete, and yet shared ‘culture’ continues
to

communities or imagined communities
holds together a community of place.
lose touch with

go

I

carry

my

origins because lo

home on my back

in a

way

cement together what could be called

that is

As Gloria Anzaldua
mexicano

is

in

my

movements such

as the

still

system.

I

am

a

home

turtle,

I

did not

wherever

I

be called a culture. So one can think, for instance, of social

Chicano movement and

that are

says, “in leaving

community of tnexicanos who

their

corresponding communities (or

imagined communities) of people, as based on a shared

many communities

shared culture

(Borderlands 21 ). Even without living in a community of

place that shares a culture, she belongs to an imagined

continue to share what can

how

analogous to

culture.

In this sense there are

comprised of those who may think of themselves as “a people”:

Black communities, Jewish communities, Latino communities. By a further analogy, one
can include here communities of people

developed certain practices together or

who do

who

not share an ethnic heritage, but

collectively enact certain

who have

ways of being; so

there could be shared styles of dressing, attitudes, ritual events, literatures or other artistic

expressions, and so on,

community

(or

all

of which can be thought of as cultural practices;

in this sense, a

imagined community) such as a gay and lesbian community can be thought

of— and popularly

is

74 See James Clifford,

thought of— as having a corresponding culture.

The Predicament of Culture (230-236) and Raymond Williams, Culture and Society

for critical discussions of the history of the concept of ‘culture’ and the

anthropological use of the term.
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emergence of this contemporary

,

When

a culture

is

non-hegemonic, and especially when a culture

threat of annihilation or cooptation

country

white/anglo culture),

is

act of political resistance.

assumption

that

it

is

under a serious

under the forces of the hegemonic culture
(which

may

appear that the preservation of the culture

The promotion of “multi-culturalism,”

non-dominant cultures

in this society

need

to

in fact, is

in this

is itself

an

based on the

be practiced and celebrated

in

order to resist their erasure in the mainstream
or their disappearance into the elusive
melting

However,

pot.

the simple preservation of non-dominant
cultural practices

is

not

necessarily hberatory. Notice, for instance,
that every culture contains practices
that

perpetuate relations of dominance and subordination
along lines of group difference
the

members of the

among

culture. Preservation of traditional cultural
practices, then, includes

preservation of the practices of systematic dominance
and subordination.

A single cultural

practice might be understood both to be oppressive
and to be resistant to oppression. For
instance, Trinh T.

belong

Minh-ha looks

to cultures in

wearing a

She notes

veil.

the act of veiling.
precisely,

which

It all

women

that

may

veil

[i]f

traditionally

made (presumably by women who

wear

veils)

which such an

see dominance” (“Not

be done “in defiance of
veil

in

their

back on may mark the

the only problem,

it

Because

I

I

372).

women

more

Women’s

right to their bodies”

with a cultural identity,

fact that there are specific cultural

dominance and subordination.

itself.

think there are deeper problems with conceiving of cultures as unifying

communities,

‘culture.’

carried out, or

could presumably be worked on without calling into

question the desirability of culture

political

You”

is

another culture’s hegemony.

practices that, in identifiable ways, perpetuate relations of

were

act

men’s oppressive

But the problem with culture goes deeper than the

It this

between wearing or not

the act of unveiling has a liberating potential, so
does

women

(“Not You” 372); but putting the
in resistance to

choice to be

depends on the context

on how and where

removing a

at the

I

will turn

will argue that

when

now

to a critical

political

examination of the very concept of

communities are constituted or defined by a
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particular shared culture, the possibility for
true resistance to oppression depends
in part on

the possibility of the relevant culture’s
being one that can be “lived” rather than
one that

stagnant, reified set of practices and
characteristics that

have

little

room

Renato Rosaldo points

belief that “if

work

it’s

moving

it

to enact ‘culture’ as

ambiguous and
a political

out, the classic

isn’t cultural” (209).

something

away with

possibility of

that

For the

culture.

its

excludes being “lived.” For

norms of anthropology include

If

the

possible to reconceptualize and

it is

may

it

and recreated,

turn out to be useful to think of

The Spectacle

have developed a critique of culture

will also reject their

I

it

as sharing a culture.

Situationists 75

all

members can only consume, and

that is actively “lived”, created

B.

point, although

is

resistant to essentializing definitions,

community

The

a

for changing. This requires a
reconceptualization of ‘culture,’ for the

typical understanding of the concept of
‘culture’

instance, as

is

that

I

will use as a starting

assumption that there could be such a thing as doing

Situationists, the very

being something which

is

concept of culture precludes the

actively “lived” rather than

consumed.

Their

account highlights the ways in which cultures that are (as the Situationists say)
“spectacularized” harmfully limit the possibilities presented to people by their culture.

However,

the Situationists fail to see societies as anything but spectacularized; they

see resistance in

how

people live their cultures. Furthermore, their

rather than the revision— of all cultures requires

or unencumbered

self,

7

way

of being.

do face possible destruction, preventing

presuppose some sort of pre-social

As

I

will argue,

when colonized

this destruction requires

being able

is, members of the Situationist International (S. I.)— were a group who engaged
and action in France in the 1960’s. Their work continues to be actively taken up (and
contemporary anarchist theory and practice. See, for instance, publications such as Anarchy

-’The Situationists— that

radical thought

revised) in

to

call for the destruction-

a self that could conceivably exist apart from or without any social

context, without any culturally specific
cultures really

them

fail to

magazine, that draw on and develop some Situationist ideas.
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in

to see resistant

ways of revising

the culture-of keeping the culture alive

and

resistant to

spectacularization.

The concept of

‘culture,’ for the Situationists, is related to

phenomenon of spectacularization
Situationists,

such society

it

is

As

(of society).

the term ‘spectacle’

only through the spectacle that society

is reified;

because

it is

presented to

what they describe as the

its

is

is

presented to

members,

it

comes

used by the

its

members, and

as a thing outside of

themselves that they do not create (although they have the
illusion of creating

choosing different elements of

Debord,

who was

a

as a “social relation

member

it

from among a

truly

among people mediated by images”
The

5).

lived into something that appears, and can only be

or of

it

open range of possibilities). Guy

of the Situationist International

world which has become objectified” ( Society

as

(

(S.I.),

Society

describes the spectacle

4).

“a vision of the

It is

spectacle turns what

consumed-consumed

is

otherwise

as an image.

The

concept of the ‘spectacle’ was used by the Situationists:

to

come

to terms with a society in

by the image. The term
representation that
position

meant
According

to

it

‘spectacle’

commodity

be living and forced instead

commodity. As Debord

becomes

become commodities

To choose

to

(

to

simply consume

is

the

it

that

is

treat

they are

the Passage”).

when

capitalist

everything as a

moment when

one “chooses”

to

bear children, for example,

the

commodity has

this

consume based upon
is

to

“choose”

to

are presented to us.

among

be marked

The

the

choice, of

limited because only certain images are offered as possibilities, and the
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the

way, spectacular society forces

allows us to do nothing but choose from

commodified images— seeming alternatives— that
course,

(“On

life

Society 42). For instance, in spectacular

with the spectacular society’s image of ‘mother.’ In

people into passivity, for

it

a society of the spectacle

commodity, or

writes, “[t]he spectacle

attained the total occupation of social life”

that they offer.

to describe the idealized

culture produces of itself and the alienated

relations turn everything in the society into a

image

was deployed

provides for people as ‘spectators’ separated from the

to the Situationists, a society

society, life choices

which lived experience had been supplanted

Situationists believe that the

images dominate

possibilities outside of their limits.

Debord

to

such an extent that

we

cannot imagine

pictures a society of the spectacle as offering

only “[f]alse choice within spectacular abundance”
( Society 62).
Under
instead of creating or living our lives,

Ehrlich puts
life

(67).

it,

to

consume

we

we

but

it,

we

are bored, but

we

as a

passively

makes one

show

consume them. As Carol
a passive spectator in one’s

(of our lives)

which we cannot

leave;

we

cannot actively choose to create something different. “The

the action unfolds,

is set,

think

social relationships

She speaks of the spectacle

can passively watch
stage

we merely

this account,

we applaud when we

think

we

are happy,

cannot leave the show, because there

is

we yawn when

no world outside the

theater for us to go to” (67).

What
are depends

is

important in spectacular society

on what we have, which

commodity. Debord describes the

which

into the definition of all

The

from which
function.

it

(

economy

now

appears to have such a

reached:

human

had brought

life

by the accumulated

leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing,
its

immediate prestige and

its

ultimate

Society 17)

way: culture

is,

for the Situationists, that

that the society of the spectacle takes;

particular society. That

is,

it is

which delimits

writes, “[w]hat

organization of

life in

is

the particular

a formulation of the possibilities within a

culture determines the specific structure and character of the

“alternatives” that are presented in a society as the possibilities from

Debord

life

realization an obvious degradation of being into

“having” must draw

all

we

Situationist critique of spectacularized society relates to their critique of culture

in the following

forms

how

depends on

present phase of total occupation of social

results of the

The

appear, for the value of what

phase of the domination of the economy over social

first

having.

how we

centrality of “appearing” as characteristic of the phase

the society of the spectacle has

The

in turn

is

termed culture

reflects,

which we can choose.

but also prefigures, the possibilities of

a given society” (“Report” 17). Culture, thus characterized, does not

allow people to actively create or live their

lives; rather, culture
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determines and reflects the

possibilities that are presented to people,

choose

from those

possibilities.

The

who

S.I.

are left only to passively

defines culture as: “[t]he reflection and

prefiguration of the possibilities of organization
of everyday

moment; a complex of aesthetics,
the life that
S.I.

feelings and

objectively determined by

is

its

consume or

life in

a given historical

mores through which a

economy”

collectivity reacts

on

(“Definitions” 46). Elsewhere, the

writes about culture:

The formative mechanism of culture
activities

which

fixates the living

from one generation

which

to another

thus amounts to a reification of

human

and models the transmission of experience

on the transmission of commodities; a

strives to ensure the past’s

domination over the

reification

future. (Canjuers

and

Debord 310)

To summarize,
all,

culture

is

the S.I has argued that there are

inherently conservative, in the sense that

traditions rather than the creation of

requires us to repeat past

ways of being

changing social conditions may
has

become commodified, such

spectators/consumers of culture

commodity must

In response to these
life”

call for

which

it

constructions of

life;

instead of creating

partaking of a culture

new

ones, despite the fact that

changed ways of being. Secondly, culture

Debord

itself;

culture. First of

favors the preservation of

that the existence of culture forces us to

also turn into the star

193). Culture, as society’s

everyday

new

two problems with

image of itself, must be consumed
problems with culture, Debord
is

be

writes, “[cjulture turned completely into

commodity of the spectacular

will eradicate all that

itself

termed

society”

(

Society

as an image.

calls for a “revolution in

‘culture’

and

will create in

conditions in which the present dominates the past and the creative aspects of

its

life

place “the

always

predominate over the repetitive” (“Perspectives” 75). Because they saw culture as

something

that is entirely without value (or rather, of negative value), the S.I.

complete destruction of anything

everyday

life is to

be begun, the

situations (thus their

that

S.I.

could be termed

‘culture.’

advocated

This revolution

in

argues, by what they term the construction of

name— Situationists).

Constructing situations involves purposefully
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and experimentally arranging and enacting
situations which, as “unitary ensemble[s]
of
behavior in time”(“Preliminary” 43), create
ambiances which take the “players”~or
livers ’-outside

situation

is

.

.

.

of the situations that are presented

made

to

be lived by

these constructed situations
life

by the

as defined

Before

I

and bringing

possibilities

begin to critique the

life.

To

the spectacle,

view

into

S.I.’s project,

is

possibilities that the spectacle

it

life as

and some of what we do involves resistance

really affected

is

is

(or

is

by

it

to the spectacle.

script;

Acting
our

act according to the spectacle, are limited to run

along the same lines as the scripts that have been presented to us; when

we

watching ourselves act in accordance with

see ourselves as

enacting the authentic version of

this limited imagination,

some image

that

we have

their being acted out before,

over and over:

in the

we

witnessed.

these scripts as being imprinted in our minds, our memories, for

watched

in

equally) determined by

according to the spectacle can be thought of as acting according to a

we

more

a consumption of the spectacle—

do-is inaccurate; not everything we do

imaginations, to the extent to which

does

life.

will be helpful to have a

and how (and whether) one

describe everything about one’s

as the Situationists

“The

life.

the nature of everyday

can then be taken into everyday

concrete sense of what the spectacle

everyday

of everyday

constructors” (“Preliminary” 43). Playing with

done with the aim of both exposing

spectacle,

new

not provide, these

is

its

in the spectacle

are spectators

One can

we have

think of

heard and

media, in advertising, in tourist

brochures, in literature or stories, and (perhaps more than anything else) in the interactions
that

we

see take place between others. All of these are agents of the spectacle: they are

places where

come
being.

we view

others act, and

if

we do

to believe that these versions of reality

Some

practices that

activities in

we

everyday

life

are

not resist the messages presented to us,

all

we

comprise the authentic ways of acting and

more

scripted than others, for

it

is

only certain

see acted out over and over again. Intimate, embodied interactions, for

instance, are especially scripted.

We

these interactions, but the variety

is

have been presented with many seeming variations on

limited.

One may joke about how “canned”
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the typical

sex scene

imaginations:

when
one

the

is

a

is in

movie or a

television show, but these

One knows what

show

is

one’s

own

doing what qualifies

to expect after the kiss

life

may check

one

as, for instance,

which people engage often follow

woman,

woman,

in front

his

thumb on her cheek

when one

watching a show, but

is

one’s actions against the script to see

if

“romance.” The minute details of movement

the scripts.

sexual script for a man, facing a

canned scenes form our

For instance,

to take his

it

is

in

one minuscule part of a

hand and place

it

on the neck of a

of her ear, and to then maintain control by

directing the motions of her head with his hand;
in particular, he can direct her head

towards his for a

kiss.

Such a motion

signals “romance.”

It is

following such scripted

interactions that qualifies an activity as one of romance,
erotic play, sex.

much from

deviate too

the script

may no

longer believe themselves to be engaging in

We act as spectators in our own

authentic romance, erotic play, sex.

back from what we are doing and view ourselves with an eye
appear, on
steps

how

well what

we

where resistance

is

step

on how we

are doing qualifies us as engaging in a defined practice.

“tough dyke,” or “real Jew,” or “radical professor,” or “profound
enact.

when we

lives

that focuses

back and from the position of spectator evaluates whether one

image one might

Those who

Looking

at

what

is

fits

One

“good mother,” or

artist” or

whatever other

particularly scripted in one’s life helps to reveal

needed, and one can interpret serious deviations from the script as

resistance to spectacularization.

The

Situationists' project,

possibilities, is

which

is

aimed

entirely at the creation of

new

problematic in several ways. Not only do they ignore the possibility that

something of value could be

lost in the

process of destroying

all

“repetitive”-that

is,

repetitive of past or traditional-ways of being, but they also fail to recognize that the

project they propose
that

is,

is

inconceivable unless the self can

exist without culture,

without any culturally specific ways of being. Perhaps they are so embedded in a

hegemonic (French) culture
exist

somehow

many

that they

never actively recognize or take up the fact that there

distinct cultures, that their

own

culture
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is

only one

among many— that

they

themselves do not, in
position as
practices

fact,

avoid enacting culturally specific practices.

members of a hegemonic

which

are really their

own

culture leads

them

to

Perhaps their

mistakenly see as universal those

culturally specific practices. Failing to
recognize

themselves as having a specific culture allows them
to ignore what they might have

were

their specific culture to

unencumbered

to lose

be annihilated. 7 * Their theory needs to presuppose
an

a self free from social construction, separate from
any culturally

self,

specific social context, capable of creating

new

possibilities out of

nowhere. But no

practice-indeed nothing about everyday life-exists outside of
a social context, and with the
sociality of all practices necessarily

are the arenas in

which

comes

their cultural specificity, for all social contexts

specific cultures define or inform people’s

could be no such thing as living without culture as long as what

which describes not only the

artistic

and

is

ways of being. There
meant by

intellectual expressions of a

‘culture’ is that

group of people, but

also their everyday lived practices, including, for instance, their
language.

Furthermore, the Situationists do not consider what might be desirable about
cultural survival.

I

dangerous one, for

think that the S.I.’s suggestion that
it is

only certain cultures which really are

destroyed, through the assimilation of their
It is

members

not possible to live without culturally specific

wipe out particular

we endeavor to

cultures, to

in

into other,

danger of being

have members of a culture replace
If

colonization and imperialism-and consequent cultural

one looks

hegemonic) cultures

76 Thanks to

is

possible to

at the

contexts of

that

it

is

away with any

never culture

in general

always culturally constituted), but only specific (non-

that are destroyed.

Amie Macdonald

cultures.

hegemony-in which

The danger becomes evident when one recognizes

can be destroyed (the self

is

for this point.
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a

their cultural practices

spectacularization takes place, one will see the dangers in trying to do

that

it

is

lost or

more hegemonic

ways of being; however,

with practices that are specific to a different culture.

culture.

destroy culture

C. Spectacularization and t he Relations
between Cultures

The

Situatiomsts describe the

phenomenon of spectacularization

which we (namely members of a society of the
spectacle)
our social position

may be

power

all

victims, no matter

within our society and no matter what the
relation

between our own and other
the

are

as something of

cultures.

Debord does mention

to define the spectacle of other societies

may

what

be

that imperialist societies

have

(“The society which carries the spectacle

does not dominate the underdeveloped regions only
by

its

dominates them a^ the society of the spectacle ” [Society

economic hegemony.

It

57]), but this observation only

leads the Situatiomsts to see a colonized culture
as yet another culture that should be done

away with on account of its being

They do not

spectacularized.

of culture for members of colonized cultures can mean
loss of
the colonizing society’s culture. Indeed, as long as
they

also look at

how

the loss

identity, or assimilation into

assume

that a self

could exist

without culture, free from social context, they do not have to
recognize the loss of one’s
culture as a death of one

spectacularized leaves

s self. 77

Their look

them believing

be destroyed. 78 However,

it

is

how

at

colonized cultures are also

that all cultures— including colonized cultures— should

imperialism and the colonization of some cultures that

intensifies or creates the spectacularization of these cultures; but
imperialism

colonization also intensifies the need for finding a

way of living

and

these cultures.

Imperialism demands that colonized cultures be made consumable, and not only
the sense
culture.

which

the Situationists describe,

where members of a society consume

in

own

their

Colonized cultures are also often made the object of consumption of the members

77
Thanks to Maria Lugones for pointing this out.
78 For instance, in
their “Address to Revolutionaries of Algeria and of all Countries” the (French)
Situationists write that although the “movement drawing the Arab peoples toward unification and socialism
has achieved a number of victories over classical colonialism,” they should still, for instance, “finish with
Islam, manifestly a counterrevolutionary force as are

all

religious ideologies” (“Address” 151).

Situationists fail to see here are the implications of their (as

members of

Algerian revolutionaries to abandon their Islamic [and colonized] culture. While
as a religious ideology, includes beliefs or practices

mean

the

it

may

be true that Islam,

which under some description of what counts as a

revolution would be considered to be counterrevolutionary,

context of colonization would just

What

the colonizing society) telling

it is

also true that

abandonment of Islam

in the

assimilation into the colonizers’ culture— also quite probably a

counterrevolutionary move!
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ot the colonizing culture.

exotic spectacles

Images of some colonized cultures become

whose very value derives from

the prevalence of “ethnic food” restaurants

World

how

countries attests to

readily

and import stores

filled

they

For instance,

become

in the U.S.

with artifacts from Third

consumable dominated cultures have been made by

U.S. imperialism. The colonized cultures
artifacts

their exoticism.

artifacts;

come

to

be represented by a few symbolic

and images: Mexico (lumped together with the

rest

of Latin America)

is

burritos

and sombreros, sunny days by warm oceans where
smiling brown people serve drinks on
a platter, and latin lovers
the rest of the

Orient

)

who romance you

is

fans and

little

to the tunes

black shoes, egg

people, and seductive, willing and deferring

consumed by members of a dominant
or images of

them

in

a grouping

It

latin

rolls,

women. These

society

if

music; China (together with

swarms of small yellow

artifacts

and images can be

they are imported (either the actual artifacts,

media) or through the practice of tourism. 79

But something must be done
consumption.

of

to

a living culture before

it

is

suitable for

must be reduced from a continually changing grouping of lived practices-

whose boundaries

are never clear-cut and are always in flux-and

made

into a

definable set of characteristics and artifacts which can then be said to constitute a
particular
culture.

Edward

Orientalists

this

purpose

Said, in Orientalism describes the process through
,

have made
is

“to

all

make

of the “Orient” consumable.

which Western

A practice of Orientalism that serves

out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every

generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom,

or type; and above

people

who

all,

to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts” (86).

are described

by Orientalists must be reduced

consumed; they must be describable

to spectacles that

as, for instance, characters in a

The

actual

can be

play that can be

watched. As Said writes,

79 “Modern mass tourism presents cities and landscapes
not in order to satisfy authentic desires to live

in

such human or geographical milieus; it presents them as pure, rapid, superficial spectacles (spectacles from
which one can gain prestige by reminiscing about)” (Canjuers and Debord 308).
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Underlying

all

the different units of Orientalist discourse
...

is a set of
representative figures, or tropes. These figures
are to the actual Orient ... as
stylized costumes are to characters in a
play; they are like, for example, the

cross that
in a

When

all

Everyman

commedia

will carry, or the particolored

dell' arte play.

(

71 )

aspects ol a culture can be represented by a few
symbolic artifacts and images, the

whole culture can be acted out as a play
culture can be

The

consumed

as a play

characters, of course,

recognizable, or the play

is

is

filled

with recognizable characters, and so the

watched.

must wear a

Thus when

ruined.

American consumer of colonized
to see this

Mexican

Anglo-American

as he really

there are

is,

the

Mexican wears

Guatemala

that has

many language

must

either

is

that they are

a baseball cap instead of

no longer “authentic”; the Anglo-

fill

in the

missing sombrero and

go

for experiencing the “authentic” in the culture

For instance, the town of Antigua, Guatemala

schools, shops and restaurants that cater to U.S. (and European)

who

live there

have been changed

what they wear, whether they speak English, what goods they produce
of their interactions with these students and

who come from

one of the

is

been drastically (and visibly) affected by U.S. imperialism:

students and tourists, and the Guatemalans

tourists

fail

or must dismiss this character as not really Mexican.

tourists very predictably

they are out to view/consume.
in

cultures

costume so

particular

a sombrero and plays rock music instead of Salsa, he

towns

costume worn by Harlequin

tourists.

Seeing

this,

many

Guatemalans who exhibit “pre-imperialist”

is

terms of

by

to sell, etc.)

all

students and

the U.S. decide to spend their time in a different

town, one with more “authentic” Guatemalans. The assumption here

(in

Guatemalan

that only

characteristics are real Guatemalans,

and

therefore they are the only ones suitable for consumption as representatives of a

(supposedly disappearing) culture. In another village
los indigenas

have discovered

the authentic: they dress

up

in

how

in

to get a tiny bit of

what the

Guatemala called Santiago

money from

tourists consider to

Atitlan,

the tourists’ quest for

be the traditional indigenous

costume (hand woven and embroidered outfits— trajes- complete with exotic headpiece;
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indeed,

it

is

the traditional clothing of the people of this
village, but

what they would continue

to

wear everyday were

it

it

not necessarily

is

not for the effect that tourism has had in

creating this image as the spectacle of “authentic
indigenous,” and in any case, their

wearing

it

now

has a different meaning than

commodified) and charge a few cents

same person could stand
is

in the

it

would have had

for each tourist

same spot

in

their culture not

who wants

to take a

The colonized
consumable. Not only

its

members,

then,

must

fit

the proper

the colonized culture spectacularized to

is

is

the colonizers, but the particular spectacle

the perfect

must be one

make

image

it

to

consumable by

that the colonizers find desirable to

sisters

radical friends

love to

own

walking

pictures of us

to the fields in hot

with straw hat on head

bandana

if

in bright

embroidered

if

sun

brown

black
shirts

holding brown yellow black red children
reading books from literacy campaigns

smiling (63)

But

if

the spectacle

is

altered a

smiling-then the image

less

is

Our white

little

— for

instance

if

the people in these pictures are not

consumable. Carrillo goes on:

sisters radical friends

should think again.

No

one smiles

at the

beginning of a day spent

digging for souvenir chunks of uranium
or cleaning up after
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it

way

be

consume. As Jo Carrillo writes,

Our white

for

consumption.

later

culture and

photograph. The

Western clothing and never earn a penny,

only the authentic spectacle that makes a desirable photo, and the
photo

of capturing the spectacle for

been

our white

sisters

radical friends (63)

Of course,

the spectacle can co-opt almost anything

the people in the pictures

ot

and make

it

consumable; thus, even

were not smiling, the image might just become a

consumable spectacle;

for instance, pictures of crying babies

different brand

on the backs of

overworked, unhappy mothers become a spectacle of
“poverty,” which
romanticized and consumable image. In any case, the
colonized culture

and

is itself

is

is

molded according

to its consumability for the

a

represented by

for the colonizing culture in order to serve the
purposes of colonization; the

the colonized culture

if

image of

members of the

colonizing culture. The demands of imperialism and colonization
guide the process by

which colonized cultures are commodified as they

are

made

suitable for

consumption by

the

colonizers.

One
tendency

to

result of the

domination and colonization of a culture

be spectacularized

can only be the preserved,
to

in the sense

authentic’

Colonized society
succeed

is

in creating

an intensification of

its

of being preservative of the past; ‘culture’ here

ways of being, ways

such an extent that they are no longer creative. Albert

society as “calcified”; as he writes in

is

The Colonizer and

that are repetitious

Memmi

of the past

describes colonized

the Colonized

:

a diseased society in which internal dynamics no longer

new

become

structures. Its century-hardened face has

nothing more than a mask under which

it

slowly smothers and dies. Such a

society cannot dissolve the conflicts of generations, for

it

is

unable to be

transformed. (98-99)

This stagnation of culture comes about

image

to maintain as the

in part

because the spectacle captures a stagnant

commodity. Said argues

that this has

happened with

of the Orient; Orientalism “views the Orient as something whose existence

is

the cultures

not only

displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West” (108). The images of the
Orient that are consumable by the

West

are

images of the “authentic” and ancient Orient;

contemporary, and changing, feature of Oriental culture has not been scripted into the
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if

a

spectacle of the Orient, then

indigenous Guatemalan
tourist’s

will not be sought after for

who dons Western

clothing,

become defensive

the culture

in

such a

change and grow

80
.

way

will not

be a proper target of the

to change, lest

Thus

the

it

two problems

being instead of creative of
I

cease to function to

Defending a culture from outside attack reinforces
it

appears that the culture cannot risk being

be wiped out completely.
that the S.I.

commodities under the spectacle, and

(although

may

that internal criticism

the tendency of culture to be conservative,
for

open

it

consumption. Like the

camera. Furthermore, cultures that are under
attack and that face annihilation from

colonization

make

it

new

will later argue that

claim exist for

all

cultures-that they

become

that they are conservative of past (traditional)

possibilities-seem to exist

one can also see resistance

at least for

ways of

colonized cultures

problems from within

to these

colonized cultures). These cultures are particularly commodified
for they are constructed to

be consumed by the colonizers, and also by the members of the
culture

which the commodified image of the culture

may become

is

internalized

to the extent to

by them. And these cultures

especially stagnant and conservative both because the spectacle of
these

cultures sells only

if

it

presents an image of the “authentic” (that

is,

ancient and

unchanging), and because being defensive against outside attacks makes
members of these
cultures not open to criticizing and changing their cultures.
S.I.’s critique

It

might seem

of culture seems to apply to colonized cultures, their

that

because the

call for the eradication

of culture should be especially pertinent here.

But

at the

same

possible annihilation.

of the

time, colonized cultures are the only cultures that really

And

members of these

losing one’s culture for

annihilation of colonized cultures really just

cultures into a

members of colonized,

experience of losing one’s culture
like

what the

hegemonic

Situationists

in the

culture.

What,

means

then, is the

or non-hegemonic cultures?

context of colonization,

imagine to be the liberating

assimilation

harm of

The

would argue,

possibilities in

80 On this point, see Maria Lugones’
“Hispaneando y Lesbiando.”
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I

do face

lived

is

nothing

doing away with

anything that can be termed

Because they presuppose an unencumbered or
pre-

‘culture.’

social self, a self that can exist without
culture, they see losing any (spectacularized)
culture

as an act of liberation. But
social contexts,

and

if

if,

to the contrary,

it

is

the case that the self is constituted in

the term ‘culture’ describes the everyday
practices that form people’s

self-identities in these social contexts, then the
lived experience of losing one’s culture is

more an experience of death, death of one’s
to

colonized cultures that there

is

the

self or identity.

most urgent need

If this is so,

then

is in

it

to conceptualize ‘culture’

regard

without

spectacularization.

D. Cultural Annihilation and Assimilation

When

a

non-hegemonic culture

culture, but rather they

release people

become

is

annihilated

its

members

are not left without

assimilated to the hegemonic culture; this does nothing to

from the non-liberatory aspects of culture, and

it

meanwhile forces

colonized people through a loss of identity. The hegemonic culture
this process,

some

it

just

becomes more thoroughly hegemonic.

cultures that takes place (or

is

in

In this

is

the

never annihilated

in

way, the annihilation of

danger of taking place) through colonization does

not help liberate anyone from the spectacle; instead,

it

is

a replacement of one spectacle with

another.

With
survival

mind,

this in

come

I

want

to

back up now

on people’s

culture-it

is

look

at

how

struggles for cultural

out of the recognition that erasure of colonized cultures

oppression— of systematic harm done
effects

to

to a people as a

a form of

way of subjugating them. Given

lives of losing their cultures— and being assimilated into a

clear to

me

that struggles for cultural survival are necessary,

erasure of colonized cultures

is

anything but harmful.

and

One might be

would be unable

the

dominant
that the

a part of a process of oppression. If one were to

resistance to spectacularization, as the S.I. does, one

survival constitute

is

fail to

see

to see culture as

led to believe that although struggles for cultural

ways of resisting colonization and oppression, they
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are at the

same time

simply struggles for something
to argue that this

way of

(i.e.

culture) that

need not be the case;

rather,

not at

is itself

all liberatory.

I

would

like

one can see resistance, and one can find a

fighting for cultural survival to be fighting
for a living culture, not a spectacularized

and consumable one.
I

will look briefly at an

in order to

be able

to practice their cultures,

context where there
assimilation

example of what

is

must

mean

for those

fight the effects of colonization.

One

U.S. Latinos.

Many

of the ways in which Chicano

and Latino cultures are under attack by members of the
dominant Anglo culture are
Perhaps most obviously, Spanish

Many Chicano and
to

be spoken

to

is

is

not honored as a legitimate language in the U.S

a part of

sometimes even when

Chicano and Latino cultures

wipe out completely, other aspects

bought up-by Anglos
of “art” which
expressions

is

who

of, for instance,

co-opt them for their

become circumscribed by

own

that

it

seems

that

Chicano culture

The colonization of Chicano

fight to

stagnant, co-opted culture that the

experienced as loss of

self.

When

remain alive-it

Anglos would have

the vast

art 82

is

be

it

its

.

and

numbers of wealthy
culture creates a

fighting against being the dead,
83
.

Loss of culture

one cannot eat the food of one’s

language, go about one’s day according to

way

Chicano

distorted) a tradition of building with adobe,

Anglos who are moving

must

is full

artists’ possibilities for artistic

the anglo definitions of authentic

to the Southwest.

like

over-

consumption. The Southwest

accommodate

that culture

Anglos would

are taken

create out of adobe monstrous buildings to

where

81
.

present are native speakers.

all

sold as native or traditional, and Chicano

Anglos have taken over (and grossly

situation

clear.

U.S. Latino children do not learn to speak Spanish. Spanish
tends not

in public contexts,

While Spanish

who,

an active struggle against cultural colonization and
subsequent

among Chicanos and

is

particular cultures can

concept of time,

culture,

is

speak

move through

its

space in the

particular to one’s culture, and so on, one can experience a death of one’s self, one’s

81

Witness, for instance, how many states have passed or are trying to pass “English Only” laws.
82 See Sylvia Rodriguez,
“Art as Racial Inscription,” Radical Folk Winter 1993.
83 For a description
of the effects of colonization on a Chicano community, see Lugones’ “Hispaneando y
.

Lesbiando.”
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whole

identity. Culture affects

every

of her (Indian and Chicana) cultures,
in

my

voice

my

speech rhythms

must even be the way
Anzaldua
(59).

writes,

The

I

sweat!

my

Why

[ejthnic identity

how

“[i]t’s in

the self

my

my

damn

my

face
it’s

mother's voice

near everything!” (42).

twin skin to linguistic identity— I

whose

And

Because

I

I

possibilities are continually created

am led

to think

I

as Gloria

am my

language”

some way

also see the conservative

about the potential for a culture

and recreated out of the

lives

of the people

who

rather than a culture that defines and limits the lives of these
people by

presenting them with “false choice within spectacular abundance.”

by looking

it

Lived

see enforced assimilation as unacceptable, but

maintenance of tradition as unacceptable,

it,

legs ...

cultures are under attack.

E. Culture as

at resistance that

people already engage

To do

Anzaldua present ideas evocative of possibilities

this

I

will begin

in to cultural death: resistance to the

stagnation and the commodification of culture. Both Henry Louis Gates

that

my

the shape of

it's

can be lived and created rather than consumed-is
the necessity of keeping as

living selves the people

practice

blood,

necessity for cultural survival-and therefore
the necessity for finding

that cultures

whose

formed. As Anita Valerio says

is

dreams and memories

it’s

is

of

bit

Jr.

and Gloria

for living cultures, particularly cultures

have already been significantly affected by colonization. They offer ways of thinking

about traditions and/or cultures as constituted by change and ambiguity or multiplicity of

meanings, revisions and indeterminacy, rather than by unchanging essences
cultures to be formulated or defined.

Gates’

American
tradition

The Signifying Monkey

literary tradition,

is

I

an account

that allow

will first discuss Gates.

is

in part

an account of what constitutes the African-

that reflects significant resistance in

developed; Gates’ account leaves

this tradition

of being continually created and recreated, that

be useful here, for what he writes about a

is,

lived

by

open
its

the

to staying alive in the sense

participants. His account can

literary tradition parallels
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how

what might be said

about the culture to which

this tradition is

connected (as well as other colonized cultures).

Gates draws on the relation between the black
vernacular tradition and the African-

American

literary tradition

because he

is

particularly interested in seeing

how

language

plays a central role in constituting (and being
the realm of revisions within) a tradition.

would

like to

tradition to

extend his work by transferring his ideas about what
constitutes a

make claims about what might

African-American

literary tradition

culture: the black vernacular.

language as the realm that

is

As

I

I

literary

constitute a culture. Indeed, his theory of the

comes out of what
will argue later,

I

is

a piece of African-American

think that his exclusive focus on

constitutive of a tradition

is

problematic, for

it

blinds

him

to

other realms that both provide the basis for the cohesiveness
of a tradition and provide the

source for changes within a tradition. For instance, social and
political forces affecting the
lives of those participating in a tradition manifest

To broaden

content of the tradition.
political forces that

themselves as changes

his theory to allow for a focus

shape a tradition or a culture,

it is

in the

form and

on the social and

necessary to look

at

more than just

language, and to consider the culture, rather than just the literary tradition that
springs from
the culture.

Gates conceives of the African-American
of revisions that authors

honor and pay homage
here
the

how (mocking and

make on one

another’s work, revisions that

to (or both) a previous author.

yet drawing

myths of Esu-Elegbara and

American

literary tradition as constituted

on

his

academic

the Signifying

I

am

may

by a chain

either critique or

not going to describe in detail

tradition) he extracts his theory

from

Monkey-figures from African and African-

(respectively) cultures-but rather will just say that

two important

features that he

sees about these trickster figures are that they deliver meaning figuratively rather than
literally,

and

The myths

that their

reflect

myths

are characterized

on meanings within

ambiguous and open

by an indeterminacy of interpretation

their cultures, but

always leave these meanings

to multiple interpretations; they never deliver
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(ch. 1).

one

literal

meaning.

Furthermore, Gates argues, central to the
African-American
practice of “Signifyin(g)

of the Signifying
literary theory,

metaphor
redo

it

Monkey

a practice that
tales.

comes out of the black vernacular and

Signifyin(g), as Gates applies

for textual revision” (88).

s

own work

To

to

the focus

African-American

Signify upon someone else’s

own work and

is

(51).

work

is

It is

“a

to repeat

it

or

the other author’s, and to

with a purposeful difference, a difference that might
serve as a

critique or that

might serve

Signifyin(g)

a playful and yet critical

is

it

can be described as “Repetition, with a signal
difference”

both to draw a connection between one’s

mark one

literary tradition is the

to

extend and compliment a feature of the other work.

members of a culture— speak back and

way

in

forth to

which authors— or

participants in a tradition,

one another, repeating and refiguring what

others have said, remaining within one identifiable tradition
(or culture) by repeating
specific shared uses of language (or other shared
characteristics), but

meanwhile not

allowing the tradition (or culture) to be statically defined, for the
revision

mth

is

always done

a difference a difference that serves to recreate and change the tradition
(or culture), to
,

perhaps set

it

off in a

new

direction. 84

Gates wants the African-American
series of revisions:

literary tradition to

be defined by no more than a

changes and re-creations. He writes:

84 It

is interesting that to the extent to which the practice of Signifyin(g)
— or revising with signal
differences— works against a tradition’s (or culture’s) remaining static and preservative of the past while
meanwhile repeating enough of its antecedents to remain identifiably linked, it is very much like what the
Situationists termed ’plagiarism.’ The Situationists saw plagiarism as a way of making ideas progress;
ideas could be taken up by one thinker where another had left off, and the thinking-changing and recreating-of the idea could thus continue. They counterposed this practice to the practice of quoting and citing

authors whose words and thoughts then remain static and unchanged in the process. “Plagiarism is
necessary. Progress implies it. It sticks close to an author’s phrase, uses his expressions, deletes a false
idea, replaces it with the right one” (Khayati 171). Similarly, Signifyin(g) takes up an idea and re-presents
it,

changed.

It

allows an author to walk a line between being completely without a tradition or antecedents

(an impossibility) and being confined within a tradition which
position which

would force

is

defined and presented by the spectacle (a

the author into producing, for instance, a pre-formulated piece of “authentic”

African-American writing). According to Gates, originality— i.e. lacking antecedents— has been a
complicated issue for African-American writers, who have frequently been accused of being “imitative”
It seems that what
which many African-American authors

rather than original.

place, then the tradition

is

is

really the case

write, but if

significantly not

is

Gates

that there

is

one of imitation,

is

an identifiable tradition within

right about the extent to
i.e.

stagnation.

Hurston: “Hurston proceeds to argue that what we really mean by originality
because ‘originality is the modification of ideas’” (118).
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which revision takes

Gates cites Zora Neale
is in

fact masterful revision,

Literary succession or influence.

which the

revision,

.

.

can be based on only formal

must be able

literary critic

to demonstrate.

demonstrations allow for definitions of a tradition.

Few

It is

clear that

what he wants

to

avoid

“Commonwealth”
is

literature.

a formulation of the tradition that forces

out of the participants’ lived practices (that

of their shared use
Culture,
tradition,

whose

its

it

is

to

is

is

found

open

historical

is,

their revisions

be conceived along the same lines

The

tradition

is

open

to

at

must

change.
literary

of meaning— meaning

amongst a people-but where

and change. Looking

its

Gates conceives a

like a shared universe

in the historical interactions

to revision, re-creation

that

such as

upon one another), out

language, where that language use

might be constituted by something

basis

meaning

if

of, in this case,

in rubrics

(120)

participants into an essentially defined set of
characteristics or practices.

come

These discrete

definitions of tradition

escape the racism, essentialism, or nationalism
often implicit
‘African” or “Jewish” or

literary

that

a culture as constituted by

changes (within the boundaries of some connections between people,
such as

shared [but changing] language and practices) instead of by an essential
characteristics that remain the

order to be the creators of

its

same over time refocuses one’s
revisions, instead of

Gates’ focus on a literary tradition leads
the basis of the tradition.

I

would argue

language may, to some degree, lose

its

that if

consuming

him

we

centrality

attention

set

on

of practices or

living a culture in

the culture as

to single out shared

it is

given.

language use as

are looking at other cultural traditions,

and become one among many defining

characteristics of a tradition or a culture. In fact, even in literary traditions,

I

think that

it

is

a mistake to focus on language to the exclusion of other characteristics; revisions in
content, as well as those in form, serve to change and re-create literary traditions. In any
case, since Gates’ theory calls for revisions, he himself

is

open

to

being Signified upon;

^See,

for instance, Jewelle Gomez’s description of “negritude” as a historically formed shared
understanding, not an essential set of practices. “During the Harlem Renaissance writers frequently spoke of
their ‘negritude’: a set of values, a style, a subtext that distinguished them culturally from the rest of

American

citizens.

‘Negritude’ was never perceived as a mere essence that could be distilled

of shaking hands or to the food we eat.
ability to shout out loud” (114-115).

It

was not only a shout
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in

down

to a

church but the entire history of the
,

way

and so

I

will repeat

him here with

a signal difference-the difference of looking at

more than

just formal revisions.

Gates provides a theory of

how

literary

works may be indeterminate, without

closure, double voiced; he thus generates an idea of

by extension, the culture

to

which

how

this tradition is tied)

a tradition of such literature (and

makes

itself difficult for the

spectacle to present as a packaged, pre-formulated commodity.
There are no essential
characteristics that can serve as the basis for a formulation— or an

African-American

literature or culture.

image— of,

A member of a culture that is conceived of as

constituted by the ambiguity and indeterminacy of revisions

simply consume the culture, for participation

in

it

upon revisions

now,

an example of

to

Gloria Anzaldua,

Chicano culture

in a

way

in

how such

is

not forced to

calls for active participation in the

carrying out revisions, making critical changes in the culture or tradition.
to turn,

for instance,

It

form of

will be helpful

a culture might be lived in practice.

Borderlands/La Frontera. offers a description of living her

that

is full

of resistance. For her, what began as resistance or

rebellion to her culture— to a culture that she describes as having betrayed her, directing and

limiting her possibilities while ignoring her desires-has transformed into a resistance

within her culture, a resistance that instead of throwing

away

her cultural practices and

values serves to both preserve and critically revise and sort through these practices and
values.

She writes of the

initial rebellion:

Era indiferente a muchos valores de mi
ni obediente. ”

And

“Repele. Hable pa’ tras
’

cultura.

No me deje de

Fuimuy hocicona.

hombres. Nofui buena

then of the transformation of this rebellion:

Ya no solo paso toda mi vida botando

que me traicionan. Tambien recojo

provado y

las

las

las

costumbres y las valores de mi cultura

costumbres que por

costumbres de respeto a las mujeres.

tolerance, for this Chicana la guerra de

Her own

los

.

resistance within her culture produces for

el

tiempo se ban

But despite

independence

is

my

growing

a constant. (15)

Anzaldua a culture-or perhaps more

accurately, a position in between, amongst, or at the margins of several cultures-that
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is

deeply constituted by change and
ambiguity. She
a culture of a borderlands world,
a

Working

against the tendency of

community

clashes that continually produce

with culture (that
Situationists

is,

would

customs-customs

and a lesbian-she embraces the cultural
sees herself as both doing

away

with culture that binds her with tradition-the
sort of culture that the

like to annihilate)

beliefs of Indo-Hispanics

I

and as creating culture-lived

I

(80-81).

.

culture: “I

am

challenge the collective cultural/religious
male-derived

and Anglos; yet

creation of yet another culture.
all

Texas-Mexico border.

to try to preserve old

new ways of being. She

cultureless because, as a feminist,

eradication of

woman

a Chicana tejana, and she writes
about

that is located at the

some Chicanos

that she experiences as oppressive
as a

is

am cultured because I am participating
Whereas

in the

the Situationists advocate the

culture because they conceive of culture as,
by definition, a pre-

formulated construction of a society of the spectacle,
Anzaldua experiences possibilities for
a culture being otherwise.

One

aspect of the culture that

clashes of the borderlands
instance, or

and

is its

Tex-Mex. Where

is

kept alive and changing because of the cultural

language(s): Chicano Spanish with

culture

traditional practices, languages

is

its

many

variations, for

conceived of as that which preserves “authentic”

must remain pure and unchanged by

social

and

political

forces that affect the nature of people’s lives. Chicano
Spanish violates this stricture.

"Chicano Spanish
Spanish

considered by the purist and by most Latinos deficient, a mutilation of

(55). Think, for instance, of the

spectacle of, say,
to learn

is

an

Mexican

unadulterated

culture,

wants

Anglo-American who, enamored of the

to learn Spanish. This

Anglo

Spanish— a Spanish whose words are

will typically

not, for instance,

want

mixed

with English words.

But Chicano Spanish

is

a border tongue

which developed

naturally.

Change,

evolution, enriquecimiento de palabras nuevas por invention o adoption have

created variants of Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje.

corresponde a un

modo de

vivir.

Chicano Spanish

language (55).
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is

Un lenguage que

not incorrect,

it

is

a living

The language of this Chicano

culture, then, is constituted

correspond to a (changing) way of

by revisions with signal

living.

Like Gates’

all

differences, the language(s) of

practices

within the loose boundary of

among

possibilities of organization of

what

Chicano
to

culture(s) are constituted

changing social and

political

some

historically shared understandings

put

a "reflection and prefiguration of the

and

a people.

If culture is, as the Situationists

46), then

that

literary tradition that is constituted

by revisions— new creations and changes-that respond
forces,

by changes, changes

is

everyday

it,

life in

a given historical

interesting in the situation that

moment”

Anzaldua describes

is

(“Definitions”

that there

for

is,

Chicanos, no one given prefiguration of these possibilities; rather, there
are several such

which

prefigurations,

are inconsistent with each other. This can leave a

Chicano

in the

interesting— and potentially fruitful— position of being able to see one
culture from the point

of view of another, and of having to actively create some mestiza culture out
of the
clashes. 86

As Anzaldua

Cradled

in

writes:

one culture, sandwiched between two cultures, straddling

all

three

cultures and their value systems, la mestiza undergoes a struggle of flesh, a

struggle of borders, an inner war. Like
reality that

people,

all

we

perceive the version of

our culture communicates. Like others having or living

in

more than

one culture, we get multiple, often opposing messages. The coming together of

two

self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference causes un

choque, a cultural collision .(78)

The

culture that

writes that the

It

seems

that

Situationists

emerges from

“numerous

this collision

possibilities leave la mestiza floundering in uncharted seas” (79).

such a position— floundering

were trying

emerges out of lived experience. Anzaldua

in

uncharted seas— is just the position the

to put themselves in

when

they went about purposely

“constructing situations” to take themselves out of the preformulated situations presented

by the everyday spectacle. What comes out of this borderlands world
86 By saying that this

is

a potentially fruitful position to be

in,

I

do not mean

position might also be an extremely difficult or painful position to be
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in.

to

is

a culture of

be denying that

this

ambiguity,
their

full

of elements that the tourists after the “authentic” will
never find described

in

guidebooks, for guidebooks cannot formulate the parameters
of such a culture enough

to present

as a spectacle; out of this borderlands

it

meanings, indeterminate origins: “To
borscht,

/

whole wheat

eat

live in the

crucial to

to base values

culture

s set

welcome

Borderlands means to

/

put chile in the

speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent” (194).

tortillas,/

*

It is

world come practices with multiple

*

*

the cultural collisions that produce ambiguity and to refuse

on what appears as (but cannot actually be) a

bounded

distinct, clearly

of values. Spectacular thinking calls for the production of only one show;

are asked to believe that there

is

collisions will force us to see

many

Communities

“no world outside the theater” (Ehrlich 67); but
worlds, worlds that cannot

interested in escaping the spectacle need to

all

be

welcome

in the

we

cultural

same

theater.

the experience of the

mestiza.

A culture constituted by continual changes and re-creations, or revisions, is
resistant to being spectacularized, for

it

cannot easily be delimited or formulated. Cultural

collisions-the effects of cultural domination and colonization-can

continually undergoing such revisions.
direction of assimilation

work

to put

having to actively create. There

is

It

may seem

work

to

keep a culture

strange that even changes in the

members of colonized

cultures in the position of

a line to be walked here between on the one hand

assimilating and undergoing a cultural death (an option that simply leaves one to have to act

out the hegemonic culture’s spectacle), and on the other hand ignoring the reality of the
lived cultures that are produced

by

social

and

political forces including forces

of

domination, and recognizing, instead, only the spectacle of ancient and “authentic,”
stagnant cultures.

I

am

not saying here that there

is

anything positive about

domination; rather, given the fact of colonization, given that

bits

this

of the colonizers’ culture

force themselves into colonized cultures, recognizing and affirming these colonized cultures
as living requires recognizing

and living the ambiguity of meaning-and the revisions
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in

cultural practices--that

come

out of cultural clashes, even clashes of dominance
and

subordination.

The new mestizo copes by developing
for ambiguity...

She learns

a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance

to juggle cultures.

operates in a pluralistic mode-nothing

is

She has a

thrust out, the

plural personality, she

good

the

bad and the

u §ly> nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does
she sustain
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else.
(Anzaldua 79)

Looking

at the position

experience of creating a
ambiguity.

One could

an active participant

new

of those caught in the middle of cultural clashes reveals the

culture out of contradictions, double-messages, and

work

also

at

in the creation

thinking of

that is at

also

may

political forces

To

keep oneself

the extent to

in the position of

being

cultures, without this necessarily

which

it

creates constantly

and cultural clashes, colonization creates a lived

reality

odds with consuming an unchanging, “authentic” culture (although colonization
intensely

commodify

cultures

and cause

colonized cultures to cling to the unchanging

who

to

and recreation of living

taking place in a context of colonization.

changing social and

how

their stagnation,

of their cultures); by throwing those

artifacts

experience cultural clashes into “uncharted seas,”

to actively create.

But colonization forces the changes

of the dominant culture.

I

and compel members of

it

puts

them

in the position

in the direction

of having

of further hegemony

suggest, then, a strategy of consciously, purposefully being the

creators of revisions in our cultures, and directing these revisions in liberatory directions

without losing the
tradition

it

tie

between the created culture and the universe of sense from whose

emerges.
*

I

argued

in earlier chapters that

*

it

is

*

necessary to reconceive of group identity

such a way that (instead of depending on essential characteristics of group members

in

in

order to unify the group) allows or encourages identities to be both hybrid and open to
continual change through

all

participation in the political

constitutive practices, including the practices that

community

itself.

In this chapter
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I

come

with

have extended the argument

so that

it

believe

applies not only to socially constructed
identities, but also to the concept that

is

frequently taken to ground such identity, namely
the concept of ‘culture.’

long as a constitutive community understands
priori in
to) a

its

will not

it

community,

namely the concept of

is

be enough

for identity

is

may

to

social,

includes everyday practices and

itself

and therefore

ways of being,

to

form

members deeply enough

necessarily culturally constitutive.

community

that

aims

is

a problematic basis

at liberatory

Thus

to

it

be a social being must be to be
that is truly constitutive-that

has been necessary to consider

change should conceive of the ways

constituted culturally within the community.

identity

must be conceived

way

never unencumbered

their practices, their values,

become

in a

is

cultural, context (and as long as

one

its

terms of (or analogous

by based on another problematic grounds,

community

that affects

in

simply argue that identity

a culturally constituted being). Furthermore, a

is

basis for unity to be found a

not dispensable, assuming that the self

always constituted within a

culture

its

While

I

what a

ground— must

‘culture’

also be significantly revised

is.
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argued that

have argued
it

a political

members

in earlier chapters I

that allows for hybridity, here

is,

and so on-

how

that its

order for a group identity to be so conceived, the ground for that identity— if
as a cultural

As

‘culture.’

Culture, however,

but

identity or

shared culture or even to be describable a posteriori

shared culture,

for political

its

I

is

that in

described

from the popular understanding of

CONCLUSION

Sources IV.

whom do you

With

believe your lot

is

cast?

From where does your strength come?

I

think

every

somehow, somewhere

poem of mine must

repeat those questions

Which

are not the same. There

that

not chosen

is

in the

beginning

we

that

is

a

given

is

whom, a where
and sometimes falsely given

grasp whatever

we can

to survive

--Adrienne Rich

I

have suggested

conception of the

self;

in this dissertation that

important to maintain a communitarian

following Aristotle and the traditional communitarians,

an account of the self as socially constituted
there

it is

is

descriptively accurate, and

I

I

believe that

also think that

normative value to recognizing the self as so constituted and to encouraging the

is

development and sustenance of the

sorts of

communities

in

which members

self-

consciously participate in each other’s moral lives rather than leave one another alone and
isolated in this respect.

demand
from the

I

have also argued against the assumption of or the

for unity in constitutive communities,
traditional

But the
in

However,

and hence

I

depart both from Aristotle and

communitarians.

call for unity

contemporary identity

does not end with the traditional communitarians;

politics

and also

is

to

be found

in the

presumed connection between shared culture and community.
call for unity,

whether

that unity

re-emerges

concept of ‘culture’ and the
I

have argued against the

be based on a shared socially constructed
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it

identity, or

whether
identity

its

roots be in a shared culture. In the case of identity
politics, the call for unity of

can be essentializing;

if

the basis for

membership

in the

community

is

the sharing

of certain essential characteristics of identity, then
difference can result in marginalization or
expulsion. In the case of a
culture,

community whose

maintenance of the culture

itself

unity derives from

its

members’ shared

can be conservatizing; the culture can remain

closed off from changes, preservative of the “traditional” or
the “authentic”; furthermore,

can come

to

be treated as an object outside of the people

changing lived

realities

live

it

and as such the

of these people do not serve to continually offer new, changing,

and ambiguous ways of conceiving of what

What,

who

it

then, are the alternative

shared between

is

models

for constitutive

members of a community engage with one another

members of the community.

community?

at the level

How can

of shaping each other’s

selves through the practices of the community, and yet allow this process of self
constitution to be continually open to change, impossible to predict a priori and fed by
,

elements that are not divided into the essential and the inessential, but that mix and create
hybrid selves? The self that

is

not to be fashioned by a

community

into a pre-defined “sort”

of a self (for instance, a “real” lesbian, a “real” Black, a “real” Jew-where to be “real” or
authentic

is

to

embody

such, uncontrollable.

members must be
control

who

the essential characteristics)

is

a self

who

is

unpredictable, and as

A community that is not to be based on the conceptual unity of its

willing to relinquish control.

I

suggest, then, resisting the urge to

one’s “people” are, to open wider the possibilities of

whom one

takes as

“one’s own.”
*

*

*

Irena Klepfisz contrasts critically what she calls the “inside”-namely inside the

women’s movement-and
world.

The

contrast

is

the “outside”-which she finds herself thinking of as the “real”

one of control versus lack of control: the inside

carefully controlled choices, or at least there

whereas the outside world

is

a world in

is

which

is

created through

the illusion of there being such choice,

it
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is

obvious that there

is little

choice and

little

control.

inside

is

Though

Klepfisz recognizes that the contrast

part of the real

world

too,

contro1 one

really a false opposition-the

though characterized by different attitudes-her
point

to critique the illusion that is created

—

is

on the inside of the movement; the

illusion is that

is

one

’

s

world, that one can control

who

one’s people are, that

whom one

works

with can be carefully chosen, that one can possibly
afford to choose. Klepfisz points out
that

on the outside-particularly

in the

world of working class people-choice and control

are impossible.

Klepfisz

first

describes the inside of the

wondering why she thinks of

world as unreal:

this

Not so much unreal

we want

we choose

work

to

To some

as sifted.

“movement” world-the
people

women’s movement, beginning by

it

we choose

with,

seems

we want

frequently difficult to make.

In contrast to

movement

is

with.

what goes on

And

We choose the

we want

to

work

None of this

to create.

on,

is

true to a greater degree than in the “real”
to these choices, coalitions are

We think we have

there are people

in the

The

a great degree.

the causes

world-the outside. Because we are so used

work

To

inside-is created through choices.

the feminist institutions

absolute, but certainly

degree.

we choose

women’s movement,

a choice about

not to

Klepfisz’s

work
life

whom we

with. (20)

outside of the

characterized by a lack of control:

I

have no control over the circumstances

job and usually take what

manageable

travelling

I

can

get,

in the office

in.

I

look for a

time— all the considerations surrounding work. But
in the office, just as

members of my

I

family, just as
all

work

hoping for a decent salary or benefits or

do not choose the other people

woman. These

I

come with

do not

birth.

select

I

do not choose other

who can

And working

be a Jew or a

circumstances

come with

the job. (20)
In fact, Klepfisz observes, there

people
than

is

who have just been thrown

among

those in the

a stronger and

more

unified “coalition”

among

the

together without choice (office workers, for instance)

women’s movement. And
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I

the unity of workers in an office does

not require sameness, precisely because the
office workers are not under the illusion that

they could choose each other; they take each other
as they come. Klepfisz writes: “Most of

[women workers

us
the
the

enemy

In the office,

is.

we

who

own”

if

rarely mistake

women’s movement, however,

take as “one’s

and

an office] know, even

in

we

are very different

what side of the

the idea that

we

line

are

all

whom one

one can control

leads to continual fighting within the

from each

is

who

other,

on”

In

(21).

willing to

movement about who belongs

does not:

We act as if we always
associate or join with

We are

have a choice.

insulted

someone we disagree with or

when asked

to

We try

as

dislike.

much

as possible to pick and screen those around us.

This

is

probably an exaggeration.

This

is

probably not an exaggeration. Look

apart, the trashing

choose.
If

Klepfisz

is

membership

And we

right both in that

We confuse who the

and back-stabbing.

frequently fingering each other.

at the in-fighting, the pulling

movements

or communities that attempt to control

are under a delusion that such control

in

choose exactly

is

really possible

and

to create the

when

just

it

will

be important

thrown

their

way

but instead want to

community (including exercising choice over who may

belong) requires, as Klepfisz puts
of Gloria Anzaldua,

is

that the attempt at

Having a controlled community, a

at control.

which members refuse what

how

is,

can’t. (21)

up the delusion of and the attempt

community

enemy

We act as if we can afford to pick and

such control has a damaging effect on members of the community, then
to give

real

it,

a sifting. This sifting stands in contrast to the attitude

she writes that “nothing

is

thrust out, the

good

the

bad and the

ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned” ( Borderlands 79). Pre-sifting, or the attempt at
careful control, pre-empts the possibility of standing at the conflux of different cultures-of
different configurations of the constitutive
possibility of identity being

community,

for all has

marks of

made and remade

identity;

it

interferes with the

unpredictably in the continued practices of a

been decided ahead of time;
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it

stifles the

growth of a

culture,

capturing
to

be

it

in history in a

and

identity,

While on

that

is

is

another sense in which control cannot be exercised
over

the sense in

one hand there

the

is

which one

inherits a past, a people, a set of practices.

the illusion that control can be exercised as

it

is

manifested

an attempt to preserve a stagnant past and refuse change,
on the other hand there

the illusion that

one has no past

unencumbered. According
tradition— one
identity

is

at all, that

one can choose an

to this logic, if

identity, as if

one has no past-if one

One can

free to self-create.

is

one captured by

that past in

also

not the bearer of any

choose— and therefore control— one’s

entirely

illusions are tenable.

is

one came

and one’s community. “One’s people” are whomever one chooses
them
But neither of these

is

authenticity and allowing nothing thereafter

real.

Meanwhile, there

in

moment of supposed

One

is

to be.

neither free of an inherited past nor

such a way that one can only watch

it

happen, standing as a

spectator as the culture or the defining identity animates itself in oneself.
*

It is

asking
or a

is

to

dangerous

to ask the

know whom

community

to associate with,

constitutive

this

motivation

marks of
is

such control can do; the control
fit

are

my

*

people?” question

whom to join

with. In part this motivation reveals that

“come with” any
But secondly,

“who

*

identity, for

suspect because
is

it

it

with,

if

the motivation behind

whom to

form a movement

one does not believe oneself to

presupposes that

ignores the

damage

all

can be chosen.

that the exercise of

a control of people, especially those people

who

will not

within the defining limits of a community based on certain essential elements of identity.

Furthermore, to live a
find

it

life

outside of the confines of a

community

that is so defined is to

impossible to predict what the political callings will be, for they are not given

advance by the defining identity of the community. To
calling the “outside”

Lorde makes

is

to

live

one’s

life

in

on what Klepfisz

is

be ready to act politically without having complete control. Audre

this point beautifully:
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Sometimes we

are blessed with being able to choose
the time

and the arena
and the manner of our revolution, but more
usually we must do battle
wherever we are standing. It does not matter too

much

radiation lab or a doctor’s office or the
telephone

if

company,

welfare department, or the classroom. The real
blessing

whoever
alone

Answering

the

if

I

am

wherever

needs be.

‘who are

my

(

I

am,

A Burst of

in concert
T

with as

it is

many

is

in the

the streets, the

to

be able to use

others as possible, or

ight 120)

people?” question cannot serve as a guide

in a controlled

process of picking one’s political companions,
precisely because the process of joining
together with others cannot be completely controlled

where

it

is

necessary to stand and fight wherever one

whomever.
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if it is

may

to take place within a

find oneself and with

world

APPENDIX
SENTIDOS DE COMUNID AD/SENSES OF COMMUNITY
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encuentro of the Escuela Popular Nortena, Valdez,

New

This workshop was prepared by Maria Lugones and
Lisa Tessman.

Sentidos de Comunidad:

Herramientas para pensar sobre redes comunitarias
y sobre politica de base comunitaria
Aquf incluimos algunas palabras utiles para pensar sobre distintos
sentidos de comunidad.
Varios de los terminos se pueden usar juntos para describir a
un mismo grupo de gente
como formando una comunidad. Usted puede usar cualquiera que le resulte util,
otro termino

o crear

si

Usted quiere, para poder caracterizar a

mente.

la

comunidad que Usted

tiene en

Comunidad de apoyo: un grupo de gente que se apoyan unos a los otros: se ofrecen
cntica, ayuda, apreciacion en sus projectos; a veces tienen proyectos
en comun, a veces,
los proyectos son individuales. Por ejemplo: un grupo de
amigos.

Comunidad de eleccion: un grupo de gente que se junta voluntariamente para un
comun. Por ejemplo: un grupo politico, un grupo de intereses comunes. Mas

fin

concretamente. un grupo de trabajo sobre cuestiones de salud de la mujer, un grupo de
ejercicios ffsicos, un grupo de concientizacion, una organization estudiantil
latina.

Comunidad de residencia: la comunidad en la cual uno vive y que puede contener
diversos grupos de gente. Los miembros de la comunidad pueden vivir en este lugar por
razones similares o diferentes, por ejemplo, por eleccion, por tradicion, por necesidad
economica o

privilegio, pueden estar forzados a vivir en esta comunidad o por otras
circumstancias. Por ejemplo: Valdez, Los Angeles Este, El Norte de Springfield, La
Prision de Mujeres de Framingham.

Comunidad de
(por ejemplo:

origen:

Buenos

la

comunidad en que una nacio. Puede haber nacido en un lugar
San Juan, el barrio de Phillips, el Bronx), un grupo

Aires, Valdez,

un genero o raza particulares, una religion (por ejemplo: catolica), una familia (por
ejemplo: la familia Garcia), etc. Uno no elige la comunidad de origen.
cultural,

Comunidad de destino/comunidad politica: una comunidad que Usted puede
formar con otros, o que puede hallar ya formada (aun si Usted entra en una comunidad ya
formada, pero participa criticamente la esta formando, asi que toda comunidad esta siempre
en un proceso continuo de formacion). La comunidad con la cual uno quiere echar su
destino Puede ser que esta comunidad no tenga conciencia de si-misma como comunidad,
pero al afirmarla como la comunidad de destino de uno mismo, esta afirmando su futuro
como una comunidad, y esta afirmacion es politica. Por ejemplo: las mujeres de color, los
pobres rurales, las lesbianas, los Chicanos, Los Angeles Este.
.

Ofrecemos estas maneras distintas de pensar sobre comunidad porque creemos que el tener
un sentido de colectividad-de comunidad— es central para hacer politica que no sea
individualista. Al pensar sobre los distintos sentidos de comunidad reconocemos que ya
pertenecemos a comunidades y que somos afectados por nuestra membrecia en comunidad
y reflexionamos sobre como eso nos afecta como personas politicas: ^Que conocimiento
nos da que poder contribuir a la lucha politica? ^Que experiencias hemos tenido dada
nuestra posicion particular en nuestras comunidades? El describimos a nosotros mismos
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dados estos distintos sentidos de comunidad, tambien nos
puede ayudar a pensar si
queremos formar nuevas alianzas, o crear cambiar nuestras
propias comunidades.
y
hstamos pensando al mismo tiempo sobre como es que las
comunidades en las cuales
nemos participado nos han formado
y como han creado en nosotros un sentido de
ldentificacion, lealtad, etc.
y sobre que comunidad queremos como comunidad polftica
donde encontraremos a nuestras companeros politicos. Por lo tanto,
decir que la polftica
necesita ser comunitaria en vez de individualista no dice lo
suficiente, porque aun tenemos
que pensar a que clase de comunidad nos estamos refieriendo.
^.Quienes son los miembros
de nuestras comunidades? ^Cual es la base de la comunidad:
un pasado comun? ; Un
proyecto comun? ^Un compromiso politico? ^E1 hecho que los
miembros viven juntos^
^Circunstancias o poderes mas alia de su control? Alguna otra cosa?
^Como nos han
i
tormado nuestra comunidad? ^Que clase de comunidades queremos afirmar
como
comunidades?
;

Por

de estos ejercicios es que somos gente polftica queremos tratar de
y
mal con nuestra sociedad para pensar en como cambiarla. ; Con quien
queremos cambiar a la sociedad?
lo tanto la idea

percibir lo que esta

Nos vamos

a dividir en grupos pequenos para hacer estos tres ejercicios que nos van a
hacer pensar y hablar sobre los cinco sentidos de comunidad.
1. Descrfbase a si misma brevemente usando algunos de
estos sentidos de comunidad. Por
ejemplo, alguien puede decir, “Una de mis comunidades de origen es la comunidad
Catolica, pero desde ese entonces he rechazado algunos aspectos del ser catolico. O, mi
comunidad de lugar es Valdez. Vivo allf voluntariamente con el proposito de hacer trabajo
politico. Otra gente que vive en esta comunidad incluye a los Hispanos cuyas familias han
vivido aquf por muchas generaciones, y anglos que se han mudado para explotar la belleza
del lugar, etc. Uno de mis comunidades de eleccion es la Escuela Popular Nortena, un
grupo de gente que he elegido como mis companeros politicos. Etc.”

^Quien es Usted en cada una de estas comunidades?
como piensa en cada una de
En particular, ^hay comunidades que promueven su ser resistente mientras que otras
lo atrapan en ser oprimido, en sus roles oprimidos? ^Hay comunidades que tienen en Usted
efectos opuestos a la vez? Por ejemplo, alguien puede decir, “Mi familia es una comunidad
pequena-parte de mi comunidad de orfgen-me ayuda a ser resistente a la opresion pero
tambien me hace participar en mi propia opresion y en la opresion de otros. Es un lugar
donde me volvf la persona que soy culturalmente-mi madre por ejemplo me enseno el
espanol mientras que otros ninos Chicanos no lo estaban aprendiendo-asf que es un lugar
que me da fuerza en mi compromiso de no dejar que se destruya mi cultura. Al mismo
tiempo, es un lugar donde soy testigo de abuso y a veces soy abusada-mi padre maltrata a
mi madre y tambien me ha pegado a mf. Algo que he aprendido de esto es que ser una
mujer significa sufrir una cierta cantidad de abusos y estoy tratando de des-aprender esto.
Por lo tanto, trato a veces de estar lejos de mi familia.”
2.

ellas?

^Hay alguna comunidad que no

tiene en su vida presente que querrfa tener; por ejemplo,
una comunidad polfticay -una conciente de si que la ayuda a mantener un
sentido politico de Usted misma y de su lugar en la sociedad? ^A Usted le parece posible
crear tal comunidad o trabajar dentro de una comunidad para cambiarla y que sea mas como
la comunidad de sus suenos? ^Con quien querrfa Usted hacer este trabajo? Que serfa
3.

('Tiene Usted

necesario para completar este trabajo?
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Senses of Community:
tools for thinking

about networks

&

community based

politics

Below

are some terms for thinking about different
senses of community. Many of the
terms overlap or can be used together to describe
one group of people as forming a
community. You can use whichever ones you find to be
useful, or create anotheFterm
you want to in order to characterize a community you have
in mind.

if

Community

of support: a group of people whose members support
each other: offer
sometimes their projects are in common,
sometimes they are individual projects. Example: a group of friends.

critique, help, appreciation in their projects;

Community of choice: a group of people that comes together purposefully and
voluntarily for a common end. Examples: a political group,
an interest group. More
concretely, a group doing work on health issues for women,
an exercise group, a
consciousness raising group, a Latino student organization.

Community of place: the community in which you live and which may, to one degree
or another, contain many diverse groups of people. The members
of the community may
live in this place for similar or for different reasons, for
instance, out of choice, out of
tradition, out of economic necessity or privilege, out of force,
or out of a variety of
circumstances. Examples: Valdez, East L.A., North End of Springfield,
Women’s

Framingham

Prison.

Community of origin: the community you were bom to. You can be born into a place
(examples: Buenos Aires, Valdez, San Juan, Phillips neighborhood, the Bronx), a cultural
group, a particular gender or race, a religion (example: Catholics), a family (example: the
Garcia family), etc. You do not get to choose your community of origin.

Community of destination/political
or found-already-formed, or both (even

community:
if

a community that may be formed
you enter an already-formed community, if you

engage

critically with it, you are in part forming it; so it remains continually in the process
of formation). The community with which one wants to throw one’s lot The community
may not have a consciousness of itself as a community, but in claiming it as your
community of destination you are affirming its future as a community, and this affirmation
is political. Examples: women of color, the rural poor, lesbians, Chicanos, East L.A..
.

We offer these different ways of thinking about community because we think that having a
sense of collectivity-of community-is central to doing politics which are not

community we can come to recognize
ourselves as already belonging to communities and being affected by our community
memberships, and we can think about how this affects us as political people: what kind of
knowledge does it give us to bring to our political struggles? what experiences have we had
individualistic. In thinking about different senses of

because of our locations in our communities? Describing ourselves using different senses
of community can also help us see whether our political visions lead us to want to form
new alliances to create or change our communities. We are thinking, then, both about how
the communities of which we are or have been a part have formed us or created certain
senses of identification, loyalty, etc. in us; and about what community of people we want
as our political companions. So to say that politics need to be communitarian rather than
individualistic does not say enough, for we still need to know what sort of community we
are talking about. Who are the people in our communities? What are the communities
based on: a common background? a shared project? a political commitment? the fact that
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members live together? that members have been thrown together by
powers or
circumstances outside their control? something else? What
sort of people do our
communities make us into? What sort of communities do we want
to affirm as

—

communities?

So

the idea of the exercises

We

want

we

are about to

do

is

We

“okay, so we are political people.
society and going about changing it

to say,

work on perceiving what is wrong in our
But who are we going to make these changes with?”
to

will work in small groups to do the following three exercises
and talking about these different senses of community.

that will get us thinking

Describe yourself briefly using a few of the different senses of community. For
someone might say, “One of my communities of origin is as a Catholic, but I
have since rejected many aspects of being a Catholic. My community of place is
Valdez; I
live here out of choice, for the purpose of doing political work.
Other people who live in
this community include hispanos whose families have lived here for
many generations,
anglos who have moved in to exploit the beautiful surroundings, etc. One of my
communities of choice is Escuela Popular Nortena, a group of people whom I have chosen
as my political companions. Etc.”
1)

instance,

What “self’ does each of these communities or ways of thinking about community bring
out in you? In particular, are there some communities that nurture your resistant self and
others that trap you into acting out an oppressed or oppressive role, that is, into being an
oppressed or oppressive self? Are there some communities that have several different,
perhaps contradictory or opposite effects on you? For instance, someone might say, “My
family is a small community-part of my community of origin-which helps me be resistant
to oppression but also makes me participate in my own and others’ oppression. It is the
place where I became the person I am culturally-my mother saw to it, for instance, that I
2)

learned Spanish even though many other Chicano children weren’t learning it-so it is a
place which gives me strength in my commitment not to let my culture be destroyed. At the
same time, it is a place where I witness and am sometimes subject to abuse-my father
mistreats my mother and has hurt me before, too. One thing I have learned from this is that
being a woman means suffering a certain amount of abuse. I’m trying to unlearn this, so it
helps to stay away from my family.”
3) Is there some community that
instance, do you have a political

you lack in your present life that you wish existed; for
community, a community which is conscious of itself as a
community and maintains a political sense of itself and its place in society? Can you
envision creating such a community, or working within a community of which you are
already a part so as to change it to be more like the community you envision? Whom would
you do this with? What would it require?
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